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ABSTRACT
French petroleum policies are of interest both in themselves, and as
an indication of possible future European attitudes towards the petroleum
sector. An analytical description of French petroleum policies and regu-
lations is presented. Of particular economic relevance are: (a) the
requirement that refining companies in France purchase French-produced oil
originating from the Franc Zone at comparatively high prices, and (b) the
protectionist measures which have been erected to shelter the French
market from both external and internal competition.
Two hypotheses are tested. First, that the artificial price premium
attributed to Franc Zone oil may have led to a misallocation of investment
in field development. A selective analysis of Algerian oil development
provides positive, though partial, evidence to this effect. Second, that
the sheltered competitive climate surrounding the French petroleum sector
may have led to monopolistic return opportunities. The French petroleum
market is shown to have indeed been among the most profitable in Western
Europe in spite of higher crude oil transfer prices practiced by the
country's refining companies. The cost of France's protectionist poli-
cies--borne by the country's energy consumers--is partially estimated at
more than $100 million per year.
Finally, an analysis of the rationale for government-sponsored oil
exploration, by a country such as France, concludes that the political or
security-related dividends which can be anticipated from such a program
are minimal at best, and can conceivably be negative. To achieve signi-
ficant economic returns from exploration, preferential fiscal conditions
must be secured from host producing countries. An analysis of ERAP's
agreements with Iran and Iraq indicates that their terms are in fact more
favorable to ERAP than generally prevailing conditions. ERAP's agreements
with Libya and Algeria, however, are more ambiguous in their evidence of
ERAP's ability to negotiate preferential terms for its oil exploration
program. Even an exploration program aimed at securing preferential terms
from the producing countries is shown to be subject to critical question.
An alternative and potentially more efficient route to low cost and
reliable oil supplies is suggested to lie in the establishment of a
balanced purchasing program associated with the promotion of competition
and structural diversity in a country's refining sector.
Thesis Advisor: Morris A. Adelman
Title: Professor of Economics
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"...(in) France, with its cult of individualism, the
constant challenge to the role of the state, and the
no less constant appeal to government, as well as
the omnipresence of judicial traditions, policy takes
the aspect of the classital French garden, which you
will no doubt remember, often includes a labyrinth."
Dominjon, G., "French Oil Policy,"
Institute of Petroleum Review,
November 1965, p. 386.
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INTRODUCTION
Western Europe has, in recent years, become increasingly dependent
on the imported supply of petroleum. The response of individual
European countries to their growing dependence on overseas energy
supplies, however, has been quite varied, some countries having taken
a far more interventionist attitude than others towards the petroleum
sector. The following study is set within the context of this diversity
in attitudes - a diversity which is expressed most strikingly by the
particular activism of French petroleum policies. The focal concern of
the succeeding pages is thus aimed at describing and evaluating con-
temporary French petroleum policies and achievements, in the hope that
this analysis may help to shed light on the public policy options which
are relevant and open not only to France but to most European countries
as well.
The fact that energy is of pervasive importance to an industrialized
society is not, in itself, sufficient cause for government regulation or
participation in the energy industry. In practice, official interven-
tion in the petroleum industry has been promoted on a variety of
grounds, of which the following two have been advanced most frequently.
a) Competitive forces in the petroleum industry are claimed to
be weak, giving rise to a monopolistic supply structure.
The argument in favor of intervention under such conditions
is reinforced if the inherent monopolistic benefits can be
shown to revert to foreign rather than national entities.
- 12 -
- 13 -
b) Petroleum resources are claimed to be concentrated within a
relatively limited number of exporting nations, raising the
possibility that external political factors could influence
a country's supply network. This is the well-rehearsed
security of supply argument, which has been used in many
instances to the benefit of non-competitive indigeneous
energy producers. Another facet of this argument has been
gaining currency of late - promoting the notion that the
international trade in petroleum should be elevated to
inter-governmental exchanges in recognition of the mutual
dependence existing between oil producing and consuming
nations.
Both of the above-mentioned conditions have indeed characterized
the international petroleum industry, though in varying degrees over time.
As a result, most of the major oil consuming countries have evolved
differing forms of national policies governing their attitudes and rela-
tionships with this industry. Perhaps the most well-known and contro-
versial is the United States mandatory oil import control program. In
Western Europe, the governments of the United Kingdom, Italy, France,
Spain, and others, have at various times and in different ways taken a
hand at directing the future of this industry in their respective
countries.
By and large, however, the major part of Western Europe's energy
requirements today remains in the hands of private oil companies, whose
-14-
sources of crude oil production are generally localized in the Middle
East and North Africa, and whose activities are not particularly subject
to European government intervention. But as Europe's indigeneous produc-
tion of coal retrogresses, its dependence on imported petroleum is ex-
pected to increase; and in this vision of growing dependence on overseas
oil supplies, certain European circles have seen cause for calling on
their respective governments to take a more active role in the oil pro-
duction, refining and distribution industries.
Among European nations, France has in recent years been singularly
activist in this regard. Its activism has been prompted by at least
two developments: the discovery of relatively large oil and gas re-
serves in Algeria, and, more recently a politico-economic policy which
has emphasized the achievement of "independence" in the more critical,
or strategic, areas of national life.
The development of French petroleum policy has taken place
against the background of the country's membership in the European
Economic Community. For some years the Executive Commission of the
EEC has struggled with the problem of harmonizing energy policies
among its member countries - a necessary step if the principles of a
common market are to apply to the Community's energy sector. But it
has met with very little success in this endeavor. Meanwhile, France
has steadfastedly pursued its interventionist policies in the petroleum
sector, while attempting to pursuade its European neighbors to follow
suit.
- 15 -
Contemporary French petroleum policies have to a significant ex-
tent been molded in response to the discovery of oil in Algeria (part
of the "Franc Zone") by government-sponsored French companies (later
merged into what is now known as the "Enterprises de Recherches et
d'Activites Petrolieres"-ERAP). These discoveries posed the problem
of developing commercial outlets for Saharan crude oil - a problem
which was compounded by the imperfections and the integrated structure
of the petroleum market. Crude oil was in over-supply creating a
premium on the ownership of "downstream" refining and distribution
outlets. The petroleum production potential in Algeria, however, far
exceeded the market outlets which ERAP's forerunners could conceivably
hope to control, thus creating what the French call "orphan oil." The
French Government's response to this state of affairs was the imposi-
tion of controls on the importation of crude oil into France, favoring
"Franc Zone" oil. And as a concomitant, controls on refined petroleum
products were given new vitality.
All the while ERAP and its affiliated companies extended their
activities by entering into the refining and distribution sectors in
France and elsewhere, and by embarking on a relatively sizeable over-
seas exploration program, now no longer uniquely confined to Algeria
or the Franc Zone.
The following study will be concerned with these aspects of
French petroleum policies - the promotion of ERAP's activities for-
ward into refining and distribution, and horizontally into a wide-
spread exploration program. Its central concern will be to appraise
- 16 -
not only the economic rationale for these policies but also their
potential economic consequences. Does the French example provide
a model to be emulated or to be shunned by other European countries?
In order to attempt to answer this question the justification for
French official action in the petroleum sector must be considered;
but equally important, the economic consequences which follow from
this action must also be identified and measured.
This study opens in Chapter I with a detailed description of
the complex of government controls and regulations which mold the
activities of the French petroleum industry. To my knowledge, no
analytical and comprehensive description of this mechanism has been
published to date. Much has been written on France's law of 1928 by
which a government monopoly on crude oil and petroleum product im-
ports was "delegated" to the private sector.1 But this law provides
no more than legal background and authority for the much more practi-
cal and economically relevant control system imposed by the executive
arm of government: the Direction des Carburants (DICA). One of the
consequences of this control system is that French refining companies
have had to pay an abnormally high price for French-owned oil pro-
duced in the Franc Zone.
Chapter II follows with a case history of the development of
Algeria's oil industry. The focus of analysis in this chapter is
aimed at determining from available evidence whether French crude
1Cf. Touret, Denis, LeRegime Francais d'Importation du Petrole
et la Communaute Economigue Europeenne, Librairie Generale de Droit
et de Jurisprudence, Paris, 1968.
L
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oil import policies may have led to a misallocation of investment re-
sources at the field development level - whether as a result of the
sheltered and high priced crude oil outlet which is made available to
it on the French market by government action, ERAP may not have in-
tensified its field development activities beyond the competitive
breakeven point.
Chapter III shifts the scene to the metropolitan French refining
and distribution markets. The possibility that French petroleum im-
port protectionism may have provided the country's oil companies with
abnormally high return opportunities is examined. The analysis pre-
sents positive evidence to this effect, and an approximate estimate
of the resulting cost to French energy consumers is derived.
Finally, Chapter IV presents a critical appraisal of ERAP's ex-
ploration program. The justifications which have been advanced in
favor of this program have been plural, but the most potent, from the
French point of view, relies on the possibility that ERAP's explora-
tion agreements may allow France access to low cost oil. The possibil-
ity that ERAP may discover lower real cost oil than that associated
with the large reserves already discovered in the Middle East is at
best low. However, it is not unreasonable to expect that ERAP may
be able to induce the oil producing countries to grant it preferential
terms, either because of political, or market oriented considerations..
thus giving it potential access to low "tax-paid" cost oil. ERAP's
exploration agreements with Iran, Iraq, Libya and Algeria are con-
sequently analyzed in this chapter to determine whether this pos-
sibility may have found expression in practice.
___ iih im ~j~~-~--
CHAPTER I
THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
.1
CHAPTER I
THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
HISTORICAL NOTES
From its earliest days, the French petroleum sector has been the
object of government intervention. By the early 1870's, already, a
protective duty had been imposed by France on petroleum product im-
ports. Although the primary goal of this levy was to provide a source
of government revenue, it also led to the edification of an embryonic
and indigeneous refining industry.
The "refineries" which were built at the time, however, did no
more than a minimum amount of processing, as they relied on the im-
ported supply of a pre--processed mixture of products, dubbed "French
crude." France's oil companies of the time had jointly entered into
an exclusive supply agreement with the Standard Oil Company, in return
for the latter's assurance that it would not compete with them on the
French market. As a means of circumventing the country's tariff barrier,
Standard Oil created a petroleum product mixture, which was allowed the
same preferential entry into France as natural crude oil by the
country's customs authorities, and hence came to be known as "French
crude."
By 1903, the French Government had reversed its protectionist
stand. At least partly in recognition of the ineffectiveness and un-
desired consequences of its initial measures on this front, the
country's external tariff duty was progressively brought down. This
- 18 -
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led to an increase in the country's imports of finished products to
the detriment of those of "French crude." Furthermore, a "produc-
tion surtax" was imposed, whose effect was to further increase the
incentive in favor of product imports.
Within a further few years, however, the French Government re-
turned to its initial interest in promoting the development of the
country's refining industry. From 1919 to 1928, a succession of
decrees and laws were passed to this effect. As a result, the State
was given a monopoly on the import of crude oil and products, a
monopoly which in turn was delegated to private industry through the
issuance of periodic "import authorizations" covering both crude oil
and petroleum products. Refineries located on French soil, moreover,
were placed under a special regime. These were considered to be "in
bond" (usines exercges), and the shipment of petroleum products from
them into the French market was officially considered to be an import
transaction.
A new structure of import duties was also erected during this
period - one which was later to be reinforced in 1947 by a reform of
the customs system. As a result, both "imports" from French refiner-
ies and from abroad were subject to import duties, but the rate of
imposition was greater in the latter case. This difference con-
stituted the most important protective measure than favoring the
development of the local French refining industry.
The reform of the import customs system of 1947 reinforced and
extended this incentive. Price increases following the Second World
- 20 -
War had eroded the original protective differential. The "Plan de
Modernisation et d'Equipment" - also known as "Plan Monnet" - which
appeared at the time, concluded that:
"It appears normal that for a transitional period, that
is to say until such time as refineries of an international
scale will have been constructed, the new protection per ton
of crude oil should be significantly increased. Subsequent-
ly it should be reduced to the minimum level necessary to al-
low the operation in France of refineries of an international
scale (refineries of the order of 1,000,000 tons...)."
Accordingly, a new structure of "ad valorem" duties was instituted
in 1947. This time "imports" from local refineries were exempt from
all duties. The term "ad valorem" still used officially by the
French in this connection, is in some respects a misnomer. The im-
port tariff system which is in effect today - and which in an out-
growth of the 1947 customs reforms - is based on official rather than
real prices. Its tax base is thus, effectively, physical units of
imports rather than value.
The 1947 reform created an encouraging climate for the growth
of the French refining industry. It met with a sympathetic response.
With the conclusion of the War, the industry entered into an era of
uninterrupted growth.
In recent years, however, import duties have not - in themselves -
provided any significant protection to the refining industry. The
tariff rates instituted in 1947 have gradually been reduced - the
- 21 -
reduction usually being offset by increases in the internal taxes which
all petroleum products, whether imported or produced locally, have to
support. Possibly of greater importance in this respect is that im-
ports from EEC member countries were eventually allowed to enter
France duty-free. The following table shows the import tariff
structure which was in effect in June 1967 for the more important cate-
gories of petroleum products.
TABLE I-1
FRANCE'S IMPORT TARIFF STRUCTURE FOR
REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
Gasoline (regular
or extra)
Petrole Lampant
(kerosene)
Fuel Oil Domestique
Gas Oil (diesel)
Fuel Oil Leger
Fuel Oil Lourds
Physical
Units
Hectoliter
Hectoliter
Hectoliter
Kilogram
Kilogram
Kilogram
Duty Rate**
6%
6%
3.5%
3.5%
3.5%
3.5%
Value
Applicable
14.80 Frs.
14.50 Frs.
9.92 Frs.
26.90 Frs.
10.70 Frs.
9.10 Frs.
Amount of
Duty*
0.89 Frs/HL
0.87 Frs/HL
0.35 Frs/HL
0.94 Frs/KG
0.37 Frs/KG
0.32 Frs/KG
*
Imports from EEC countries are not subject to duty
**
These rates conform with the EEC's external tariff structure.
Source: Guide du Petrole, Reglementation 1967, Editions 0. Lesourd,
Paris, 1967.
owl-
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The duty-free status of EEC imports, together with the relatively
low tariff hurdle facing imports from other countries, both indicate
that the degree of import protection which the French refining in-
dustry receives from this direction today is negligible - if not in-
existent. But the flow of imports of petroleum products into France
is not unrestricted. In practice it is very severely limited by a
complex system of quantitative controls, whose functioning will be
described further below.
The basic motivating interests which have led to the erection of
France's petroleum import controls have also shifted over time. As the
French refining industry and the corresponding local market for petro-
leum products matured, the "infant industry" argument in favor of a
protectionist refining policy became increasingly obsolete. Another
argument, however, came to supplant it. For during this time, French
oil companies were developing sizeable crude oil producing capabili-
ties - in the Middle East, and subsequently in Northern and Western
Africa. Market outlets were needed to match this producing potential,
but these could not easily be secured in an industry which was then
oligopolistic and integrated in structure. The local French market,
itself, consequently, offered a convenient and attractice means of
disposing of surplus production. Internal French petroleum policy
correspondingly turned from its original aim of promoting the general
growth of refining in France, towards the more specific goals of
assisting the commercialization of French-produced oil and of sponsor-
ing the development of the indigeneous elements within the country's
refining and distribution sectors.
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The following sections of this chapter describe the controlling
mechanisms which have been erected towards this end.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE FRENCH REFINING INDUSTRY
The refining industry in France is controlled by seven companies,
classifiable into four district groups:
(1) Affiliates of major international countries.
- Four companies fall into this category: Shell
Francaise, Esso Standard SAF, Societe Francaise
des Petroles B.P., and, Mobil Oil Francaise.
In addition, Caltex has a minority (40%) in-
terest in Union Industrielle des Petroles (UIP),
an ERAP refining subsidiary.
(2) Private independent sector.
- Antar Petrole de l'Atlantique is the only inde-
pendent refiner in France.
(3) Semi-public international sector.
-- Consists of the Compagnie Francaise de Raffinage
(CFR), the local refining affiliate (50.4% owned)
of the Compagnie Francaise de Petroles (CFP).
The French Government has a 35% equity interest
in CFP and controls 40% of the company's voting
power.
(4) Public, government-owned sector.
-- ERAP, through its two refining affiliates Elf-Union
(100% owned) and Elf-UIP (60% owned), is the most
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important agent in this sector. In addi-
tion, SNPA (51% owned by ERAP) produces
relatively negligible amounts of petroleum
products in association with its natural
gas production activities at Lacq.
Further details on the refining activities and inter-corporate
affiliations of these companies are given in Appendix I-A.
A characteristic trait of the international affiliates in France
(Esso Standard being the only exception in this respect) is that they
have undertaken to refine relatively important volumes of crude oil on
a processing basis, either for the account of their parent companies or
for that of associated companies in neighboring countries, the result-
ing petroleum products being destined for export. In 1966, for example,
Shell Francaise processed 2.2 million tons of crude for the account of
Deutsche Shell and Shell Switzerland, Societe Francaise BP processed
2.3 million tons for the account of BP Trading, while Mobil Oil
Francaise processed 1.4 million tons for the account of Mobil Oil
Corporation. As a result, France has consistently been a sizeable
net exporter of petroleum products (Table 1-2). The actual imports
of crude oil into France consequently overstate by a significant mar-
gin the strictly local requirements of the country's refining sector.
This fact has a direct bearing on the crude oil import constraints
which face the French refining industry. It is also a potent factor
which weighs in favor of the majors' affiliates during the course of
their sometimes delicate relationship with the French administration.
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TABLE 1-2
FRANCE' S PHYSICAL TRADE BALANCE IN
REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
(Thousands of Tons)
Year Imports Exports
1956 1285 5667
1957 2744 4546
1958 1749 6666
1959 2125 6511
1960 2687 7074
1961 2426 8178
1962 3070 7526
1963 4046 7955
1964 4415 8955
1965 4068 11441
1966 4916 14367
*
Including exports to the Fr
aviation fuel to foreign vessels.
anc Zone and supplies of bunker and
Source: Activite de l'Industrie Petroliere, 1966, Tome I, Comite Pro-
fessional du Petrole, Paris.
THE COMPAGNIE FRANCAISE DE RAFFINAGE - OUTLET FOR MIDDLE EASTERN OIL
With the end of the First World War, France, through CFP, ac-
quired a 23.75% share in what is now known as the Iraq Petroleum
Company.1 In 1929 a convention was signed between the French Govern-
ment and CFP whereby 25% of the French petroleum market was to be
1Then known as the Turkish Petroleum Company. Subsequently, CFP,
together with its other partners in IPC, were awarded two other con-
cessions in Iraq in the name of the Mosul and Basrah Petroleum
Companies. The same group of companies also acquired concessionary
interests in Qatar and Abu Dhabi.
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"reserved" for this newly formed company. Thus, for the first time,
the French authorities acknowledged the downstream problems largely
peculiar to the petroleum industry, and officially took a hand at
assuring a market outlet for CFP's crude oil resources.
Today, CFP's refining subsidiary, the Compagnie Francaise de
Raffinage (CFR), controls more than 25% of France's refining sector
(23% of the country's installed atmospheric distillation capacity
in 1966, but 29% of actual crude throughout - excluding processing.
Bearing in mind that a not inconsequential portion of France's re-
fining industry is export-oriented, CFR's position relative to the
domestically-oriented refining industry is correspondingly higher
than indicated by these figures). However, the company's control
over distribution outlets is not commensurate with its refining
position. As a result the majors' affiliates in France have been
required to off-take refined products from CFR for sale through
their own local distribution networks. In recent years, however,
this practice has met with increasing opposition on the part of
the international companies; and in 1966, an agreement was finally
reached between them and CFR foreseeing the progressive elimination
of these product purchases by 1970. In counterpart, the TOTAL
(CFP/CFR) distribution system is expected to be strengthened to
bring into balance the group's refining and distribution capabilities.
1For further details on these arrangements see Petroleum Intelli-
Sence Weekly, January 4, 1965, October 31, 1966, June 1 and September
7, 1966.
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The relative importance of the product purchases which the in-
ternational companies have thus contracted from CFR is indicated by
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly to be of the order of 8% of CFR's re-
fining throughout.1 Confirmation of this general order of magnitude
is given by Esso's 1965 Annual Report which states that it had
reached agreement in principle to off-take 2.5 million tons of pro-
2duct from CFR over a five-year period. Both of these statements
indicate that the cumulative purchases of products from CFR under
this system must have represented between 2% and 3% of France's
total internal petroleum product demand during 1964-65. The
quantities involved are thus not particularly large at the aggre-
gate level, even though their relative importance from a corporate
viewpoint can be significant.
The majors' affiliates furthermore have had to off-take pro-
3
ducts not only from CFR, but also from SNPA. The production of
liquid petroleum products is a by-product associated with SNPA's
production of natural gas at Lacq. The volumes thus produced have
not been large (about one quarter of a million tons of liquid pro-
ducts in 1967, excluding approximately an equal and additional pro-
duction of LPG), but their commercialization has nevertheless
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, September 7, 1964, p. 3.
2
Esso Standard, S.A.F., Rapport Annuel 1965, p. 10.
3Cf. Shell Francaise, Rapport Annuel 1967, p. 12.
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apparently been entrusted to the international companies in France.
Presumably ERAP/ELP will gradually assume the latter task as it
further develops and expands its own distribution network.
The crude oil marketing problem arising from CFP's participa-
tion in Middle Eastern oil was, thus, in part resolved by ensuring
that the company would control at least 25% of France's domestic
crude oil demand, through its refining affiliate, CFR. Given the
circumstances of the time this was an attainable objective. Since
France's refining industry was in its infancy, CFR was able to carve
for itself a position in this sector without dislocating the country's
supply network or refining structure. It apparently found it more
difficult to develop an equally viable distribution network, but
was able to induce its competitors -- presumably assisted by govern-
ment prodding -- to relieve it of its surplus production of refined
products. The process was generally one of growth in step with that
of the overall French market, rather than one of supplanting exist-
ing sources of supply.
DISCOVERY IN THE SAHARA -- THE PROBLEMS OF SURPLUS
The discovery of sizeable oil deposits in the Algerian Sahara
created a problem of a far different order. Qualitatively, the issue
was the same as that which faced CFP at its inception -- the lack of
immediate market outlets for an important part of Algeria's potential
oil production. The international oil producing industry continued to
face a heavy overhang of excess production capacity, while oil prices--
although lower than in the past -- were, for both historical and
structural reasons, above any conceivable point of equilibrium. It
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was consequently natural that the control of market outlets continued
to be a dominating objective for the industry's participants.
Yet among the most important companies contributing to the early
discoveries in Algeria were BRP and RAP, both wholly owned by the
French Government, and later merged to form ERAP. These companies
had been created with the primary intent of promoting oil exploration
in metropolitan France and in the Franc Zone. They did not at the
time control any outlets through which their eventual discoveries
could be commercialized. Their early successes in the Algerian
Sahara (most notably the fields of Edjeleh and Hassi Messaoud, dis-
covered in 1956) consequently created the problem of finding a home
for what the French have since called "orphan oil."
The problem could not be approached as simply as it had earlier
been in the case of CFP. By the time of the Algerian discoveries
(1955/56) the refining industry in France had reached a state of
relative maturity, so that ERAP's predecessors could not be expected
to capture an immediate and important position in this sector without
creating serious dislocations in its structure.
Over time, however, such an objective was conceivable. The
state-owned company correspondingly embarked on a program of forward
integration. Its first move in this direction was consummated in
1960 with the absorption of Caltex's French refining and distribution
interests into a joint company. This was followed by the construction
of a number of refineries in France and Africa, as well as one in
Germany (Speyer), and the signing of a long-term processing agreement
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with the Albatros refinery in Belgium. Correspondingly, the company
developed its distribution activities, and consolidated them in 1967
under its own colors and brand name: Elf.
But this program of forward integration, important as it was,1
could not by itself assure a short-term outlet for ERAP's crude oil
resources. Even as late as 1967, eleven years after the first dis-
coveries in the Sahara, the relationship between these resources and
the crude oil demand of the company's controlled refining outlets
was still far from balanced, as shown in Table 1-3.
By the end of the 1950's, however, the crude oil demand of
France's refining sector, taken as a whole, was sizeable. Moreover,
it fell under the jurisdiction of the French Government. This
potential outlet consequently represented a convenient way to dispose
of ERAP's production surpluses. The alternatives which faced the
French authorities at the time were, therefore, twofold: either to
allow ERAP to sell its surplus Franc Zone production on the open mar-
ket, or to require that existing refining companies in France purchase
at least a portion of their crude supplies from the Franc Zone. The
latter proved to be their choice.
Most of the literature concerning this aspect of French oil
policy repeatedly refers the reader to France's law of 1928 and the
attendant periodic crude oil import authorizations issued by the
IBy end 1967, the ERAP group had invested approximately 760 mil-
lion Francs (150 million dollars) in its refining, distribution and
petrochemical activities. (Elf-ERAP, Rapport de Gestion, 1967, p. 53)
- - ---A 11P, __ __ - ____ - __ mlft mwawwww._
TABLE 1-3
ERAP'S CRUDE OIL SUPPLY AND DEMAND
BALANCE - 1967
(Millions of Metric Tons)
Source: ERAP, Rapport de Gestion, 1967.
RESOURCES DEMAND BY CONTROLLED OUTLETS
Production by ERAP Group:
France
Algeria
Gabon and Congo
Nigeria
TOTAL
Production by Associated
Companies:**
Algeria
TOTAL RESOURCES
*
0.4
18.5
2.4
0.8
22.1
1.7
23.8
Demand by French Outlets
Less: supplies of
Caltex crude to
UIP
7.4
1.1
Demand by other European
Outlets* *
Demand by African Outlets****
TOTAL CONTROLLED DEMAND
6.3 (.A)
3.6
0.5
10.4
Including SNPA, but excluding the latter's Canadian production.
Crude available to ERAP by virtue of overlift agreements with companies associated
with it in joint production ventures.
1.8 million tons for the Speyer refinery, 1.1 million tons supplied to the Albatros
refinery at Antwerp, and 0.7 million tons processed in Italy
ERAP has participations and corresponding crude supply rights in refineries at Dakar
(Senegal), Abidjan (Ivory Coast), Port-Gentil (Gabon) and Tamatave (Madagascar).
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French authorities. The effective practical limitations on the
country's refiners, however, are not to be found in these public
declarations. The latter provide no more than background and
legal form for the more practical restraints imposed on the in-
dustry. By the same token, however, they need to be described and
analyzed before turning to the more economically relevant facets
of French policy affecting the country's crude oil supply sources.
THE LAW OF 1928 AND FRANCE'S CRUDE OIL IMPORT AUTHORIZATIONS
By 1928, an intricate legal framework had been erected around
France's petroleum industry. The French State was granted a monopoly
on crude oil and refined product imports in 1926; and in 1928 this
monopoly was "delegated" to the private sector through the issuance
of periodic crude oil and refined product import authorizations.
Only the crude oil authorizations will concern us for the moment, the
system of import controls over refined products being discussed in a
subsequent section.
The latest crude oil authorizations -- the third to be granted
since the law of 1928 -- appeared in the form of a series of govern-
ment decrees dated February 27, 1963. The first authorizations of
this type had been granted in 1930 for a period of 20 years. They
were followed by a second set whose validity eventually extended over
15 years. It was consequently not until 1965 that the latest authoriza-
tions came into force, even though they had been formally decreed
earlier in 1963. Their period of validity was this time limited to
ten years -- from 1965 to 1975 -- which explains why they are- often
commonly referred to as A-10's.
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Specifically, the crude import decrees of 1963 authorized each
of France's eight refining companies to import certain quantities of
"foreign" crude oil. The term "foreign" has a particular significance
in this context, since it does not apply to crude oil produced in the
Franc Zone (metropolitan France and former French territories -- in
particular Algeria and Gabon). Moreover, the authorizations are not
expressed directly in terms of crude oil units, but rather specify
the quantities of certain refined products which the refiner is
authorized to produce from "foreign" crudes. The latest decree of
1963 allowed that all refined products other than motor gasoline and
lubricants, could be produced in "provisionally unlimited" quantities
from crudes of foreign origin (this format is identical with that of
the refined product import authorizations; with the exception that
the 1965 version of the latter included lubricants in the "temporarily
unlimited" product category, leaving motor gasoline as the only re-
maining product facing quantitative import limits).
Table 1-4 shows the recent evolution of the crude import authoriza-
tions related to motor gasoline production. The authorizations initially
granted in 1950 (shown in the first set of columns) were periodically
increased -- uniformly for all refining companies -- so that their
level was substantially higher by the time they expired in 1965.
They were then replaced by a new 10-year list of figures, shown in the
last set of columns in Table 1-4. It should be noted that the import
authorizations granted to CFR, are in addition to the company's right
to serve 25% of the French market using CFP's Middle Eastern oil re-
sources.
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The form in which these crude oil import quotas are issued includes
a number of peculiar, if not cumbersome provisions. The most striking
of these is that the quotas are expressed in terms of petroleum product
rather than crude oil units. The A-10's thus seem to beg the fact that
motor gasoline is a joint product, and that a range of other refined
petroleum products is inevitably associated with its production. To
this extent the "temporarily unlimited" right granted to French refin-
ers to produce refined products other than motor gasoline and lubri-
cants is puzzling, if not meaningless. The A-10's make no mention of
refining yields -- actual or notional -- by which the quantities of
gasoline which the companies are authorized to produce from "foreign"
crudes can be translated into effective crude import quotas. If actual
refining yields were used for this purpose, the international refining
companies would presumably be motivated to import heavier Middle
Eastern crudes in order to reduce their yields of motor gasoline; and
hence, maximize their use of Middle Eastern relative to Franc Zone
crude (the landed cost of Middle Eastern or Libyan crudes to the in-
ternational companies being less than that from Algeria or Gabon).
Such a system would also tend to distort optimal refinery configura-
tions in France since cracking, or other refining facilities designed
to increase the yield of light ends, would be abnormally penalized.
The use of notional -- as opposed to actual -- yields would simplify
the system, but would not eliminate its distinctively artificial
character (why not specify crude oil quotas directly, in this event,
since that is precisely what the gasoline authorizations would be
doing by proxy? And what meaning to give to the temporarily unlimited
character of the authorizations for other products?)
____ ~---------- ~
TABLE 1-4
FRENCH CRUDE OIL IMPORT AUTHORIZATIONS
FOR MOTOR GASOLINE PRODUCTION
Initial Authorizations
Granted in 1950
(Tons x 103) %
Authorizations Ex-
piring by 1965
(Tons x 103) %
New Authorizations
Effective from 1965
(Tons x i03) %
Shell Berre
Esso Standard
BP
Mobil
SUB-TOTAL
Antar
CFR*
ELF/UIP
SUB-TOTAL
TOTAL
*
Not including CFR's right
petroleum product demand.
Source: Guide du Petrole,
O.Lesourd, Paris.
to import and process sufficient crude to supply 25% of France's
Tome Reglementation, 1962, 1964 and 1967 editions, Editions
497
420
327
169
1413
295
468
145
908
2321
21.4
18.1
14.1
7.3
60.9
12.7
20.2
6.2
39.1
100.0
816
690
537
278
2321
485
769
238
1492
3813
21.4
18.1
14.1
7.3.
60.9
12.7
20.2
6.2.
39.1
100.0
816
690
537
278
2321
540
769
870
2179
4500
18.2
15.3
11.9
6.2
51.6
12.0
17.1
19.3
48.4
100.0
(-.3
U,
I
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A comparison between the crude oil import authorizations and
actual import figures only serves to heighten this impression of
artificiality. As shown in Table 1-4, Esso's authorization in 1965
stood at 690 thousand tons of gasoline. In actual practice, Esso's
refineries produced 1300 thousand tons of gasoline in 1965, none
of which was destined for export (Esso's sales of gasoline were
1580 thousand tons, presumably including off-takes from CFR). On
the other hand, 53% of the crude oil refined by Esso in 1965
originated from the Franc Zone. Consequently, on the assumption
that actual refining yields are operative in interpreting the crude
authorizations, and accepting for the moment the 53% breakdown
between Franc Zone and the total amount of crude oil distilled by
Esso, then it can be inferred that the gasoline which the company
produced from "foreign" crude amounted to 610 thousand tons
(47% x 1,300). Compared to an authorization of 690 thousand tons,
Esso would thus appear to have had a reasonable operating margin,
especially when it is remembered that the authorizations can, and
have, been generally increased over time. In fact it can be argued
that the company's operating margin was even higher than just in-
dicated. In 1965, Esso exported some 600 thousand tons of products
(including bunkers and aviation gasoline). The amount of crude oil
refined by Esso used in the above calculation should correspondingly
be reduced (by more than 600 thousand tons to account for refinery
1These figures as well as those following are taken from the
1965 Annual Report of Esso Standard SAF.
-1
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consumption and losses), since the import authorizations refer only
to products processed for the internal French market (exports are not
subject to any restraints). The effect is to increase the relative
position of Franc Zone crude from 53% to 58%, and hence to decrease
the equivalent amount of gasoline produced from "foreign crudes" from
610 to 545 thousand tons.
Directionally, the same results are given if a similar comparative
analysis is undertaken for any of France's eight refining companies.
The limits imposed by the crude oil import authorizations are, thus,
apparently not attained in practice by these companies. Moreover, the
A-10 gasoline quotas are seen to be subject to a plurality of relatively
complex and ambiguous interpretations.
These considerations reinforce one's suspicion that if France's
crude supply sources are indeed controlled, then a more direct and
practical system must have been devised for this purpose. It has.
Stripped to its essence it consists of having the authorities (in
this case the Direction des Carburants -- DICA -- of the Ministry of
Industry) simply inform the refining companies as to how much Franc
Zone crude oil they are obligated to purchase from French producers.
DICA's authority in this regard stems from the following paragraph,
included in the 1963 decrees through which the latest set of crude
import authorizations were granted:
"the beneficiaries are obligated ... at the request of the
minister in charge of fuels (DICA), to undertake - in pro-
portion to their deliveries on the internal market - con-
tracts of national interest for the purchase of crude oil,
derived or residual products ...
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On the strength of this "national interest" argument DICA has en-
sured that a major portion of French produced oil in Algeria and Gabon
would be absorbed by the French refining industry. This was achieved
through a far simpler -- and therefore a far more effective -- system
than that of the crude oil import authorizations just described. To
this extent these authorizations have, in practice, little immediate
bearing in determining France's crude oil supply sources. They do,
however, have longer-term implications which were judged sufficiently
important to induce the affiliates of the international oil companies
to appeal against the 1963 A-10 decrees to the Conseil d'Etat, France's
highest court in such matters. The vice-president of Shell Francaise
carried the protest further and to a more personal level by resigning
from his post in 1963. These measures and their causes will be dis-
cussed later on in this chapter. But we shall turn beforehand to a
descriptive analysis of the crude purchases which France's refiners
have to undertake from the Franc Zone in fulfillment of their "national
duty."
FRANC OIL AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST
With the discovery of sizeable oil reserves in the Algerian
Sahara, and subsequently in Gabon, ERAP and its associated companies
faced a pressing marketing problem. The company's program of forward
integration offered the possibility that its controlled market outlets
might eventually be brought into balance with its crude oil production
potential; but this was necessarily a longer-term prospect. In the
meantime ERAP faced the alternative of selling its surplus production
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on the open market at prices which, at that time, were well below the
equivalent transfer prices at which crude oil was being imported into
France by the international majors. Understandably, a price disparity
of this nature could hardly have been tolerated indefinitely by the
French authorities. But rather than pressure the international
companies to lower their import prices, the French government chose
instead to require that these companies purchase part of their crude
supplies from ERAP, thus reducing -- if not eliminating -- the state
company's sales on the open market.
A government ordinance was accordingly passed in 1958 by which
the concept of national interest purchase contracts was integrated
into the existing and subsequent crude oil import decrees. It was
thus only by 1958, at the time when the early discoveries in Algeria
were being developed, that the passage quoted at the end of the pre-
ceding section formally empowered the Direction des Carburants to
demand that France's refineries purchase Franc Zone crude oil in
respect of the national interest.
The earliest formulae used by DICA to translate this intangible
concept into specific and quantitative purchase obligations are not
well known. The following scattered elements of information have
been reported. Until 1966, the general principle had been estab-
lished that these purchases would represent a specified proportion
of Franc Zone crude production. By 1965, the price which was being
paid by foreign refining affiliates in France for Algerian oil was
2.26 $/barrel, FOB Algeria. Under this system the purchases of
- 40 -
Societe Francaise B.P. amounted to 1.2 and 2.25 million tons in 1960
and 1961, respectively.1
In any event, DICA decided in 1965 to modify the basis for assess-
ing the refining companies' Franc oil purchase obligations. Instead
of depending on Franc Zone production, these were now to be related
to French internal petroleum product demand. This change was appar-
ently designed to reduce the sensitivity of the original system to
sudden changes in the rate of Franc Zone production. A surge in
Algerian production was, in fact, expected to occur during 1966,
as the country's third major oil pipeline became operational.
It was thus that in June, 1965, DICA addressed a memorandum to
France's refining companies suggesting that, henceforth,*55% of the
crude oil necessary to satisfy the country's internal product demand
should be taken as a basis for calculating their respective Franc oil
purchase obligations. This set the stage for a series of triangular -
and hence lengthy - negotiating sessions between the French authorities,
represented by DICA; the French refining industry, whose interests
were by and large represented by the refining affiliates of the inter-
national oil companies; and the French producing interests, repre-
sented by ERAP through its oil marketing affiliate, SOVAP (Sopiete
pour la Valorisation des Pftroles Bruts). The general principle
suggested at the outset by DICA in its memorandum was eventually
accepted, although the method which was ultimately adopted to calculate
Cf. Societ Frangaise des Petroles B.P., Rapports du Conseil
d'Administration, Assemblee Gen~rale Ordinaire, of May 31, 1961 and
June 30, 1966.
-41-
the precise obligation of each refining company was necessarily more
complex.
The first step was to estimate the amounts of crude oil which
would be required to satisfy France's internal product demand, from
1966 through 1968 -- the three-year period for which specific purchase
contracts were to be drawn up. This nominal internal market demand
for crude oil was then allocated among the country's refining
companies according to the projection of their respective market
shares. Each company's gross Franc Zone "quota" -- the basis for
determining its purchase obligation -- was then equated to 55% of its
imputed crude oil demand.
From this gross quota, each company was allowed two types of dis-
counts in arriving at its net purchase obligation. To the extent that
a refining company had crude oil production interests in the Franc
Zone - either directly or through associated companies - at least
a part of this production was allowed as a deduction against its
gross crude oil quota. The French affiliates of the international
majors were entitled to deduct, in this manner, 100% of their produc-
tion interests in metropolitan France, and 80% of any production rights
held by them (or any associated companies within their group) in over-
seas Franc Zone areas. The second type of deduction which was
eventually allowed off the gross Franc Zone quotas, originated from a
negotiated compromise concerning the price to be assessed on the pur-
chase obligations. In imposing a relatively high price for these
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purchases, DICA accepted that each company's gross Franc Zone quota
be reduced by 10% towards the calculation of their net purchase ob-
ligations.
This system of assessment led to the signing of three-year (1966-
68) crude purchase contracts between the international refining com-
panies and SOVAP. The amounts of these purchases for 1966 were cal-
culated by applying the formula just described to the figures in
Table 1-5.
The estimated internal crude oil demand of 56 million tons which was
used to calculate the companies' 1966 purchase obligations is a purely
notional figure. It cannot be compared with any published data on
France's actual crude oil supplies, part of these supplies being
slated for export as refined products (in 1966 crude oil supplies
to French refineries amounted to 67.5 million tons, while exports
of refined products totaled 14.4 million tons). Moreover, implicitly
included in the 56 million tons demand figure is most, if not all, of
France's imports of refined products (amounting to 4.9 million tons
in 1966). France's data on its international petroleum exchanges,
therefore, cannot be simply compared to DICA's estimate of the
country's crude require ments. A more direct approach consists of
starting with data on the country's internal (i.e.: excluding bunker
fuels) consumption of petroleum products and to derive the correspond-
ing crude requirements by adding an estimate for refinery consumption
and losses. This is done for the civilian market in Table 1-6, no
data being available on military consumption. The resulting figure
TABLE 1-5
1966 FRANC OIL PURCHASE OBLIGATIONS OF FRANCE'S
INTERNATIONAL REFINING AFFILIATES
Estimate of total internal demand for
crude oil in 1966 ................... 56 million tons
Source: Compiled from numerous
press articles, including Petroleum
Press Service, March 1966
Millions of Tons
Projected
Share in
Refining
Sector
ESSO
SHELL
B.P.
MOBIL
TOTAL for
International
Affiliates
13.1
19.4
12.2
4.8
49.5
Imputed
Crude
Oil
Demand
7.35
10.88
6.84
2.69
37.76
Gross
Franc
Zone
Quota
Allowable Deductions
10% off
Gross
4.05 0.40
5.98 0.60
3.75 0.37
1.48 0.15
15.26 1.52
F.Z.
Production*
2.40
3.18
0.28
5.86
Net
Purchase
Obligation
1.25
2.20
3.38
1.05
7.88
*
100% of own metropolitan production and 80% of other Franc Zone production.
Esso's production interests are limited to metropolitan France. Shell's produc-
tion in the Franc Zone is primarily derived from Algeria (Royal Dutch Shell has
a 65% interest in CPA and a 35% interest in CREPS). B.P. has no production in-
terests in the Franc Zone. Mobil has minority participations in a number of
Algerian fields.
I
TABLE 1-6
ESTIMATES OF FRANCE'S INTERNAL CIVILIAN
MARKET DEMAND FOR CRUDE OIL
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Internal Civilian Market
Demand* in Petroleum
Products
Estimate of Refinery
Consumption Losses
and Storage
Crude Oil Require-
ments for Internal
French Civilian
Market
23.5 25.9 30.3 35.9 41.6 46.5 49.9 56.7
2.3 2.6 3.0 3.5 4.1 4.6 4.9 5.6
25.8 28.5 33.3 39.4 45.7 51.1 54.8 62.3
*
Sources: Activite de l'Industrie Petroliere,
Activite de l'Industrie Pftroliere,
Direction des Carburants.
Tome I, 1966, Comit4 Professional du Petrole.
Annse 1967, Ministere de l'Industrie,
**
Estimated at 9% of crude throughout, or 9.9% of product output.
41
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for 1966 is 54.8 million tons which comes very close to DICA's estim-
ate of 56 million tons -- especially when it is remembered that milit-
ary consumption is not included in the former of these two quantities.
The method by which the crude oil obligations are assessed can
significantly alter both the total amounts to be purchased by France's
refining sector, and the distribution of these purchases among the
companies within that sector. At the time when the system just des-
cribed was being negotiated in 1965, Soci6t- Frangaise B.P. raised the
most vehement objections against DICA's proposals. In spite of earlier
exploratory efforts in the area, B.P. was the only international company
without a participating interest in Franc Zone oil, and consequently
considered that DICA's proposed system penalized it unfairly vis-a-vis
its international refining competitors. One of its arguments was that
the aim of the purchase system was to assure an outlet for surplus
French production and that oil produced in the Franc Zone by any of
the international majors was hardly entitled to be classified in this
category. B.P. consequently suggested that the Franc Zone production
allowances be eliminated from the proposed system, but that in counter-
part the total quota, for all refining companies combined, be reduced.
Along the same vein, the company also took issue with DICA's definition
of France's internal crude requirements. It pointed to the fact that
about 10% of the country's petroleum demand was supplied by product
importers, and concluded that either these importers should be re-
quired to undertake crude purchases in the national interest on an
equal footing with the country's refining companies, or that DICA's
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estimate for the country's crude requirements should be reduced. In
presenting these arguments B.P. proposed that its Franc oil purchase
assessment for 1966 should stand at 2.0 million tons rather than the
3.75 million tons resulting from DICA's method of evaluation (this
would have meant an absolute reduction in B.P.'s Franc Zone purchases,
since, under the earlier system, these had amounted to 2.25 million
tons as far back as 1961).
B.P.'s arguments were obviously presented with negotiating con-
siderations in mind. But they underscore, nonetheless, the fact that
the system of purchase assessments which DICA had proposed, and was
finally able to impose, is to a large extent arbitrary in nature.
It is consequently subject to modification depending upon circumstances
and the government's prevalent appreciation of the national interest.
In principle, it should be possible to compare the refining
companies' contractual crude purchase obligations for 1966 -- as cal-
culated in Table 1-4 -- and their actual supplies from the Franc Zone
during the year. In most cases, however, the only relevant figure
reported by the international refining affiliates in France is the
amount of their crude oil supplies which originates from the Franc
Zone (which includes both own-produced oil and purchases from SOVAP).
But this number is still of interest since it should compare closely
with each company's respective gross Franc oil quota - less the 10%
allowance - shown in Table 1-4; although it may differ from it in
practice for three reasons.
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The first of these reasons is that since a company's purchase
obligation from SOVAP is fixed, any variation of own-produced Franc
Zone oil production from anticipated levels will be reflected in the
company's Franc Zone imports (to the extent that this production is
in practice imported into France rather than elsewhere). The second
reason is that since only 80% of overseas Franc Zone production is
deductible from a refiner's quota, his actual imports from the Franc
Zone would tend to be higher than the latter (again, to the extent
that this production is imported into France). The third reason is
that although French refining companies are obligated to purchase
specified quantities of Franc oil, they need not physically import
this oil into France. They always have the opportunity to exchange
Franc oil purchases for other crudes more suited either to the pro-
duct marketing opportunities open to them in France, or to the techni-
cal limitations of their local refining installations.
Having noted these reservations, a comparison between the
companies' assessed Franc Zone quotas and their actual crude oil
supplies from the area gives the results shown in Table 1-7. In
general, the figures agree fairly closely. Where discrepancies do
exist, they can be plausibly explained, especially in light of the
potential sources of differences just mentioned.
A similar analysis can be made comparing DICA's projected refin-
ing market shares (used to calculate each company's purchase obliga-
tion, as in Table 1-5) with the actual breakdown of France's refining
sector. Although the latter is not generally available, it can be
TABLE 1-7
COMPARISON BETWEEN ASSESSED FRANC ZONE QUOTAS AND ACTUAL
SUPPLIES FOR SELECTED REFINING COMPANIES
(millions of tons)
Sources: Selected Annual Reports of companies.
Activit'e de l'Industrie Petroliere: 1966, Ministere de l'Industrie, Direction
des Carburants.
90% of 1966 Gross
Franc Zone Quota
Actual Supplies
from the
Franc Zone
1966 1967*
4.01 4.69 Actual purchases from overseas Franc Zone areas in 1966
amounted to 1.67 million tons compared to a net purchase
obligation of 1.25 million tons. This difference is ex-
plained by the fact that in addition to its purchase
obligation, Esso is reported to have contracted for an
additional supply of oil from ERAP - the amount of these
supplementary purchases being of the order of its 10%
purchase allowance.
6.00** 7.40 The slightly higher actual supply figure may be explained
by the fact that Shell's interest in Algerian production
in 1966 amounted to 3.56 million tons compared to the
company's allowed deduction of 3.18 million tons.
*
The closure of the Suez Canal in 1967 may have perturbed France's normal supply lines,
particularly in view of the fact that in July of that year Iraq selectively lifted its boycott on
oil exports to France.
**
These quantities are reported by Shell Francaise as being the amount of Franc Zone crude
oil produced or bought by the Royal Dutch Shell Group.
Table 1-7 continued
on Page 49.
ESSO 3.55
Comments
SHELL 5.38
CO
I
-__ _ _ -----------------
-----------------
__ _ _ _ _ _ U_ _ -- -----------
Table 1-7
Continued
Actual Supplies
from the
90% of 1966 Gross Franc Zone
Franc Zone Quota 1966 1967 Comments
B.P. 3.38 2.24 n.a. B.P.'s 1966 Annual Report specifically mentions
that the company had exchanged a portion of its
Franc Zone crude purchases for crude supplied
by B.P. Trading, thus explaining the fact that
its Franc oil supplies in 1966 were significantly
lower than its quota.
MOBIL 1.33 1.25 1.49 Intracompany exchanges could account for the
lower level of Franc Zone imports in 1966
compared to quota. Actual Algerian production
in 1966 amounted to 0.3 million tons compared
to an allowable deduction of 0.28 million tons.
Mobil's production interest in Gabon amounted
to 0.04 million tons in 1966.
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derived from figures reported by the country's refining companies. A
factor which complicates this analysis is that most of these companies
refine relatively important quantities of products for export (either
for their own account or under processing agreements). These export
volumes -- as well as all crude oil volumes processed for the account
of third parties -- must be deducted in order to arrive at a company's
relative position within the local refining sector.1 Certain figures
must be estimated or assumed in the process (e.g., refining yields
used to convert exports of products into their crude oil equivalents),
but none of these are critical enough to seriously compromise the
accuracy of the results. The end-product of this analysis is shown in
Table 1-8, together with the theoretical market breakdown resulting
from the crude import authorizations which came into force in 1965
(the latter having been adjusted to account for CFR's reserved 25% of
the market). It can be seen that DICA's projected market shares are
very close to the estimated actual breakdown of the refining sector
(any differences are within the estimating margin of error), while
they are not at all close to the distribution of the A-10 authoriza-
tion.
Concerning the matter of priceduring the negotiations between
SOVAP and DICA, on the one hand, and the international refining af-
filiates, on the other, the latter proposed that their Franc oil
purchases for the three-year period of 1966-68, be based on a price
1See Appendix I-A for a detailed discussion of this point.
TABLE 1-8
ESTIMATED MARKET SHARES OF COMPANIES IN
FRANCE'S REFINING SECTOR
DICA's Projected Shares
Used to Calculate 1966
Purchase Obligations
(percent)
13.1
19.4
12.2
4.8
n. a.
n.a.
n. a.
Estimates of Actual
Breakdown of Metropolitan
Refining
(percent)_
1966 1967
13.3 13.2
Marker
Tfns x 10',
1966 1967
7.0 8.2
19.1 18.6 10.0 11.5
12.0 12.7
5.3 4.7
6.3 7.9
2.8 2.9
30.5 28.1 16.0 17.4
10.9 10.8
8.9 11.9
5.7 6.7
4.7 7.4
100.0 100.0 52.5 62.0
Breakdown Resulting From
A-10 Authorizations
(percent)
11.5
13.6
9.0
4.6
37.8
9.0
14.5
100.0
ESSO
SHELL
B.P.
MOBIL
CFR
ANTAR
ELF/ERAP
U,H
TOTALS
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of 1.95 $/barrel for Algerian oil FOB Bougie. At that time, in late
1965, the international companies were buying Algerian oil from French
producers, under the terms of an earlier contract, at a price of 2.26
$/barrel, FOB Bougie. In proposing a 31 cents reduction in the price
of this oil, the international companies argued that official ex-re-
finery prices for petroleum products had dropped substantially in
France since 1960 (B.P. claimed that the drop amounted to 44 cents per
barrel of crude oil refined from mid-1962 to mid-1965), and that,
furthermore, the price which they were advancing of 1.95 $/barrel would
be equivalent to that at which they could produce Libyan oil -- pre-
sumably from their parent companies.
But these arguments did not prevail. Instead, the French authori-
ties insisted on a price, FOB Bougie, of 2.12 $/barrel, but as a token
of compromise they conceded that each company's gross Franc Zone quota
be subject to a 10% quantity discount (as shown in Table 1-4). The
base price of 2.12 $/barrel was also subject to escalation with tanker
transportation costs, based on freight rate differentials between the
Eastern Mediterranean-Le Havre route, as compared to that of Algeria-
Le Havre. As a result, the price fell to 2.11 $/barrel by the first
half of 1967, but subsequently rose, in the aftermath of the Suez
Canal closure, and stood at 2.17/2.18 $/barrel by mid-1968.
One of the government's main arguments in favor of a high level
of prices for Algerian oil was that the international companies had,
themselves, been importing oil into France at high transfer prices.
At least partially in response to this argument, the international
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companies proceeded to increase their discounts on oil imports into
the country, and their local refining affiliates made sure that this
fact was not overlooked.
Thus, Societe Francaise B.P. announced in 1965 that when it re-
newed its crude supply contract with B.P. Trading in 1947, it was
granted a discount of 10 cents/barrel off the posted price for Kuwait
oil. Subsequently, this discount was gradually increased until it
stood at 16 cents/barrel just prior to 1965. This declining price
trend -- although far from exciting from the French point of view --
apparently accelerated from 1965 on:
"We (Societe Francaise BP) were able to face the
increasing competitive pressures of the French market...
only by virtue of the additional discounts which BP
Trading had already granted to us in 1965 ... A further
decline in (product) prices, in particular for heavy
fuel oil, have led our friends in London to further
increase this discount for 1967. No similar revision
is unfortunately possible for Franc oil ....
(Societ4 Francaise des Petroles
BP, Rapport du Conseil d'
Administration, Assembl~e
Gendrale Ordinaire du 22 juin
1967)
The Annual Reports of the other international refining affiliates
struck the same theme:
"Our traditional suppliers, the Standard Oil
Company N.J. and the Gulf Oil Corporation, have granted
us an additional price discount over and above that of
1965. The price of Saharan oil has also been reduced
relative to that of the preceding contract, but in our
opinion, not to a sufficient degree when compared with
the trend in real world prices.
(Esso Standard, SAF.
Rapport Annuel, 1966)
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"We will have to pay for this (Algerian) oil a price
which is significantly higher than the average cost of our
traditional source of supply."
(Shell Franjaise,
Rapport Annuel, 1965)
By contrast with the price of 2.12 $/Bl charged to the international
affiliates, ERAP's refining affiliates are known to have been billed much
less by SOVAP for Algerian oil. This became apparent in September, 1968
when the Algerian Government placed an embargo on crude oil exports which
were undertaken at what the Government considered to be artifically low
prices. It was subsequently reported that most of the export transac-
tions at issue were, indeed, intra-corporate sales to ERAP refining af-
filiates, and that they were priced at between 1.56 and 1.60 $/barrel.
In spite of the fact that oil taxes in Algeria are assessed on the
basis of a pre-established tax-reference price rather than on realized
prices, Algerian economic interests are still directly affected by the
level of realized prices in at least two instances. The first was wide-
ly reported by the specialized press at the time of the embargo, which
noted that oil companies in the country are subject to exchange controls
(consisting of repatriation provisions) which depend on the level of
realized prices. The second point of dependence, however, has hardly
been reported at all. The Franco-Algerian Accords of 1965 created a
joint venture in exploration and production called the Cooperative
1A number of accounts have been published on this incident. Cf.,
in particular, The Middle East Economic Survey, September 27, 1968, and
Bulletin de l'Industrie Petroliere, September 26 and November 7, 1968.
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Association (ASCOP), which consists of two partners: one Algerian
(SONATRACH), the other French (ERAP). Under this association, ERAP
has advanced various sums to SONATRACH, primarily to finance explora-
tion activities. These advances are reimbursable in oil discovered
by ASCOP, which is valued for this purpose at ERAP's average realized
price. The latter is known to have been in the neighborhood of 1.80
$/barrel prior to the June 1967 crisis.1 If ERAP's crude sales to the
international refining affiliates in France were undertaken at close
to 2.12 $/barrel, then its intra-corporate sales necessarily had to be
valued at far less to give an average realization of about 1.80 $/barrel.
To this point no mention has been made of the status of. the non-
international French refining companies relative to the Franc oil pur-
chase system. Although CFR and Antar have been called upon to purchase
certain quantities of oil from ERAP, the bases for these purchases have
had little relation to those described above.
In past years, 80% of Antar's crude oil requirements have been
supplied by CFP by virtue of a long term agreement to this effect
between the two companies. More recently, however, this supply arrange-
ment was modified to allow ERAP to acquire a 40% supply right in Antar
from CFP, the latter thus holding on to the other 40%. Accordingly,
at the time of signing of the Franc Zone purchase contracts in 1966,
Antar was reported to have committed itself to the purchase of close to
2 million tons from ERAP for that same year. By contrast, the formula
ICf. Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, April 18, 1966, Page 4.
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used to calculate the international companies' purchase assessments
would have led to a 1966 purchase obligation of about 2.7 million tons
for Antar (assuming a refining share of about 10%, as per Table 7,
which gives a gross Franc Zone quota for the company of about 3 million
tons. Since Antar does not have any production interests whatsoever,
its purchase obligation would equal 90% of its gross quota under this
system.)
CFP/CFR's status in this respect is even more particular. In
view of its 25% privileged position on the French market (see Page 8),
as well as its important production interests in Algeria, the CFP group
would not have been expected to purchase any oil from ERAP according to
the system of assessment imposed on the international refining companies
in 1966. Nevertheless, CFP/CFR was reported at the time to have con-
tracted for approximately 1 million tons of oil from ERAP. According
to a company source, however, these purchases were undertaken in
counterpart for DICA's approval of CFR's plans to absorb the Ozo and
Desmarais distribution networks in France.
With respect to price, both Antar's and CFR's purchases from ERAP
are reported to have been valued at less than the 2.12 $/barrel appli-
cable on the latter's sales to the international companies - although
how much less has not been made public. This pricing disparity was in
part justified by French officials by pointing to the fact that ERAP's
sales contract with CFR and Antar were long term, as opposed to those
of three year duration signed by the international companies.
The factors which have entered into Antar's and CFR's oil pur-
chases from ERAP are thus seen to have been far different from those
-57-
which have concerned the international refining affiliates in France.
These differences underscore the fact that the groundrules by which
these purchase obligations have been defined are, to a large extent,
arbitrary in nature. With time, and changing circumstances, they
could well change depending on DICA's objectives and its perception
of the French national interest.
ERAP AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST
The more important aspects of French oil policy aimed at ensuring
a market outlet for French-produced oil have just been described above.
We are now in a position to go back to Table 1-3, on page 31, and ask:
How has this policy assisted ERAP in disposing of its apparent crude oil
surplus of 13.4 million tons in 1967? The answer is given summarily in
Table 1-9.
The effect of DICA's Franc oil purchase system was to turn ERAP's
potential crude surplus into a marginally crude short position in 1967.
The system provided ERAP with a guaranteed and high-priced outlet in
the French market, over and above that of its own refining requirements;
an outlet which absorbed some 13.6 million tons of the Group's Franc
Zone oil during 1967. In consequence, ERAP's sales on the open market
were lower than its net external purchases.
In 1967, most of the ERAP Group's "foreign" crude resources was
directed to its own refineries in France -- which absorbed 3.2 million
tons out of a total availability of "foreign crudes" of about 5 million
tons (2.9 million purchased outright, 1.1 million supplied by Caltex,
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and about 1 million received in exchange for Gabon crude). The fact
that ERAP's refineries utilized a substantial proportion of "foreign"
crude relative to their total requirements is not, in itself, evidence
that ERAP was crude short and unable to supply its refineries with its
own Franc Zone resources. The mix in ELF's refining crude slate was
probably determined primarily by the company's attempt to optimize its
refining operations: mixing heavier Middle Eastern crudes with the
lighter Algerian variety in order to balance its refining output with
its market opportunities. On the other hand, that a large portion of
this "foreign" crude was bought outright rather than exchanged for
ERAP's own Franc Zone resources is significant, and confirms the like-
lihood that ERAP faced supply limitations in 1967 (partly confirmed by
ERAP itself, which states in its Annual Report that the closure of its
Nigerian fields led to the purchase of 900,000 tons of oil).
The sales of crude oil in France under the national interest mantle
covered about 49% of the ERAP Group's total crude resources in 1967.
Sales to ELF-controlled refining outlets contributed a further 26%. If
we assume that the former were undertaken at an average price of 2.00
$/barrel, and the latter at 1.60 $/barrel, and, further, that ERAP's
average realization on all of its sales was 1.80 $/barrel, then the
average price on the remaining 25% of its sales is given by:
1.80 - (0.49 x 2.00 + 0.26 x 1.60) 
- 1.60 $/barrel
0.25
It would thus seem that all of ERAP;s sales -- with the major ex-
ception of those finding a haven in France under DICA's national inter-
est classification -- were being undertaken within the price range of
TABLE 1-9
ERAP' S CRUDE SUPPLY-DEMAND BALANCE FOR 1967
(Millions of Metric Tons)
Source: ERAP/Elf, Rapport de
Gestion, 1967
ERAP/Elf, Bulletin
Mensuel d'Information
OUTLETS
PRODUCTION BY ERAP GROUP:
- France
- Algeria
- Gabon & Congo
- Nigeria
TOTAL
0.4
18.5*
0.8
22.1
PRODUCTION BY ASSOCIATED COMPANIES:
- Algeria
CRUDE PURCHASES:*
CRUDE SUPPLIED BY CALTEX TO UIP:
TOTAL RESOURCES
FRENCH OUTLETS:
- Elf-Union & Elf-UIP
- Sales under national
interest purchase
contracts
TOTAL
OTHER EUROPEAN OUTLETS:
- Speyer
- Antwerp (Albatros)
- Italy
1.7
2.9
1.1 TOTAL
SUPPLIES TO AFFILIATED AFRICAN
REFINERIES:
SALES ON OPEN MARKET:
TOTAL OUTLETS27.8
7.4
13.6
21.0
1.8
1.1
0.7
3.6
0.5
2.7
27.8
*
Of which about 3.5 million tons were marketed by ERAP for the account of SONATRACH: ERAP's
partner in the Algerian producing company of SN REPAL.
**
Of which 1.06 million tons were exchanged for "Mediterranean" (probably Libyan) crudes.
Part of these purchases were prompted by the Nigerian crisis which deprived ERAP of about
900,000 tons of anticipated production in the country.
RESOURCES
'-'1
'.0
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1.55 - 1.65 $/barrel, prior to the Suez Canal closure in mid-1967.
The exception of this case, however, is far from negligible, and
represents a substantial price penalty (either by comparison with the
prices perceived by ERAP on the balance of its sales, or with respect
to the probable cost of alternate sources of supply) which at one
point or another must be accounted for in the French economy. We
shall return to this issue in Chapter III.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND MODIFICATIONS IN THE NATIONAL
INTEREST PURCHASE SYSTEM:
The contracts which the international refining affiliates signed
with SOVAP in 1966 expired at the end of 1968. After a further pro-
tracted bout of negotiations, they were eventually renewed in 1969 -
although on a somewhat different basis - through the signing of two-
year crude oil supply contracts. The modifications which were thus
introduced into the system of Franc oil purchase assessments are four-
fold:
a) On the matter of quantities, DICA and SOVAP (now renamed
SOCAP) agreed to a further increase in the quantity allow-
ances which are deductible from each refining company's
gross Franc Zone quota. This concession was prompted by
limitations in ERAP's crude oil supply availabilities -
Sources for this Section include: Petroleum Press Service,
September 1968 and January 1969; Bulletin de l'Industrie Petroliere,
August 28, October 11, December 2 & 11, 1968; Petroleum Intelligence
Weekly, December 16, 1968 and May 5, 1969.
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the growth of the latter's production interests having
lagged behind the growth in France's demand for petroleum
products.
The general method by which each of France's international
refining companies were assessed for specific purchase
quantities did not vary substantially from that adopted
in 1966. The point of departure for this calculation re-
mained the estimated French internal market demand for
crude oil. This was established at 74 million tons for
1969 and 81 million tons for 1970. Each company's gross
Franc Zone quota was again derived by taking 55% of the
latter figure, and allocating the result in accordance
with each company's estimated share of the refining mar-
ket. Both a Franc Zone production allowance and a 10%
quantitative allowance were also admitted as before, but,
in addition, a further 5% quantity allowance off the re-
sulting net quota was introduced. The resulting purchase
assessments by company are shown in Table 1-10 (together
with the corresponding 1968 figures for purposes of
comparison).
b) The modifications which were introduced in 1969 on the
matter of price were relatively minor. It will be re-
called that the 1966 base price for Algerian oil of 2.12
$/barrel was subject to a freight escalation factor. As
a result of the closure of the Suez Canal, this factor
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TABLE I-10
1968 & 1969 FRANC OIL PURCHASE OBLIGATIONS
(Millions of Tons)
1969 1968
ESSO 2.50 2.78
SHELL-BERRE 2.40 2.28
B.P. 1.50 1.45
MOBIL 4.30 4.10
TOTAL 10.70 10.61
Source: Petroleum Press Service, Jan. 1969
had raised the price for Franc Zone oil to 2.18 $/barrel by the
end of 1968. By contrast, the base price which was eventually
retained for the 1969 contracts was 2.16 $/barrel, FOB, also
subject to freight escalation. Of the total price of 2.16,
$0.23 was estimated to be subject to variation with freight
rates. This freight element is subject to fluctuate in accord-
ance with movements of AFRA for Long Range One and Two,and on
a basis which gives equal weight to shipments from the Persian
Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean.
c) As opposed to the 1966 contracts of three year duration, the
1969 contracts extended for only two years - through 1970.
This change is reported to have been prompted by the fact
that the transition period, granted to EEC member countries
for the purpose of bringing their petroleum policies in con-
formity with the provisions of the Rome Treaty, is due to
expire at the end of 1970.
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d) Finally, the 1969 purchase obligations concerned crude
supplies originating not only from Algeria, but also
from Gabon. The contractual details related to the
latter supplies were not finalized until April 1969.
The base price was then set at 1.61 $/barrel FOB Port
Gentil or Gamba for 30 - 30.9* API crude. On the matter
of quantities, 16.5% of each of the international
companies' 1969 net Franc oil purchase obligation is
expected to originate from Gabon - rising to 20.9% in
1970. Once these purchase allocations are made, however,
a further 20% quantity allowance has been conceded by
SOCAP in deduction from the 1969 Gabon deliveries.
The advent of crude oil from Gabon into the Franc Zone purchase
system is evidence of the growing importance of this crude source to
ERAP. Royal Dutch Shell is also particularly active in that country -
and since Gabon is part of the Franc Zone, 80% of its production from
the area is allowed as a deduction in calculating its purchase obliga-
tion. Shall Gabon has a 50% interest in the two most recently developed
fields in the country: Gamba and Invinga (the other 50% being held by
SPAFE, an ERAP subsidiary). Both of these fields first entered into
production in 1967, and were together producing at the rate of 2.3
million tons per year by December 1967. In addition, Mobil Oil
Corporation, through its subsidiaries Mobilrex and Mobil Exploration
Equatorial Africa, has a 43% interest in the smaller and older field
of Batanga.
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Meanwhile, ERAP has been intensifying and diversifying its own
exploration activities. Noteworthy in this respect have been its ser-
vice contract agreements with Iran and Iraq, and its joint venture
association with Lipetco in Libya (where SNPA was also granted a
traditional concession area in 1967, in addition to the interests
which it already had in the country in association with Hispanoil and
Murphy Oil Corporation). In Nigeria, also, the French state-owned
company holds relatively important producing interests, which, however,
became inoperative with the flare-up of hostilities in the country.
Of particular interest is that none of the countries listed in the
preceding paragraph is in the Franc Zone. Oil produced in these areas
by ERAP does not, consequently, fall under DICA's present definition of
Franc oil, and hence does not stand to benefit from preferential access
into the French market. The importance of ERAP's producing interests
in these countries may be relatively limited for the moment, but the
company must have at least minimal expectations that its exploratory
efforts in these areas will be successful. In fact, ERAP has reportedly
drilled discovery wells in both of its ventures in Iran and Iraq, where-
as SNPA has decided to develop its discovery on concession 105 in Libya
(held by Hispanoil 42%, Aquitaine Lybie 28%, Murphy oil 16%, and
Auxerap 14%) at the initial rate of one million tons per year. Will
ERAP be able to place this oil in France under the guise of the Franc
oil national interest contracts? Apparently not under present rules.
But these are not immutable. In the course of an interview granted to
World Petroleum, Mr. Andre Giraud, France's Directeur des Carburants,
when asked whether oil discovered in Iran by ERAP would be granted
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special sale facilities on the French market, responded as follows:
"... amongst the condition accompanying the granting
of the special authorizations for importation and refining,
the law of 30th March 1928 provides for the eventual pur-
chase of crudes considered to be of national interest by
the Ministry of Industry. This provision, known to the
companies who solicit these authorizations is therefore
accepted by them. It is not estimated that it will be
abandoned."1
RESTRICTIONS ON REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCT IMPORTS
Imports of refined petroleum products into France are also subject
to stringent controls. Just as in the case of crude oil, periodic "import
authorizations" for refined petroleum products are issued by the French
authorities. But in equally similar fashion, these authorizations are
not, in themselves, constraining in practice. Witness the following
statement by Mr. Andre Giraud:
"It is essential to note that, contrary to a widely
held opinion, since a number of years the A-3's have had
no more than an indicative effect. Relative market shares
have not been subject to regulation, and the companies
have, for the most part, obtained satisfactory results...
"Nevertheless it is certain that the industry, as
well as the administration, still gives a great deal of
importance to the import authorizations for products
derived from petroleum, for these could at any moment
give rise to effective quota limitations, if the Govern-
ment deemed it necessary and made subject to quantitative
authorizat on (Franc Zone) oil which is now not subject
to quota."'
'World Petroleum, April 1967, p. 158.
2Interview published in the January 19, 1968, edition of P6trole
Informations - La Revue Petroliere.
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Even though not limiting in practice, the petroleum product
authorizations - just as those for crude oil - are of indicative
importance. The fact that they are of relatively short duration,
moreover, adds to their importance in this respect, by providing
the French authorities with a means to signal their intention on
a periodic and current basis. A description of the system of re-
fined product import authorizations is consequently of interest.
The two latest set of authorizations concerning the import
of refined petroleum products were granted in 1965 and again in
1968. Each of these covered successive periods of three years,
hence their .common appelation as A-3's.
With the publication of the 1963 authorizations, only motor
gasoline and lubricants were made subject to specific quantitative
import quotas, the importation of all other products being listed
as "provisionally unlimited." However, in order to be empowered
to import the latter products, a company still has to be authorized
by the 1963 decree as an accredited importer. The most recent decree,
which appeared in February 1968, went further in this respect by
allowing that lubricant imports would also be quantitatively un-
limited. Motor gasoline is, consequently, the only remaining re-
fined product which faces a specific quantitative import quota under
this system. These quotas, by major company groups, are summarized
in Table I-10.
The phrase "import authorization," often used in describing the
A-3's, can be misleading. Since refineries located in France are
legally considered to be in bond, the A-3's are more akin to
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distribution authorizations. The A-3 gasoline authorizations shown
in Table I-11 thus represent the maximum amount of this product which
each company can bring into market, whether its source is a local or
a foreign refinery.
In interpreting the figures shown in Table 1-11, it is import-
ant to note that products manufactured from Franc Zone crude presently
fall outside of the limits imposed by the A-3's. In order to place
the latter in context, it may be useful to compare them with actual
figures.
The total gasoline authorization for the 1965-68 period was
10.46 million tons. On the other hand, the actual demand for gasoline
by the internal French market during this period was, in million of
tons:
1965 1966 1967
8.4 9.1 9.9
The lack of constraint implied by these figures is all the greater when
it is noted that of the total crude oil refined at the time in France for
the French market, somewhat more than 35% originated either from
Metropolitan France or from the Franc Zone - and gasoline refined from
the latter is technically not subject to the distribution authoriza-
tions.
Activit6 de l'Industrie P'troliare, Tome II, Direction des
Carburants, Ministere de l'Industrie, Paris.
TABLE I-11
ANNUAL GASOLINE IMPORT AUTHORIZATIONS (A-3'S)
Thousands of Tons Percent of Total
(1965-1968) (1968-1971) (1965-1968) (1968-1971) Percent Increase
Shell-Berre 1618.0 2150.0 15.46 14.87 32.9
ESSO 1611.3 2050.0 15.40 14.18 27.2
BP Group** 790.2 1043.0 7.55 7.21 32.0
Mobil 575.3 775.0 5.50 5.36 34.8
Purfina 328.9 450.0 3.14 3.11 36.8
Other "Non-French" 10.5 128.0 0.10 0.89 1219.0
SUB-TOTAL 4934.2 6596.0 47.15 45.62 33.7
ELF/UGP Group 1422.2 2100.0 13.61 14.52 47.7
CFR/Total Group 2994.5 4225.0 28.61 29.23 41.1
ANTAR 707.1 1075.4 6.76 7.45 52.0
Petrolys 170.0 170.0 1.61 1.17 --
Other Companies
Associated with ANTAR 39.0 54.6 0.37 0.37 40.0
Independent Companies 197.0 237.5 1.89 1.64 20.6
SUB-TOTAL 5529.8 7862.5 52.85 54.38 42.2
TOTAL 10464.1 14458.5 100.00 100.00 38.2
These quotas only apply to gasoline destined to the internal civilian market. Exports and
military sales are not restricted.
Includes "Soci6tg Parisienne des Essences" in which BP (France). has a 45% participation.
ANTAR has a 68% participation in Petrolys.
Sources: Guide du Petrole Gaz-Chimie, Reglementation 1967, Editions 0. Lesourd, Paris, 1967
P6trole Information-La Revue Petrolie"re, March 1, 1968.
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The distribution of the A-3 quotas among France's various oil
companies is not proportional to the latter's actual sales, as shown
in Table 1-12. Their restrictive potential is consequently not uniform.
In the case of Esso Standard, for example, the total sales of motor
gasoline by that company on the French market amounted to 1630 thousand
tons in 1966, compared to its then prevalent authorization of 1611
thousand tons. These figures of course do not imply that the company
had thereby infringed on the limit imposed by its A-3 quotas, since the
gasoline which it sold was refined locally from a crude slate which was
composed of more than 45% Franc Zone crude. These figures - which are
typical of all of the international companies in France - do indicate,
however, that the A-3's would indeed become far more constraining if
products refined from Franc Zone crude were to fall under the system -
as was intimated to be possible by Mr. Giraud in the statement quoted
above.
Given the present lack of constraint associated with these authoriza-
tions, however, the question is then raised as to what are the effective
practical limitations on petroleum product imports into France.
Perhaps the most important and effective limitation is found in the
very text of the A-3 decrees. Article 11 of the two latest of these
states that authorized importers which are also beneficiaries of crude
oil import authorizations (i.e., which are also refiners in France)
are obligated to off-take from local refineries at least 90% of the
finished products marketed each year for their own account. In other
words, companies which have refining operations in France can only im-
port from abroad up to 10% of their sales in the local market.
TABLE 1-12
1965 SALES OF GASOLINE IN METROPOLITAN FRANCE BY COMPANY
Thousands of Tons Percent of Total Percent of (1965-68) A-3's
Shell-Berre
ESSO
BP Group
Mobil
Purfina
ELF/UGP Group
CFR/Tjtal Group
ANTAR
Others
TOTAL
*
Not including Petrolys or other associated companies.
Sources: Oil and Gas Journal Journal, May, 1966. (Vol. 6, No. 5).
Annual Reports of Companies
Annaire Petrole Informations, 1966, Petrole Informations, Paris.
1490
1540
730
550
300
710
2170
630
250
8370
17.8
18.4
8.7
6.6
3.6
8.5
25.9
7.5
3.0
100.0
92
95
92
95
91
50
73
89
60
80
0
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France's refining companies are thus faced with an effective
limit on their freedom to import refined products; one which is all
the more effective since it is independent of the three-year gasoline
quota authorizations and applies to all products as a group. The
constraints which face non-integrated importers, however, are less
obviously a matter of public record.
In exercising the right to import granted to them by the A-3
authorizations, all companies are, in practice, required to apply for
specific import licenses. These are generally expected to be issued
as a matter of course to all qualified and accredited applicants,
but they nevertheless add quite obviously to the authorities' suasive
powers in the event that a particular importer is judged to be stepping
outside of the bounds of acceptable behavior. The French authorities,
moreover, always have the option of rescinding any importer's accredita-
tion by removing his name from the A-3 lists of authorized importers.
The sources of constraint on non-integrated distributors in this en-
vironment can thus be imagined to be many and informal, though no less
potent for the fact.
In addition to these informal measures, however, a further
quantitative bound is added to the system in the form of specific
annual quantitative import quotas established by DICA for products
originating either from the EEC or from Eastern Europe. These quotas
are specified by product and are allocated among both the country's
refining and non-integrated companies. The total EEC quota, for all
products combined, is shown below for the past few years.
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TABLE 1-13
TOTAL IMPORT QUOTAS FOR REFINED PRODUCTS
ORIGINATING FROM THE EEC
(Thousand of Tons Per Year)
1959-61 1962-63 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
652 1416 1550 1780 1780 2509 2750
Source: Private Communication
Of the total quotas shown, approximately 70 to 80% are reportedly
allocated to the Elf/ERAP group, particularly in connection with the
latter's processing of crude at the Albatros refinery in Belgium.
Moreover, the sizeable increase in the EEC quota shown over time has
been partly achieved as a result of continued prodding to this effect
from the EEC Commission. 1
Since the EEC and Eastern European countries are geographically
the closest potential sources for petroleum product imports into
France, the limiting effectiveness of DICA's quotas, in this respect,
is obviously of substantial importance. And when these quantitative
limits are added to DICA's accreditive powers, it can be seen that
the latter does indeed have the means to closely control the flow
of refined product imports into France.
OTHER REGULAROTY ASPECTS
In addition to the control which it exercises over France's
1Platt's Oilgram, August 23, 1963; and Petroleum Press Service,
July 1964, p. 214.
imports of crude oil and refined products, DICA is also empowered to
regulate the internal activities of the French petroleum industry.
Of particular importance in this respect is DICA's control over the
construction of refineries and gasoline distribution points.
Although DICA's Franc oil purchase system effectively assured
ERAP of a protected channel by which to dispose of its crude oil
resources, the French national oil company nevertheless decided to
integrate forward on the French market. It was primarily the fact
that this decision was implicitly endorsed and embodied in the text
of the 1963 A-10 crude oil import authorizations which disturbed the
international refining companies at the time of the latter's issuance.
For the A-10 decree also strengthened and broadened the internal con-
trols available to DICA. These authorizations, moreover, projected
a substantial decline in the relative position of the international
companies, to the benefit of ERAP/Elf (see Table 1-4, page 35). The
international companies therefore suspected that DICA would utilize
its internal controlling influences to their detriment, and thus
assure the decline in their relative position projected by the A-10
authorizations.
Their concern in this respect was sufficiently aroused that they
eventually appealed their case in front of the Conseil d'Etat; while
the vice-president of Shell Francais registered a personal objection
by resigning from his post. It was not until 1965 that the companies'
concern on this front was partly assuaged, on the one hand by the
publication of the A-3 authorizations (whose projection of the decline
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in the international companies' market shares was not as dramatic),
but also as a result of a letter addressed to them by the Minister
of Industry. The letter, dated October 27, 1965, essentially denied
in relatively muted and conciliatory terms that the government's
regulatory arsenal would be used to discriminate against the interna-
tional companies.1
The various channels through which the French authorities are
empowered to regulate the internal activities of the French refining
activities - and which were at the heart of the international
companies' aroused sensibilities - include the following.
Refinery construction and expansion. Prior to the latest A-10
authorizations, issued in 1963, only the construction of totally new
refineries was subject to official approval. The 1963 authorizations
broadened this authority to cover refinery expansion plans as well.
The power thus granted to the French administration is obviously
substantial. It was underscored in 1966, when the lead position for
the construction of the Lorraine refinery was granted to CFR, in
spite of the fact that Esso had earlier requested permission to
build this refinery for itself in late 1964. In a number of sub-
sequent cases, however, projects submitted by the international
companies, both for the expansion of existing refineries and for
the construction of new facilities, have been approved. Be that
'Platt's Oilgram News Service, November 8, 1965.
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as it may, the fact remains that the French authorities are empowered
by these provisions to significantly affect the future development
and composition of the French refining industry.
Crude oil supply programs. The 1963 decrees also formally re-
quired for the first time that refining companies should submit to
DICA their annual supply programs for each of their refining units.
Expansion or modernization of a distribution network. The con-
struction of new gasoline service stations in France is strictly
regulated by DICA. The controlling mechanism to this effect has
been subject to a series of modifications, the most recent appearing
in February 1969. In essence this latest system foresees that the
construction of new service stations, as well as the take-over of
existing ones, would be subject to licensing by DICA - the allocation
of these licenses among distribution companies (one type for the con-
struction of new stations and another for take-overs) being made on
the basis of the latter's pro-rata share in the A-3 authorizations.
Moreover, the minimum allowed distance between two sales points of
the same brand was reduced from 40 to 25 kilometers. In addition, the
construction of new service stations was permitted outside of the
licensing system, but only if three older stations are closed down
in exchange (subject to the approval of the three dealers affected).
This last measure was offered in the hope that it would promote the
modernization of France's distribution network. Finally, a special
license allocation for rural areas was also envisaged.
1Cf. Petroleum Press Service, March 1969, and Esso Standard SAF,
Informations Economiques, February 29, 1969.
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Although strict in a number of respects, the February 1969 ser-
vice station regulations replaced a far less flexible system which
had been introduced in January 1969. The international companies had
viewed the latter with such concern at the time of its promulgation
that they questioned its legal validity in an action taken in front
of the Conseil d'Etat. But in late 1963, this body ruled against
them.
SUMMARY AND THE SETTING FOR SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS
The foregoing has described the complex of official intent and
regulations which directs the French petroleum industry. The stage
has thus been set for an economic analysis of official French petroleum
policy. In order to clarify and highlight the issues involved at the
outset, however, it may be well to briefly summarize at this point
recent official French action in the petroleum field.
- Soon after World War II, the French Government, primarily
motivated by security of supply and balance of payment
considerations, actively promoted oil exploration in
Algeria - an area which was then still under direct French
control.
- With the discovery of the fields of Hassi Messaoud and
Edjeleh in early 1956 came the question of how to dispose
of this potential crude oil production. The French
authorities' response to this marketing problem was to
call upon the country's refining companies to purchase
specified quantities of Algerian oil "in the national
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interest," and at comparatively high prices.
- The relatively high price structure of France's crude
oil supplies derived from the Franc Zone provided argu-
ment for the maintenance of France's restrictions on
product imports; although it should be recognized that
protection from petroleum product imports preceded the
discovery of oil in the Sahara.
- With the discovery of Algerian oil, ERAP (in the form
of its predecessor, the Union G6n6rale des P6troles),
embarked on a program of forward integration - primarily
but not uniquely confined to France.
- In 1965 ERAP launched a sizeable new exploration program,
initiated by the signing of the Franc-Algerian Accords
in July of the same year. This exploratory effort was
subsequently extended to the Middle East and other
African areas with the signing of novel exploration and
production contracts in countries such as Iran, Iraq,
and Libya, among others.
ERAP's recent exploration efforts, as well as its program of forward
integration, reflect the French Government's broad strategic objectives
concerning the petroleum industry. These objectives have recently been
publicized. On the exploration and crude oil production front, the
1 Cf., for example, interview given by Mr. Pierre Guillaumat, Presi-
dent of ERAP, in November 1967 issue of R~alitgs.
~1
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goal has been set as the control by French oil companies of a produc-
tion potential at least equal to the country's crude oil requirements.
With respect to refining and distribution, French companies are of-
ficially expected to attain a controlling position on the local market
ranging from 50% to 60% of French product demand. These are the broad -
or primary - guidelines. But necessarily associated with them are
secondard issues which also have to be resolved and whose economic
consequences are far from negligible. The complex of issues which
faces French - or for that matter European - petroleum policy-makers
can be summarized as follows:
Primary Startegic Decisions:
1) Should a country such as France promote and finance petroleum
exploration at the government level?
2) Should it create a state-owned refining and distribution
entity to serve the local market? This question need not
depend upon the discovery of a sizeable production potential
since supplies of crude oil could derive from third parties.
Secondary or Subsidiary Decisions:
1) In the event of discovery of sizeable crude oil resources,
how should these be commercialized? Should the country
invoke the national interest and insist that private re-
fining companies purchase at least part of the nationally
produced oil? Or should the national oil company inte-
grate forward, or, alternatively sell its crude on the
world market?
2) At what price level should the national oil company trans-
fer or sell its crude oil to the country's local refining
industry?
The rationale which has been advanced in justification for the prim-
ary objectives of French petroleum policy is diverse. Its various facets
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will be reviewed in Chapters III and IV. Attention will first be
focused, however, on the secondary issues listed above.
Although subsidiary in nature, the manner in which these issues
are resolved can have important economic consequences. It essentially
determines, for example, whether France needs to pursue protectionist
import policies in the petroleum sector. Depending upon the govern-
ment's aims a high price level for nationally produced crude may seem
advantageous: it provides an incentive for exploration, and it serves
indirectly to finance ERAP's investment program. But it can also have
undesirable economic implications. A fictitious price level can lead
to inefficient investment decisions and a consequential misallocation
of resources. Further, by fostering protectionism it can dampen
competition in the refining and distribution sectors. These issues
form the topical background for the following analysis of the potential
economic consequences of French petroleum policies. This analysis
opens with a selected case study of the development of Algeria's oil
industry.
APPENDIX I-A
THE STRUCTURE OF THE FRENCH REFINING SECTOR
Most of France's refineries are owned individually by the more im-
portant oil companies operating in the country. However, a multiple-
owned refining complex in Alsace entered into production in 1963, re-
ceiving its crude oil supplies through the South-European Pipeline from
the Mediterranean port of Lavera. This complex presently consists of
two companies: the Societe de la Raffinerie de Strasbourg and the
Socist6 Rhenane de Raffinage, in one or the other of which most of
Fiance's refining companies own an equity interest. Because of the
multiple-ownership structure of these companies, they are both operated
on a processing toll basis, neither of them taking title to either the
crude oil or the refined products passing through their installations.
A third company which has a similar ownership structure is the Societe
de la Raffinerie de Lorraine, owned jointly by CFR, Esso and Elf. It
is anticipated that it will enter into active operation upon completion
of the Lorraine refinery, presently under construction.
The inter-corporate affiliations of France's refining companies
can be quite complex. Table IA-1 summarizes the more relevant aspects
of the industry's structure.
The amounts of crude oil delivered to France's refining sector,
from 1963 to 1967, are shown in Table IA-2. The format of this table
is basically similar to that used by the Direction des Carburants (DICA)
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in publishing these figures, and distinguishes between crude delivered
under processing agreements and those delivered for "French require-
ments" (besoins francais). This nomenclature may be misleading, since
not all of the petroleum products refined under processing agreements
are exported, while conversely, a not insignificant portion of France's
product exports are undertaken by the country's refining companies for
their own account (as opposed to exports for the account of third
parties under processing agreements).
The relative position of the various companies within France's re-
fining sector is not compiled and published officially. However, it is
possible to construct this body of data from information given in these
companies' annual reports. But in order to arrive at a reasonably ac-
curate and consistent breakdown of the country's refining sector,
account must be taken of all inter-company processing transactions.
Furthermore, exports of petroleum products undertaken by the refining
companies for their own account also need to be accounted for in deter-
mining their position relative to the strictly local market. Otherwise,
the relative position of companies such as Esso Standard - whose
strong ties with neighboring companies in the Esso Group serve to pro-
mote its exports -- would be overstated.
Table IA-3 -- based on information given in company annual reports --
attempts to account for these potential sources of bias. Calculated
in this manner, the total quality of crude processed by the French re-
fining sector amounts to 66.3 million tons in 1966. This compares
with a figure of 67.1 million, published by DICA (the figure of 67.6
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million tons shown in Table IA-2 refers to crude deliveries rather than
to crude processed). The discrepancy between DICA's figure and the
one resulting from aggregating the information reported by each refin-
ing company is not large: slightly more than 1%.
Of the total amount of crude refined in 1966 -- 66.3 million tons -
a sizeable amount was export-oriented. Processing agreements between
the international refining affiliates and their parent or associated
companies in neighboring countries accounted for about 7.3 million
tons, whereas direct own-account exports by the refining companies
themselves absorbed an estimated 6.0 million tons of crude. The crude
oil required to serve the country's local demand for petroleum products
(net of imports) consequently amounted to an estimated total of 52.5
million tons.
4-
TABLE IA-1
FRANCE'S REFINING SECTOR
Company
Compagnie de
Raf finage
Shell-Berre.
Ownership
Owned 60% by Shell
Francaise and 40%
by Cie. des Produits
Chimiques at
Raffinneries de
Berre (controlled
by St. Gobain).
The Royal Dutch
Shell group owns
a 79% interest in
Shell Francaise
Refineries
Owned
- Berre
- Pauillac
- Petit-
Couronne
Atmospheric Distilla-
tion Capacity at
Mid-1968
(Tons)
6,000,000
500,000
9,200,000
Participation in
Other Refining
Companies
- 37% of Cie.
Rhenane de
Ragginage
Standard Oil of New - Port Jerome
Jersey owns a 63% 
- Bordeaux
interest in Esso
Standard. Gulf - Fos-sur-Mer
Oil Corporation
also owns an im-
portant but undis-
closed participation
in this company. The
balance of the company's
shares are publicly
owned and are quoted
on the Paris Bourse
4,800,000
2,600,000
3,000,000
- 40% Of Raffinerie
de Lorraine
(continued on p. 84)
Esso Standard
S.A.F.
LI.
)
Table IA-1
(continued)
Company
Ste. Francaise
des Petroles B.P.
Mobil Oil
Francaise
Antar Petroles
de l'Atlantique
Ownership
The British Petroleum
group owns approximately
70% of this company. At
least part of the bal-
ance of the company is
held publicly, its shares
being quoted on the Paris
Bourse
Wholly-owned by Mobil
Oil Corporation
No international af-
filiations. Shares
quoted on Paris
Bourse. A control-
ling interest in
ANTAR is held by
SOCANTAR, 40.5% of
which is, in turn,
owned by Pechelbronn
S.A.
Refineries
Owned
- Dunkerke
- Lavera
- Vernon
- Frontignan
- Notre-Dame
de Gravenchon
- Donges
- Vern-sur-
Seiche
- Valenciennes
Atmospheric Distilla-
tion Capacity at
Mid 1968
(Tons)
5,500,000
4,400,000
Under
Construction
1,730,000
3,600,000
4,575,000
1,200,000
Under
Construction
Participation in
Other Refining
Companies
- 1/3 of Raffinerie
de Strasbourg
- 5% of Cie.
Rhenane de
Raffinage
- 1/3 of Raffinerie
de Strasbourg (in
association with
Pechelbronn)
*
Start-up expected in 1969/70 with 3,000,000 ton capacity.
**
Start-up expected in 1969 with 3,500,000 ton capacity.
Go
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Table IA-1
(continued)
Company
Cie. Francaise de
Raffinage (CFR)
Elf-Union
Ownership
CFP owns a 50.3 interest in
CFR. Another 13.3% is owned
by Societe Financiere
Desmarais Freres, while the
French Government owns 9.1%
of the company. CFR's
shares are also quoted on
the Paris Bourse.
100% owned by ERAP, itself
wholly-owned by the French
Government
Atmospheric Distilla-
tion Capacity at
Refineries Mid-1968
Owned (Tons)
-Gonfreville
-La Mede
-Vexin/
Porcheville*
14,300,000
10,235,000
3,600,000
Participation in
Other Refining
Companies
- 1/3 of Raffinerie
de Strasbourg (in
association with
CFP)
- 51% of Raffinerie
de Lorraine
- 60% of Elf-UIP
- 78% of Rhone- o
Alps Ci
- 50% of CORIF '
- 9% of
Raffinerie de
Lorraine
Owned 60% by Elf-Union
and 40%. by Caltex
-Ambes 2,000,000 -10% of Cie.
Rhenane de
Raffinage
- 50% of CORIF
Inaugurated in July, 1968. The primary purpose of this refinery is to supply
fuel-oil to Electricite de France's thermo-electric plant at.Porcheville.
Elf -UIP
Table IA-1
(continued)
Rhone Alpes:
Union pour le
Raffinage et la
Petrochimie
Cie. de la
Raffinerie de
l'Ile de
France (CORIF)
Raffinerie de
Strasbourg
Ownership
Owned 78% by Elf-Union, the
remaining 22% being owned
jointly by Ugine-Kuhlmann
and Progie
Owned 50% by Elf-Union
and 50% by Elf-UIP
1/3 of this company is
owned by CFP and CFR,
another third by Antar
and Pechelbronn, and
the last third by Ste.
Francaise B.P.
Atmospheric Distilla-
tion Capacity at
Refineries Mid 1968
Owned (Tons)
-Feyzin
-Ile de
France
-Herrlisheim
Participation in
Other Refining
Companies
6,000,000
3,600,000
4,400,000
Compagnie Rhenane
de Raffinage
Deutsche Shell 48% -Reichstett
Cie.Raffinage Shell-Berre 37%
Elf-Union 10%
Mobil Oil Francaise 5%
3,700,000
-J
Table IA-1
(continued)
Atmospheric Distilla-
tion Capacity at
Refineries Mid 1968
Owned (Tons)
Participation in
Other Refining
Companies
Societe de la
Raffinerie de
Lorraine
CFR
Esso Standard
Elf-Union
51%
40%
9%
-Lorraine Under
Construction
Start-up expected in 1970 with 3,300,000 ton capacity
co
Sources: Union des Chambres Syndicales de l'Industrie du Petrole, l'Industrie
Francaise du Petrole, 1966/67.
Guide du Petrole - Annuaire 1967, Editions 0. Lesourd, Paris.
Company Ownership
TABLE IA-2
DELIVERIES OF CRUDE OIL TO FRANCE'S REFINERY SECTOR BY ORIGIN
Thousand of Tons Percent
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
"FRENCH REQUIREMENTS"
Metropolitan France.
Other Franc Zone
Middle East
Other
TOTAL
2,516 2,826.
15,488 17,568.
20,238 22,103
4,157 4,497
42,399 46,994
2,967 2,938
17,306 19,170
26,343 25,350
7,816. 11,945
54,432 59,403
"PROCESSING REQUIREMENTS"
Metropolitan France
Other Franc Zone
Middle East
Other
. TOTAL
"TOTAL DELIVERIES"
Metropolitan France
Other Franc Zone
Middle East
Other
TOTAL
978
3,269
504
4,751
1,103
4,545
1,210
6,858
1,206 744
4,06k 5,746
1,859 1,678
7,126 8,168
2,516 2,826 2,967 2,938
16,466 18,671 18,512 19,914
23,507 26,648 30,404 31,096
4,661 5,707 9,675 13,623
47,150 53,852 61,558 67,571
1,048
4,466
1,855
7,369
2,835
22,226
35,041
15,558
75,660
20.6
68.8
10.6
100.0
5.3
35.0
49.8
9.9
100.0
16.1
66.2
17.7
100.0
5.2
34.7
49.5
10.6
100.0
16.9
68.0
26.1
100.0
9.1
70.4
20.5
100.0
14.2
60.6
25.2
100.0
4.8 4.3 3.7
30.1 29.5 29.3
49.4
15.7
100.0
46.0
20.2
100.0
46.4
20.6
100.0
Source: Activit' de 1'Industrie Petroliere, Ministere
Direction'des Carburants, selected years.
de l'Industrie,
2,835
21,178
30,575
13,703
68,291
5.9
36.6
47,7
9.8
100.0
6.0
37.4
47.0
9.6
100.0
5.5
31.8
48.4
14.3
100.0
4.9
32.3
32.7
20.1
100.0
4.1
31.0
44.8
20.1
100.0
I
000*
'
Total Crude
Refined by
Company*
Esso Standard 8.72
Shell-Berre 11.91
Deutsch Shell &
Shell Switzerland 2.17
B.P. 10.31
Mobil 5.11
CFR 17.52
Antar 5.83
Elf/ERAP 4.68
TOTAL 66.25
Crude Refined
For Others
Under Proces-
sing Agreements
0.14
1.41.
2.30
1.41
0.24
0.11
5.61
Crude Re-
fined for
Company's
Account
8.58
10.50
2.17
8.01
3.70
17.28
5.72
4.68
60.64
Products Equiv. Crude
Exported Required for
On Otn Own-Accunt
Account Exports
1.43 1.57
0.46 0.50
n. a.
1.58
0.82
1.15
5.44
2.17
1.72
0.90
1.26
8.12
Crude Refined
for Company's
Account for Supply
of Local Market
7.01
10.00
6.29
2.80
16.02
5.72
4.68
52.52
Includes crude processed for account of the company by other refining companies - in
particular that processed by the multiple-owned refining complexes of Strasbourg and Rhenane.
**
Actual average refining yields were used to determine the equivalent amounts of crude
associated with product exports.
Includes some processing either for export or for the account of other local companies.
Source: Selected company annual reports.
TABLE IA-3
BREAKDOWN BY COMPANY OF FRANCE'S REFINING SECTOR
(1966 - millions of tons)
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CHAPTER II
ALGERIAN OIL - A CASE STUDY
The discovery of Algerian oil was the central initiating factor
leading to the creation of ERAP and to the subsequent policies espoused
by the French authorities. The development of Algeria's oil industry
consequently provides a meaningful case history which illustrates some
of the possible economic consequences of French policy decisions. Follow-
ing an introductory and overall description of Algeria's oil industry,
the central concern of this chapter narrows, and is aimed at determining
whether the sheltered and high-priced "national interest" outlet avail-
able to French-produced crude on the French market may have provided an
artificial price incentive to the oil companies operating in Algeria,
giving rise to a corresponding misallocation of investment resources.
THE PARTICIPANTS
On the French side, the two most important companies which partici-
pated in Algerian oil are the Bureau des Recherches de Petrole (BRP)--a
French government agency established in 1946 and later merged with RAP to
form ERAP--and the Algerian subsidiary of CFP, known as CFP(A). On behalf
of Algeria, the colonial Algerian Government organized the Societe Nation-
ale de Recherche et d'Exploitation des Petroles en Algerie (SN REPAL) in
which it retained a 40.5% interest, an equal share being subscribed by
the BRP, and the balance by private and semi-public investors. A number
of the international majors also participated in the initial exploratory
activities in the country, but only Shell and Mobil met with success and
still retain an interest in Algerian production. In addition, a number
of independent companies have hit oil in the country, of which the most
notable are Sinclair, Phillips and Getty (Tidewater).
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During the early exploratory years, private French capital was also
recruited for the cause. This was done through unique investment
companies whose function was to invest in a wide variety of newly-formed
exploration companies. The concept behind these investment companies
was somewhat akin to today's mutual fund: they were to provide a conduit
by which private savings could be channeled into oil exploration at the
lower level of risk achieved through portfolio diversification. The
investment risk was further reduced by means of an interest payment
guarantee by the French Treasury of 5% on paid-in capital lasting for
the first five years of the exploration companies' operations.
Most of the companies involved in Algeria formed multiple-owned
exploration and production associations or affiliates. The more
important of these are summarized in Appendices II-A and II-B.
THE FISCAL AND REGULATORY CLIMATE
In line with the French Government's desire to promote exploration
in the Algerian Sahara, a relatively liberal fiscal regime (especially
as compared with the fiscal framework obtaining in the Middle East) was
drafted during the 1950's. This regime was not substantially altered
immediately following Algeria's independence. Its basic provisions were
incorporated in the Evian Agreement of 1962 in the form of the Saharan
Petroleum Code.
The main fiscal provisions of the Saharan Code consisted of:
(a) A 50% income tax based on realized prices (the Algerian
Government was, however, entitled to contest the latter,
but did not do so in practice).
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(b) A 12.5% royalty based on realized prices netted-back to
the field, i.e., less transportation costs to the coast.
Royalty payments were allowed as a credit against income
tax liabilities.
(c) A 27.5% depletion allowance based on well-head values.
(d) Liberal depreciation and loss-carry-forward provisions,
including the possibility of carrying forward royalty
payments for eventual deduction against income tax
liabilities.
As a result of this fiscal framework, Algerian Government receipts from
the petroleum industry in 1962 amounted to $38.5 million in the form of
royalties and $1.2 million in the form of income taxes on producer and
1pipeline profits. Oil production during that year amounted to 159.3
million barrels, giving an average total receipt per unit of production
of about 25/barrel, as opposed to an average of 76/barrel for the
Middle East as a whole.2
In July of 1965, however, a new agreement was reached between the
French and Algerian Governments. The Franco-Algerian "Accords" of
1965--the first such agreement to be passed on a government to government
level--introduced some fundamental changes in the fiscal regime governing
French producing companies in the country. Its most publicized achieve-
ment was the creation of a joint Franco-Algerian venture, which was
granted exploratory rights over a sizeable area of Algerian territory.
1Pawera, John C., Algeria's Infrastructure, Praeger Social Studies
in International Economics, p. 160.
2
Petroleum Press Service, August 1968, p. 302.
3Accord entre la Republigue Francaise et la Republique Alg6rienne
Democratique et Populaire Concernant le Reglement de Questions touchant
les Hydrocarbures et le Developement Industriel de l'Algerie, 29 Juillet
1965, Imprimerie des Journaux Officiels, Paris.
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But of equal importance were the changes which it introduced in the
taxation of existing concessionaires of French nationaltiy (those of
non-French nationality were not theoretically affected since the French
Government could not pretend to represent them. In practice, however,
they were equally, if not more severely affected). The more important
of these are:
(a) a gradual increase in the income tax rate to 55% by 1969.
(b) the imposition of a tax-reference price for the calculation
of taxable income. This reference price level ranges from
2.04 to 2.095 $/barrel, depending upon the port of export.
(c) elimination of the depletion allowance.
(d) a tightening in allowed depreciation schedules.
In addition, the Algerian Government, through its national oil company
SONATRACH, increased its participation in SN REPAL to 50%.
As a result of these changes, government fiscal receipts from the
petroleum industry increased substantially, amounting to about
23 Dinars/Ton (about 61,/barrel) in 1968.
THE PHYSICAL DIMENSION
Algeria is practically unique among major producing countries in
the breadth and detail of the statistical information publicly available
on the country's oil exploration and development activities. The
Direction des Carburants of the French Ministry of Industry publishes
a statistical annual describing in physical - or real - terms, and in
1Calculated from information given in Bulletin de l'Industrie
P6troliere, January 16, 1969.
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fairly comprehensive detail, the activities of the French petroleum
industry throughout the Franc Zone. Even more interesting, however, is
the fact that this physical data can, to a large extent, be translated
into financial terms by exploiting the annual reports which are published
regularly by such companies as SN REPAL, CREPS, and, more recently, ERAP.
The availability of such financial data allows for a reasonably accurate
economic analysis of at least the bulk of Algeria's petroleum activities,
without having to make recourse to the estimating techniques which are
essential when considering other producing areas. Outside of Algeria,
the petroleum producing industry in the Middle East and North Africa
is characterized by an extreme dearth of publicly available information
of a financial or economic nature.
Before delving into the financial side of Algeria's petroleum
industry, however, it may be useful to set the scene beforehand by
describing the physical context--the fundamental determinant--of this
industry.
A large number of variables generally affect petroleum development
costs, but two of the most important are well depth and production per
well. The first is quite obviously determined by reservoir depth.
Well productivity, on the other hand, is determined by a number of
factors, of which the thickness of the reservoir pay zone and the forma-
tion's permeability are often the most critical. The potential energy
of a reservoir and the type of natural drive mechanism available to
transform it into the dynamic energy of oil production are also important
in this respect, as well as in determining anticipated production decline
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rates. Other naturally occuring parameters are, of course, also
important--sometimes even decisive. Among these are the type of
geological formations which must be penetrated before reaching an oil
reservoir, the geographical distance (over land and over sea) between
a field and the closest attainable market for the oil produced, and,
finally, the size and the general location of a field which can have
some bearing on direct production costs.
An exhaustive comparison of all of these variables, as between
Algeria and other producing areas, is neither possible nor very meaning-
ful for our purposes. Table II-1, however, does present comparative
data with respect to average well depths and average oil production per
well for selected countries. In addition, average reserve to production
ratios are also shown, giving a rough indication of the possible produc-
tion decline rates which may be anticipated in each area. The comparison,
particularly with respect to the latter two variables, does not favor
Algeria--but this is only of limited significance. This data, however,
does provide a useful lead for the introduction of a secondary observa-
tion: that oil producing conditions in Algeria are particularly
heterogeneous--limiting even further any comparative analysis based on
country-wide averages.
Algeria's oil fields are generally located in one of two broad but
distinguishable geographic areas: the northern part of the Sahara,
where the fields of Hassi Messaoud and Rhourde El Baguel are located;
and what is known as the Polignac Basin, dominated by CREPS with the
fields of Edjeleh and Zarzaitine (Figure 11-1). The substantially
TABLE II-1
AVERAGE WELL DEPTHS, PRODUCTION PER WELL, AND RESERVE TO
PRODUCTION RATIOS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES
Saudi
Algeria Libya Kuwait Arabia Iran Iraq
Average Depth of Wells
Drilled (in feet)
- 1963 7306 6851 6296 6691 9433 1621
- 1964 6460 6327 5976 5285 7986 2500
- 1965 7086 6575 7655 6575 8076 2130
- 1966 7868 7628 6452 6176 8240 5627
- 1967 9600 8125 7298 7676 8041 3664
Average Production
Per Well (in barrels/day)
- 1963 890 2940 10800 7850 4550 6650
- 1964 930 3590 12900 10200 4600 6900
- 1965 920 2550 12000 12500 4550 7600
- 1966 1110 2520 11600 12800 4600 7700
- 1967 1230 2460 12800 10200 4550 7350
Average Reserve to
Production Ratio (in years)
- 1963 32.7 44.3 99.2 97.2 59.4 56.8
- 1964 29.5 28.5 90.3 94.2 59.8 56.9
- 1965 31.3 29.2 88.4 86.2 58.1 62.5
- 1966 25.3 26.4 84.3 85.6 53.2 59.2
- 1967 22.8 31.4 83.7 81.2 45.4 64.7
Source: World Oil, August 15 issues.
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different conditions encountered in these two areas is evidenced by the
following figures:
TABLE 11-2
SELECTED MEASURES OF ALGERIA'S
OIL INDUSTRY BY REGION
Northern Polignac Algeria
Sahara Basin Total
1966 Production per well
(Tons/day) 275 51 138
1966 Average depth per well
drilled (meters) 2920 1460 2190
1963 Reserve to production
ratiol 33 19 27
SOURCES: Ministere de l'Industrie, Direction des
Carburants, Activite de l'Industrie
Petroliere, 1966.
Pawera, John C., 2p. Sit., p. 163.
Although measures such as reserve to production ratios can be
deceptive for purposes of economic analysis, the above figures are,
nevertheless, indicative of the existence of substantial differences
between the two regions. The possible deceptiveness of such data is
illustrated by the fact that a high reserve to production ratio may
simply indicate the existence of high cost reserves (high cost in the
sense that their development and production would prove to be uneconomic)
The difference between the aggregate average reserve to production
ratio shown above and the one given in Table 11-2 stems both from the
fact that different sources were consulted in each case, and from the
fact that the end-of-year production rate was taken as the denominator
in the above case as opposed to the average yearly production in
Table 11-2.
- 99 -
rather than a region with rich economic potential. An extreme case of
this nature is indeed found in Algeria, where sizeable liquid hydro-
carbon reserves are found in fields whose production is primarily
gaseous in composition. These liquid reserves, which by and large
remain unexploited have, however, been purposefully excluded in calcu-
lating the reserve to production ratios shown above.
The differences in the routing and length of the pipelines used
by the fields located in Algeria's Northern and Polignac areas are also
significant, as may be seen in Figure II-1. The TRAPSA line (wholly
owned by CREPS) covers 775 kilometers, as opposed to a distance of
660 kilometers for the SOPEG line, and 805 kilometers for the SONATRACH
line, Algeria's third and most recent major trunk line.
A further differentiating factor between these two areas comes
from the proliferation of relatively small fields which have been
developed by CREPS and CEP in the Polignac Basin. This is implicitly
shown in Table 11-3, which gives a capsuled time-history of Algeria's
crude oil production by major field. The category "Other fields -
CREPS/CEP" in this table essentially consists of small fields developed
by these companies in the Polignac Basin. The number of producing
fields of this category rose from 4 in 1963 to 10 in 1967. These
numbers, in fact, tend to understate the actual trend since the production
of some of the smaller new fields (Timedratine, Krebb, Zarzaitine N.E.)
has been integrated into that of larger adjoining fields for reporting
purposes. In 1966, the annual production of this type of small field
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TABLE 11-3
ALGERIAN CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION BY FIELD
Year of Tons x 103
Discovery 1961 1963 1965 1967
Northern Algeria
& Northern Sahara
Hassi Messaoud (N) 1956 3322 4382 5336 6676
Hassi Messaoud (S) 1956 4878 6563 7319 8863
Haoud Berkaoui 1965 -- -- 6 909
El Gassi El Agreb 1960 467 1117 581 2003
Rhourde el Baguel 1962 -- 183 971 4243
Thourde Nouss 1963 -- -- -- 180
Gassi Touil 1963 -- 12 637 4459
Nezla Nord 1966 -- -- -- 263
Other Fields 8 9 4 109
SUB TOTAL 8675 12266 14854 27705
Polignac Basin
Edjeleh 1956 1451 1826 1758 1687
Zarzaitine 1957 5229 6687 5318 3802
Tinguentourine 1956 10 482 562 508
El Adeb Larache 1958 5 494 407 337
Tin Fouye (N) 1960 6 785 1319 1946
Ohanet Sud 1960 -- 164 289 445
Hassi Mazoula (S) 1959 -- -- 16 297
Acheb 1963 -- -- -- 210
Ohanet Nord 1960 288 211 769 602
Askarene 1962 -- 73 167 208
Guelta 1962 -- 60 255 245
Other Fields-SOPEFAL -- -- -- 114
Other Fields-CREPS/CEP -- 99 311 396
SUB TOTAL 6989 11381 11171 10683
TOTAL ALGERIA 15664 23647 26025 38388
Number of fields:
1963 - 4
1965 - 9
1967 -10
Source: Ministere de 1'Industrie,
Direction des Carburants,
Activite' de l'Industrie
P~troliere, selected years.
-101-
ranged from 8.8 (Tin Fouye Sud) to 74.7 (La Reculee) thousand tons
(approximately 190 to 1600 barrels per day), while at the end of the
same year the rate of production per well ranged from 17 (La Reculee)
to 39 (Assekaifaf) tons per day (approximately 132 to 303 barrels per
day).
Also worth noting from Table 11-3 is the decline in absolute terms
of the production rate of a number of fields in the Polignac Basin
during the 1961 to 1967 period. In some cases--particularly in those
of Zarzaitine and Edjeleh--this decline occurred in the face of signi-
ficant additional expenditures invested in field development; thus
indicating that field development programs--at least in this region of
Algeria--have been particularly intensive, leading to an attendant
steep rise in marginal development costs.
This phenomenon, together with the relatively small size of some
of the fields developed in the area, provides a focal point for the
economic analysis which follows, since it suggests that field develop-
ment programs may have been influenced by the relatively high priced
French market outlet virtually assured to French producing companies by
France's crude oil import regulations.
THE ECONOMICS OF ALGERIAN OIL
Cumulative exploration and development capital expenditures in
Algeria's oil industry, through 1962, are given in Table 11-4. These
figures have the advantage of breaking down total expenditures by
broad category of activity. To this extent they provide a possible
TABLE 11-4
CUMULATIVE CAPITAL EXPENDITURE - THROUGH 1962
IN ALGERIA'S OIL INDUSTRY
Francs x 106 % Dollars x 10 6  %
Exploration:-
Geological 117 4 23
Geophysical 1,118 40 224
Drilling (expl.) 1,555 56 311
SUB TOTAL 2,790 100 558 42
Development 2,263 453 34
Transportation 1,649 330 24
TOTAL 6,702 1,341 100
Source: Pawera, John C., Op. Cit., p. 164.
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analytical point of departure. For example, given these figures, and
the time-history of Algeria's crude oil production shown in Table 11-5,
it is an easy matter to calculate the ratio of cumulative development
expenditures through 1962, to the equivalent end-of-year production
rate. This gives 101 Francs/annual ton (964 dollars/daily barrel)--
a figure which seemingly could be advanced as a rough measure of the
average capital investment required to develop a unit of oil production
capacity. It should immediately be noted, however, that such an estimate
suffers from a number of upward biases, among which are the following:
(a) A portion of the expenditures given in Table 11-4 were
invested in the development of gas fields, and conse-
quently should be excluded from the numerator. In
practice, however, the amount of such expenditures was
so small as to be negligible. By the end of 1962 only
8 productive wells had been drilled at Hassi R'Mel,
Algeria's major and only commercially producing gas
field. And of these, at least one--the discovery well--
was an exploration rather than a development well.
(b) Generally, there is a time lag between investment and
attendant production. This effect, however, has little
impact, especially when considering cumulative expendi-
tures over a relatively lengthy period. For example, if
we took the extreme case of assuming a one year lag, and
thus divided by the 1963 end-of-year production rate, the
resulting ratio would be 94 Francs/ton--a not very
significant reduction.
(c) The third source of bias is more important. It derives
from the fact that taking actual production as the
denominator ignores the production decline which
actually occured, but which was masked by increases in
productive capacity. In other words, actual production
only measures net rather than gross increases in pro-
ductive capacity.
The relevance of this last source of bias is indicated by the
following figures:
TABLE 11-5
TIME- HISTORY OF ALGERGIA'S CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION BY FIELD - THROUGH 1962
Thousand of Tons
End-of-Year
Average Annual Production Production Rate
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1962
Oued Gueterini
Djebel Onk
Hassi Messaoud Nord
Hassi Messaoud Sud
33.5
1.0
13.4
0.9
6.6
3.2
216.0
212.5
3.7 4.2
0.3
3.6
4.4
5.2
5.0
600.7 2373.0 3321.6 3670.6
689.0 4271.4 4878.7 5506.7
23.5El Gassi
El Agreb
2.2
0.2
Edj eleh
Zarzaitine
Tinguentourine
El Adeb Larache
Ohanet Sud
Tan Emellel Sud
Tin Fouye
20.7
2.7
0.2
32.9
14.9
0.2
0.2
491.3
1469.5
1.8
2.2
30.3
436.4
1451.3
5229.3
9.9
5.5
Ohanet Nord 288.2
Askarene
In Adaoui
Guelta
Tan Emellel Nord
TOTAL 34.5 23.2
41.2
708.8
1881.8
7307.1
326.1
301.3
119.3
5.5
550.1
29.1
1.1
2.6
31.8
455.5 1341.6 8637.3 15665.5 20487.8
Source: Ministere de l'Industrie, Direction des Carburants, Activite de l'Industrie Petroliere, 1962
5.1
H0
.I
4117.0
6942.6
528.8
1841.7
7276.9
472.7
459.8
119.7
7.8
439.4
43.2
2.3
54.3
22306.2
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Field
average end-of-year production
per well (Tons/day)
1961
Hassi Messaoud North
Hassi Messaoud South
Edjeleh
Zarzaitine
347
322
45
285
With the possible exception of Hassi Messaoud South, a marked
declining trend in average well productivity is clearly discernable
from the above figures. This trend is primarily--if not solely--
attributable to natural conditions, as evidenced by the following
statements:
Concerning
Hassi Messaoud1
Concerning 2
Edjeleh
3
Concerning
Zarzaitine
"The irregularities and anomalies of the
reservoir have resulted in frequent production
restrictions: some wells initially of a high
potential, did not perform as expected during
continuous production--the gas pressure dissi-
pated rapidly and the wells had eventually to
be shut off."
"The pressure decline remains relatively slow in
the various producing zones. In the carbonifer-
ous reservoirs the decline is somewhat more
rapid than in those of the devonian because of
the relatively small gas cap volume."
"During the first semester, the GOR of the field
has increased rapidly. During the second
semester, it was reduced slightly as a result
of a decrease in the production rate."
1Pawera, John C., Op. Cit., p. 176.
2Ministere de l'Industrie, Direction des Carburants, Activit6 de
l'Industrie Petroliere, 1963, p. 308.
3 Ibid., p. 310.
1962
320
371
34
247
1963
265
365
32
172
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In principle, and within the limitations of the available data, it
is possible to account and adjust for biases due to declining production
trends. A possible approach would be to assume a production decline
rate for each field and to adjust actual annual production accordingly.
Alternatively, the annual increase in the number of producing wells
connected on each field, multiplied by the average production rate per
well, provides a somewhat more lengthy--though more accurate--means of
estimating the gross annual increase in production capacity per field.
But such a refinement in the earlier estimate of unit development
expenditure costs is hardly warranted, inasmuch as the result would
still suffer from being an aggregate average for the country as a whole--
whereas development and production conditions in Algeria, as already
noted, are highly heterogeneous. Yet the guiding purpose of this
analysis is to attempt to estimate unit development costs for some of
Algeria's more marginal fields, in order to determine whether they
provide evidence of possible economic interaction between official
French policy decisions (the establishment of a relatively high price
for the crude oil sold by ERAP to the French refining companies) and
investment decisions on the part of the petroleum industry (the develop-
ment of otherwise non-commercial fields--made economically viable only
because of the high-priced value attributed to oil sold to the French
refining sector. Hence, a case of resource mis-allocation resulting
from official French policy). It is consequently essential to this
analysis to develop data which are as disaggregated as possible.
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The annual reports published by companies such as CREPS, SN REPAL
and ERAP, represent the least aggregative source of financial and
economic information available on Algeria's petroleum industry. ERAP
makes available a broad breakdown of its capital expenditures in the
country, but these data are limited to the most recent years and are not
detailed in nature--an analytical obstacle which is compounded by the
diverse interests which ERAP has in Algerian oil through its minority
and majority owned affiliates. The annual reports of SN REPAL offer a
more fertile ground for research, but one which is essentially limited
to the field of Hassi Messaoud. CREPS' interests in Algeria, on the
other hand, cover a variety of producing fields, while its annual
reports provide relatively detailed information on the company's
activities. Moreover, insofar as the company's operations are practically
confined to the Polignac Basin, it may be presumed that variations in its
cost structure are not the result of changes in geographic conditions.
DEVELOPMENT WELL COSTS AND FIELD EQUIPMENT COSTS IN THE POLIGNAC BASIN
CREPS' annual capital expenditures in exploration and development,
as given by its annual reports for the years 1963 to 1965, are reproduced
in Table 11-6. Even this data, however, is only representative of the
average of CREPS' operations as a whole, and consequently does not
distinguish between the variety of producing conditions encountered
among the different oil fields developed by the company. Estimating
techniques are necessary in order to further refine the data. To do so,
it is necessary to distinguish between two categories of development
expenditures:
TABLE 11-6
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES BY CREPS IN EXPLORATION
AND DEVELOPMENT 1963 TO 1965
Millions in Francs Total
1963 1964 1965 '63 to '65
Expenditures in geological and
geophysical exploration 23 16 8.5 47.5
Non-productive wells 66 49 7.7 122.7
Productive wells 76 76 45.2 197.2
Operating equipment 51 30 25.6 106.6 C
Source: CREPS, Rapport du Conseil d'Administration A l'Assemblee Genfrale,
1963-1965
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(a) Development well costs. The cost of a development well
will, generally, tend to vary from field to field in
relation with reservoir depths. The investment in devel-
opment wells per initial unit of production capacity will,
of course, also depend on well productivity. Appendix
II-C derives an idealized function which expresses CREPS'
well costs as a function of depth. This relationship,
which will be retained in the following analysis, is:
WC = 500 + 945 D (2.32 x 103 + 0.543 D)
where WC = Cost of a development well in thousands of
Francs.
D = Well depth in meters.
(b) Field equipment costs. Included in this category are the
various types of production equipment installed forward
of the Christmas tree and up to the point of tie-in with
a primary pipeline system. A field's gathering system,
storage tanks, gas/oil separators, stabilizers, etc.,
would all fall under this category. Appendix II-D dis-
cusses various methods for estimating CREPS' expenditures
in field equipment. This analysis suggests that a con-
servative estimate for this expenditure cost component is
25 Francs per annual ton of anticipated production.
ANNUAL FIELD OPERATING COSTS, PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION COSTS AND TAXES
Table 11-7 presents selected data taken from CREPS' annual reports
for the years 1963 to 1965, pertaining to the company's field operating
costs, pipeline costs and tax payments.
Field Operating Costs
Line 2 in Table 11-7 gives the company's total direct operating
costs for the years 1963 and 1964 (the equivalent figure was not
reported in 1965). Operating costs per ton of crude oil produced thus
increased over that time from 4.5 to 7.4 Francs per annual ton. This
upward movement must have been at least partially caused by the company's
TABLE 11-7
CREPS AND TRAPSA
FIELD OPERATING COSTS, TAXES, AND PIPELINE COSTS
1963 1964 1965
CREPS
Crude oil produced for company's account (tons x 106) 10.0 10.3 9.1
Direct field operating costs excluding major pipelines
costs (Francs x 106) 45.1 76.8 na
Direct field operating costs per ton of production
(Francs/Ton) 4.5 7.4 na
Total income tax and royalty payments (Francs x 106) 111 146 203
Taxes per ton of production (Francs/Ton) 11.1 14.1 22.3
TRAPSA
Volume transported (Tons x 10 ) 10.3 na 11.2
Gross revenue (Francs x 106) 189 na 205
Less:
pipeline profits 49 68
pipeline depreciation 57 44
106 112
Estimate of direct operating costs
Francs x 106 83 na 95
Francs/ton transported 8.1 8.5
Source: CREPS, Rapport du Conseil d'Administration a l'Assemblee Genbrale, 1963, 1964, 1965
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gas injection program and by the effect of declining crude oil production.
On the other hand, these figures represent company-wide averages and
should consequently be biased on the low side of actual unit costs for
CREPS' smaller and more marginal fields, since unit field operating costs
generally tend to increase the smaller the field and the rate of
production per well.1 Rather than incorporating such a relationship
in explicit fashion, however, the subsequent analysis will instead
assume a uniform figure of 6 Francs per initial annual ton of production.
In this figure is included all categories of direct field operating
costs up to the point of tie-in with TRAPSA, the major trunkline which
serves to transport CREPS' production to the Tunisian coast.
Pipeline Transportation Costs
The appropriate figure which should be used for this cost category
is not immediately obvious. The actual pipeline transportation charge
paid by CREPS in 1963 and 1964 was 19.1 Francs per ton. This figure,
however, is far too high for our purposes since it represents the pipeline
tariff which is paid by CREPS to its own 100% owned crude transport
affiliate, TRAPSA. The major part of this tariff consequently essentially
returns to CREPS in the form of TRAPSA profits and depreciation charges.
In order to estimate these figures it is necessary to turn to TRAPSA's
own financial accounts. Relevant figures from the latter are shown at
1Adelman, M. A., Oil Production Costs in Four Areas, Paper presented
at the Proceedings of the Council of Economics of AIME, 1966, pp. 5-13.
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the bottom of Table 11-7. TRAPSA's profits and depreciation charges
are deducted from the pipeline's gross revenues in order to arrive at
an estimate of the company's direct operating expenditures. A question
which arises in this respect is whether depreciation should not properly
be included as an element of cost in lieu of capital costs. This was
rejected, first because TRAPSA is approximately 60% debt financed, and
the interest on this debt is implicitly accounted for in our method of
calculating operating costs, and, secondly, because the pipeline was
operating in 1965 with some measure of over-capacity: its nominal
capacity being 13.5 million tons per year, whereas actual throughput in
1965 was 11.2 million tons. This last factor, associated with the
limited size of CREPS' recent discoveries as well as the decline in
production from its major fields, argues for the exclusion of capital
costs in estimating marginal transportation costs. The figure which is
consequently retained in our following analysis for this category of
cost is 8 Francs per ton. It should be recognized, however, that by
basing the subsequent analysis on short term marginal transportation
costs one introduces a potential downward bias in the results deduced
therefrom.
Taxes
Although CREPS' income tax and royalty payments to Algeria do not
represent real cost transactions at the aggregate economic level, they
must nonetheless be accounted for at the French national level since
they represent an external transfer of income to that country.
- 113 -
CREPS' tax payments per ton of production are seen from Table 11-7
to have increased from 11.1 Francs in 1963 to 22.3 Francs in 1965.
This progression was maintained in 1966, when the equivalent figure was
23.5 Francs/ton. These increases in unit tax payments can to a large
extent be attributed to the new fiscal regime introduced by the signing
of the Franco-Algerian "Accords" of July 1965. But these numbers--inso-
far as they represent average conditions--are of limited analytical
value, since variations in cost conditions between different fields can
also lead to significant variations in unit tax payments. For example,
the difference in well costs per initial unit of production as between
a productive field such as Tin Fouye Nord (135 tons/day/well) and the
far more marginal case of Ouan Taredert (20 tons/day/well) is estimated
at 163 Francs/ton, giving rise to a difference in depreciation charges
of 20 Francs/ton, and hence to a potential difference in unit tax pay-
ments of 12 Francs/ton. Unit tax payments, therefore, cannot be assumed
as simply proportional to output, but should instead be expressed as a
function of field development and operating costs. This expression of
dependency can generally be expressed as follows:
Taxes/unit (T) = 0.55 (tax reference price, RP, -
field operating costs, OC, -
pipeline transport costs, PT, -
depreciation, A)
The relevant pipeline transport cost figure in this case is the
TRAPSA pipeline tariff of about 19 Francs/ton, as opposed to the direct
cost figure of 8 Francs/ton just estimated.
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As far as depreciation is concerned, the Franco-Algerian "Accords"
established that producing wells would be depreciated on a straight
line basis at a rate of 12.5% per annum, whereas other producing facili-
ties would be subject to a 10% depreciation rate. Thus,
A =0.125 W + .10 FEJ x 365
where WC = Total well cost
FE = Field production expenditures per
initial unit of production
and J = Initial rate of production per day and
per well.
It may be noticed that the tax function just presented has been
expressed in continuous form, and consequently does not account for
minimum tax (i.e., royalty) payments--even though the Algerian petroleum
tax structure specifically provides for the latter (royalties, which are
not expensable, but which can be credited against income tax liabilities,
are valued at 12.5% of the tax reference price netted back to the field).
Royalty payments, however, have been ignored purposefully in the fore-
going tax function. For, although the production from each of CREPS'
marginal fields, if accounted for separately, would have been liable for
unit royalty payments, CREPS has the faculty to consolidate its tax
accounting over all of its production in Algeria. Thus CREPS, as opposed
to a company with limited activities in the country, can offset the high
cost of developing marginal fields against the low costs associated with
its more prolific discoveries--effectively escaping in this manner from
the obligation to support minimum fiscal payments on its most marginal
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production. In itself, this practice is not necessarily to the detriment
of the host and tax-collecting government, for, if royalties had been
assessable on the production of the company's marginal fields, the
probable alternative would have been that they would never have been
developed in the first place--their real development costs being so
high as not to provide for any substantial economic rent to be siphoned
by the government in the form of royalty and tax payments.
We now have in hand all of the necessary elements in order to
proceed with our initial objective: a comparative economic analysis
of development and producing costs among CREPS' various fields--with the
purpose of determining whether the resulting cost distribution provides
evidence of a possible aberrant interaction between French policy
decisions and French investment decisions.
ANALYSIS OF CREPS' ECONOMIC SUPPLY PRICE BY FIELD
The theory and methodology used in this section is an offshoot of
the one developed by Adelman. The objective is to express the develop-
ment supply, or breakeven, price per field (SP) as a dependent function
of the investment and operating cost parameters derived above, given an
assumed cost of capital (r) and a production decline rate (d).
The decline rate
.Table 11-8 gives a five-year time history of the wells producing
and the average production per well on each of the fields in which CREPS
1Adelman, M. A., Op. Cit .
TABLE 11-8
WELLS PRODUCING AND AVERAGE PRODUCTION PER WELL BY FIELD
Number of Wells Producing Production per Well (Tons/day)
62 63 64 65 66 62 63 64 65 66
Acheb -- -- -- -- 1 -- -- -- -- 90.8
Acheb Ouest -- -- -- -- 7 -- -- -- -- 67.2
Assekaifaf -- -- 2 2 2 -- -- 37.8 46.1 38.8
Dome a Collenias-- -- 3 3 3 -- -- 21.6 16.8 23.4
Edjeleh 69/76 64/90 73/93 60/96 87/88 34.4 32.0 28.9 30.6 27.3
El Adeb Larache 18 25 25 23/ 1 25/ 2 67.0 54.0 50.8 46.3 38.4
Hassi Mazoula -- -- -- 0/ 5 0/ 5 -- -- -- 27.1 18.9
Hassi Mazoula Sud- -- -- -- 3 -- -- -- -- 239.8
In Akamil Nord -- -- -- 2 2 -- -- -- 37.9 32.6
Krebb -- -- -- 1 1 -- -- -- 72.4 72.4
La Reculee -- 9 11 9 10 -- 32.5 29.4 23.2 17.0
Ohanet Sud 5 5 6 5 4 103.2 77.6 78.8 113.0 93.2
Ouan Taradert -- -- 3 2 3 -- -- 19.6 21.1 23.5
Oued Zenani -- -- 1 1 1 -- -- 19.7 16.2 16.2
Tan Emellel Sud 1 1 1 1 1 21.7 4.2 21.1 38.0 35.7
Tinguentourine 26 40 44 48 49 49.0 35.2 36.2 34.5 31.2
Tin Fouye Nord -- -- -- -- 2 -- -- -- -- 135.1
Tin Fouye/Timel.-- 1/20 12/13 11/15 7/21 -- 133.3 129.3 148.0 164.5
Timedratine -- -- -- 9 9 -- -- -- 70.9 87.2
Zarzaitine 82 97 104/ 6 83/17 60/20 247.0 172.2 150.6 121.0 109.6
Zarzaitine N.E. -- -- 12 12 12/ 1 -- -- 37.7 50.8 44.9
Wells on free flow/wells on gas lift or pumping
Source: Ministere de l'Industrie,
Direction des Carburants, Activite
de l'Industrie Petroli~re, selected
years.
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has an interest. A definite declining trend in average production per
well is noticeable for some fields (Hassi Mazoula, In Akamil Nord).
In other cases, the trend--and even its direction--is less obvious. The
difficulty with this data is that it still represents averages for each
field. An example of how such averaged data can be misleading is given
by the field of Zarzatine N.E. Table 11-8 shows the number of producing
wells remaining constant on this field from 1964 to 1965 while average
production per well increased. This was achieved, however, by shutting
down one of the 1964 producing wells and replacing it by a new well
drilled in 1965, whose production rate must have apparently been much
higher than average, Given this inherent difficulty in data interpreta-
tion, an annual decline rate of 10% shall be assumed for all fields.
The Cost of Capital
The factors affecting this parameter have been described in detail
by Adelman. We will follow this example in assuming an annual discount
rate of 20%.
It should be noted, however, that although the respective values of
10% and 20% which have just been advanced for the decline rate and the
cost of capital are plausible, they cannot lay claim to being irrefutable.
This factor needs to be kept in mind in assessing the results of the
following analysis. At a later stage the effect of varying these assump-
tions will be considered.
1Adelman, M. A., Op. Cit., pp. 17-24.
-~ U
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In simple form, the field supply price (SP) is given by the
following relationships:
I = PV(rt) [(SP - PI)Q - OC - T t]
T =0.55 [(RP -PT)Q - OC- A] (2)t t
where
I = Investment expenditures required to develop an
initial unit of production
= WC/(Jx365) + FE
WC = Total development well cost (Table IIC-5)
J = Initial daily production rate per well
FE = Cost of field production equipment per initial unit
of production = 25 Francs/ton
PI = Direct pipeline transportation costs per unit of
production = 8 Francs/ton
OC = Direct production costs per initial unit of
production, considered constant over time = 6 Francs/ton
Qt = Normalized production rate at time t
Tt = Normalized tax payments at time t
RP = Tax reference price = 78.3 Francs/ton
PT = TRAPSA pipeline transport tariff = 19 Francs/ton
A = Depreciation of normalized development investment
expenditures, I.
and,
PV(r,t) is the "present value transform" by which future cash
streams are discounted to present value terms. In general,
t 1 t
PV(r,t) Y = [1-] [Y ]
0
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Part of the cash streams shown on the right of equations (1) and
(2) are constant values over time (production costs, OC, and deprecia-
tion, A - the latter being constant only over the depreciation period
and zero thereafter). The other cash streams, on the other hand, are
directly proportional to production, and are consequently given by the
product of their initial values multiplied by the normalized production
rate at time t, Qt. Since the production rate is assumed to decline at
the constant rate d, the latter is given by:
Qt Qi [(1 - d)t]
where
Q. = initial production rate
= 1, for normalized input data
Consequently,
t t
PV(r,t) +Q r [ )
t Y (l + r)l
0
t1 t
-+ (r + d)/(1 -d)
0
- PV (r + , t) a transform which has been
named PBE (present barrel
equivalents) by Adelman.
Equations (1) and (2) can thus be restated as:
r + d
I=PV( d, t) [SP - PI - 0.55(RP - PT)]
+ PV(r,t) [0.45 x OC] + PV(r,n) [0.55 x A] (3)
where n = depreciation period
and t = investors time horizon.
49"JIMIPIM" - - __ __ __ - W iIMa%-WIIIMKkI-.
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The depreciation charge, A, actually consists of two items: total
development wells costs (WC) which are depreciated over 8 years, and
other producing equipment (FE), depreciated over 10 years. Thus,
PV(r,n) [0.55 x A] = PV(r,8) [0.55 x 0.125 x WC]
+ PV(r,10) [0.55 x 0.10 x FE] (4)
For r = 0.20 PV( d 20) = 3.95
d = 0.10
t = 20 years PV(r,20) = 5.87
PV(r,8) = 3.84
PV(r,10) = 4.19
Bearing in mind that I = WC/(J x 365) + FE, and that total development
cost (WC) is a function of depth (D), equations (3) and (4) provide an
expression for the supply price (SP) as a direct function of reservoir
depth (D) and well productivity (J)--the two primary and fundamental
variables which give rise to cost variation among different fields.
Since we have already calculated total well cost (WC) as a function of
target depth (D) in Table IIC-5, the above equations reduce to:
WC
1960 (SP - 48.24)
Note that the dependency relationship between J and SP was inverted in
this last equation. This was done in order to simplify the derivation
of Figure 11-2, which shows in graphical form the isometric relationship
between J and D for different values of SP.
Also plotted on Figure 11-2 is the J,D position of the new fields
developed by CREPS from 1964 to 1966. Reference was made for this
~zzzm~4
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purpose to Tables IIC-4 and 11-8. One-well fields were excluded from
this analysis,. as were investments in already producing fields aimed
at intensifying their development. The issue, however, is perhaps most
particularly relevant to the latter type of investments since they
absorb the bulk of CREPS' development expenditure budget. But the
available data is unfortunately not adequate to permit such an extension
of the analysis.
The Franco-Algerian "Accords" of July 1965, which established the
Cooperative Association (ASCOP) between the two countries, provides a
definition of a commercial field by reference to a combination of the
two parameters J and D--production rate and well depth. The minimum
combination of these two parameters necessary to satisfy the criteria
of commerciability was defined in this document in tabular form
(Article 35, Title III of the "Protocol relative to the Cooperative
Association"). This definition has also been reproduced graphically
in Figure 11-2. The general relationship between the J and D parameters,
as given by the "Accords" and as estimated by the above equations is
thus seen to be in close conformity. One cannot, however, draw any
quick conclusions from Figure 11-2 concerning the implicit supply price
associated with the "Accords" definition of commerciability.
The financial flows between the two parties in the Cooperative
Association substantially affect their break-even price--indeed, can
give rise to separate and different supply prices for each one of them--
so that the simple analytical framework devised above to simulate CREPS'
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economics of development is not appropriate to the more complex relation-
ships which govern such a joint association. It is even possible that
the development supply prices of both ASCOP partners in a given field
can prove to be below the one for a single corporate entity such as
CREPS, whose economics of development is guided by the more traditional
concession framework. This is possible because in the Cooperative
Association, the French partner finances up to 60% of the share of
exploratory expenditures incurred by the Algerian partner. This "loan"
is repayable in oil upon commercial discovery, the maximum annual amounts
of such reimbursements being limited to essentially 25% of any given
field's production. Thus in fields where the French and Algerian
partners are associated on a 50-50 basis--and where development expendi-
tures are therefore shared equally--the French partner can, under certain
conditions, anticipate returns based on 75% of field production, whereas
the Algerian partner will only be looking forward to a 25% production
share. The potential conflict of interests implied by these numbers,
however, is attenuated by the different fiscal posture of the two parties,
since the national partner can to a certain extent base his investment
decisions on real rather than tax-paid costs. These issues will be
discussed in greater depth and detail in Chapter IV.
But the general rule is that the interests of the parties in a
joint association will not necessarily be congruent. As mentioned, the
national partner will naturally tend to consider the economics of field
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development in real rather than tax-paid terms ; whereas the development
economics of the foreign partner must necessarily account for both the
financial obligations incumbent upon him and the taxes or royalties
assessable on his production share.
The effect of determining development supply prices on the sole
basis of real costs--i.e., by ignoring taxes--is shown in Figure 11-3.
As expected, the fanning to the right of the supply price isoquants in
decreasing progression, is far more rapid in this case than in Figure 11-2.
This effect is produced by the fact that in the latter case the minimum
supply price--approached asymptotically as development investment
expenditures approach zero--is given by the combination of direct unit
production and transportation costs (initially 14 Francs/ton) and unit
tax liabilities (of the order of 20 Francs per ton). On the other hand,
taxes do not enter the picture in Figure 11-3, so that the only limit
is that given by the real costs of production and transportation (i.e.,
the former figure of 14 Francs/ton).
On a real cost basis, the supply price of the majority of the
smaller fields developed by CREPS fall to the right of the 55 Francs
1The law establishing Libya's national oil company specifically
states that the latter shall be exempted from all taxes for a period
of ten years (Article XXVIII), although as a general principle the
"Corporation" is required to endeavor to "promote the Libyan economy
.... by participating with the authorities concerned in planning and
executing the general oil policy of the state, determining the prices
of crude oil and products, and safeguarding price levels" (Article II).
Cf., The Middle East Economic Survey, April 26, 1968.
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per ton (1.44 $/barrel) isoquant, as shown in Figure 11-3, while that
of the most productive field considered, Tin Fouye Nord, is below
84C/barrel. The economic rent conditions which characterize most of
the oil producing industry in the Eastern Hemisphere is highlighted by
these figures. Also underscored is the extent and intensity of the
downward price pressures which would result if the present system of
unit tax payments on production were somehow circumvented or diluted
in its impact--especially insofar as there exists in the Middle East
far more sizeable and prolific reserves (i.e., with lower marginal costs)
than those just considered.
The relatively high cost in real terms of the smallest of the
fields developed by CREPS emphasizes the degree to which that company
has intensified its development program along the curve of rising
marginal cost--an observation which brings us back to the question which
initiated our analysis: whether this behavioral pattern on the part of
CREPS is the economic response of a profit maximizing entity faced
with world market conditions, or whether it is a response to the singular
opportunities made available to it on the French market by virtue of
French policy decisions.
Figure 11-2 provides partial evidence in support of the hypothesis
that CREPS' field development program has been influenced by the oppor-
tunity to dispose of oil on the French market at an effective price of
around 2.12 $/barrel FOB Algeria. The regulatory mechanism by which
these sales are made possible was described in the preceding chapter.
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The two principal participants in CREPS, it will be remembered, are ERAP
and Shell. Any increase in ERAP's production potential could reasonably
be valued by the company at the 2.12 $/barrel price, even on a marginal
basis. This is the case since ERAP, as already described in Chapter I,
had to limit its "national interest" sales to the international refining
affiliates in France for 1969 and 1970, as a result of supply limitations.
Shell's motivation, on the other hand, stems from the fact that 80% of
its Franc Zone production is allowed as a deduction in calculating its
"national interest" purchase obligation. This provision provides ample
incentive for Shell to value its Franc Zone production at close to
2.12 $/barrel.
Of the ten fields which were put into production by CREPS during
the 1964-66 period, six appear to have had tax-paid supply prices
greater than 65 Francs per ton (1.70 $/barrel), with four of the six
being on, or to the left of, the 1.96 $/barrel isoquant. An outright
contradiction to our hypothesis, on the other hand, would have required
that the supply prices of all of the fields during that period should
have been equal or lower than the obtaining--or more rigorously than
the foreseeable--free market price level for oil of similar quality and
geographic location. An indication of this price level is given by the
fact that while the average price for Libyan crude exports in 1965 was
1.77 $/barrel (an average for both independent and intra-company
transactions), it was reported that during that same year some Libyan
crude oil sold for as low as 1.37 $/barrel, and that much moved at 1.45
- 128 -
1
to 1.53 $/barrel. The lower price range for Libyan crude oil, however,
may not only be representative of open market transactions, but also
of the lesser range of crude oil qualities produced in Libya. The
Oasis group, the largest independent group in Libya, produces crude
oil of about 37 OAPI versus an average density for the Zarzaitine mixture
produced by CREPS of about 42 OAPI. This implies a maximum price differ-
ential between the two of 10,/barrel, if one accepts the traditional--
but somewhat inflated--quality premium of 20/OAPI. By comparison with
prices reported on Libyan crudes, therefore, a price range of 1.55 to
1.65 $/barrel could be considered to be a reasonable approximation of
the free market opportunities available to Algerian crude at the time.
This was, of course, well before the closure of the Suez Canal in mid
1967, and the attendant rise in the price level for Mediterranean crudes.
By this standard, of the ten fields developed by CREPS during the 1964-
66 period, only Tin Fouye Nord can be considered to have been "commer-
cially viable."
Tempering this conclusion, however, are the inherent statistical
uncertainties associated with our cost estimating techniques. The choice
of either a 10% decline rate, or of a 20% cost of capital, is also subject
to question. Reducing the assumed decline rate to a minimum level under
prevalent conditions of, say, 5% would not materially affect our results.
On the other hand, such a reduction, if associated with an equivalent one
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, May 16, 1966.
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in the cost of capital to 10%, would modify the preceding results
sufficiently to substantially weaken--but not necessarily to infirm--
the conclusions drawn therefrom. This is evident from Figure 11-4
which shows the effect, on development supply prices, of a simultaneous
reduction in the decline rate and the cost of capital.
The other side of the coin, however, is that our analysis has
strictly limited itself to expenditures in field development activities--
to the point of assuming a 100% drilling success ratio. It would cer-
tainly be inappropriate to consider CREPS' general exploration expendi-
tures in an analysis which focuses--as this one does--on the development
of the company's more marginal fields. However, in the case of a number
of those smaller fields, CREPS has drilled step-out wells which have at
times proven dry. This indicates that the company has been willing to
invest in the delineation of its discoveries by placing at risk the
costs associated with such wells, even when the expected production
yield--in probabilistic terms--was low. By assuming a 100% success
ratio our preceding analysis has ignored this behavioral tendency.
Furthermore, it should be remembered that the assumed transportation
charge incorporated in our development cost model was strictly limited
to TRAPSA's immediate short-term marginal costs--a relatively extreme
assumption since it implies an overwhelming pessimism concerning the
expectation that new discoveries may place strain on the pipeline's
available capacity. Both of these factors--the restriction of the
analysis to strictly development activities and the tendency to
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underestimate transportation costs--act in the direction of reinforcing
the conclusions drawn above. Nevertheless, these conclusions can only
be advanced guardedly, since they remain subject to the accuracy of the
analytical estimates and assumptions on which they were based.
OTHER CONSEQUENCES OF AN ARTIFICIAL PRICE LEVEL
It may be well at this point to backtrack to the initial conceptual
framework which led to the preceding analysis of CREPS' operations in
Algeria. The closing pages of chapter I were concerned with the various
petroleum policy alternatives which are open to the French authorities.
From there the focus narrowed to a consideration of whether the estab-
lishment of a relatively high price for "nationally produced" crude oil
could have detrimental economic consequences from the French national
standpoint. One consequence of an artificial price level is that it can
induce aberrant investment decisions giving rise to resource misalloca-
tion. The preceding analysis was consequently aimed at determining
whether such a possible normative effect could be substantiated empiri-
cally.
The possibility of inducing inefficient investment decision-making
in exploration and production, however, is not the only foreseeable and
economically undesirable consequence of an administratively determined
price level. Other possible consequences include:
At the exploration and production level:
A price premium can not only be misspent in real terms
through resource misallocation, but, at the national level of
aggregation, it can also be misspent financially by inducing
income transfers to the detriment of the country promoting
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exploration and production activities. This financial
"leakage" can take a number of forms of which the follow-
ing may be noted:
(1) An artificially high price policy may induce host
governments-in producing countries to press for more
favorable fiscal or financial terms than would
otherwise be the case. The present structure of
unit tax payments to host governments is the result
of the latter's efforts to absorb the economic rent
margin which has characterized the oil producing
industry in the Eastern Hemisphere. If an artificially
high price structure created by French regulatory
policy were to widen economic rent conditions to French
producing companies--as opposed to being absorbed by
higher unit real costs resulting from more intensive,
and consequently more costly, exploration or develop-
ment programs--then the reaction of host countries
could well be to press for at least a share of this
rental differential.
(2) In a number of the novel partnership or service contract
agreements entered into by ERAP in recent years (e.g., the
ASCOP partnership in Algeria or the service contract
agreement with NIOC in Iran), the average level of prices
realized by the French company can have a direct bearing
- 133 -
on the financial flows between the parties involved.
For example, the overlift price between partners on a
producing field, as well as the valuation given to
crude oil for loan reimbursements are dependent on
price realizations in these agreements. Through the
means of such financial provisions, an artificial price
premium can, in part, be dissipated.
At the Market Level:
(1) A high price structure for crude oil imports, to the extent
that it is passed on in the form of higher petroleum
product prices, has a non-neutral impact on energy consumers.
Large primary and secondary energy consuming entities which
are particularly sensitive to energy costs (i.e., whose
energy demand function is price elastic) could be induced
to undertake inefficient investment programs in response to
an artificial price level for petroleum products. For
example, thermal-electric plants would be penalized vis a
vis nuclear or hydro-electric alternatives, leading to a
possible mis-direction of investments in favor of the latter.
Admittedly, however, direct taxes could play a far more
preponderant role in this connection.
(2) A corollary of high crude oil import prices is the need to
impose restrictions on petroleum product imports. A
protectionist climate can, in turn, foster oligopolistic
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tendencies within the country's local refining industry,
thus further exacerbating its lack of competitiveness.
A detailed consideration of all of the above issues would
carry the scope of this thesis far afield. The next chapter,
however, will concern itself with the last point just raised.
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APPENDIX II-A
PRINCIPLE OPERATING COMPANIES IN ALGERIA
Concessions
Held Singly
Concessions
Held Jointly
Compagnie Frangaise
des P6troles (Algerie)
CFP (A)
CFP
COFIREP
FINAREP
85.0%
7.5%
7.5%
Hassi Messaoud
Hassi
Hassi
Gassi
Haoud
Nezla
Nezla
Messaoud
R'Mel
Touil
Berkaoui
Nord
Est
Nord 51%
Sud 49%
49%
5%
33.8%
49%
10.5%
Compagnie d'Explora- ERAP 51.5% Ohanet 38%
tion P6troliere COFIREP 10.0% Tamadanet 38%
CEP FINAREP 9.3% Askarene 38%
REPFRANCE 4.6% Alrar Nord 38%
BP (France) 1.6%
Other 23.0%
Compagnie des Pet- Royal Dutch Hassi Chergoui Tin Fouye Nord 50%
roles d'Algerie Shell 65.0% Ouest Ohanet Sud 50%
CPA Sogerap & In Akamil 50%
ELF-ERAP 28.9% Alrar Est 50%
FINAREP 3.1% Acheb 50%
COFIREP 3.0% Brides 50%
Toual 50%
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Appendix II-A
(continued)
Ownership
Compagnie de Recherches
et d'Exploitation au
Sahara
CREPS
ERAP
Sogerap
SN REPAL
COFIREP
FINAREP
Royal Dutch
Shell
30.0%
25.5%
4.9%
3.0%
1.6%
35.0%
Concessions
Held Singly
Edjeleh
Zaraitine
Tinguentourine
El Adeb Larache
Nord In Amenas
Hassi Mazoula
Tin Fouye Sud
Tan Emellel Sud
Dome a Collenias
Ouan Taredert
Assekaifaf
Edeyen
Hassi Mazoula Sud
Concessions
Held Jointly
Tin Fouye Nord
Ohanet Sud
In Akamil
Alrar Est
Acheb'
Alrar Ouest
Brides
Toual
El Paso Europe- EL PASO Rhourde Nouss 35%
Afrique Rhourde Chouff 49%
Rhourde Adra 49%
EURAFREP Lazard Freres 3.9% El Gassi El Agreb 10%
Banque de Tan Emellel 70%
l'Indochine 7.6% Ohanet Nord 11%
REPFRANCE 10.0% Askarene 11%
FINAREP 9.1% Tamadanet 11%
COFIREP 7.4% Rhourde El Baguel 18%
Other 71.0%
Continued on Page 137
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
I-
Appendix II-A
(Continued)
A
Concessions
Held Singly
Concessions
Held Jointly
Societe Nationale des SNPA El Gassi El Agreb 51%
Petroles d'Aquitaine
SNPA
Sinclair Mediterranean SINCLAIR Rhourde El Baguel 28%
Petroleum Co.
Societe Nationale de SONATRACH 50.0% Djebel Onk Hassi Messaoud Sud 51%
Recherche et Hassi Messaoud Nord 49%
d'Exploitation des Alrar Nord 34.4%
Petroles en Algerie Nezla Nord 51% -
SN REPAL Nezla Est 63.1% 
Compagnie des Petroles
France Afrique
COPEFA
ERAP
COFIREP
FINAREP
REPFRANCE
Petroles du
Sud
Gassi Touil
Hassi Chergui
80.9%
5.8%
4.3%
1.7%
7.8%
Ownership
40%
50%
j
-I
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APPENDIX II-B
CORPORATE PARTICIPATION IN ALGERIA'S
MAJOR PRODUCING CRUDE OIL FIELDS
Oil Field Corporate Ownership
Hassi Messaoud Nord
Hassi Messaoud Sud
Nezla Nord
Haoud Berkaoui
El Gassi El Agreb
Rhourde El Baguel
Rhourde Nouss
Gassi Touil
Edj eleh
Zarzaitine
Tinguentourine
El Adeb Larache
Nord In Amenas
Hassi Mazoula
Tin Fouye Sud
Tan Emellel Sud
Dome a Collenias
Ouan Taredert
Assekaifaf
Hassi Mazoula Sud & Nord
La Reculee
SN REPAL
CFP (A)
SN REPAL
CFP (A)
CFP (A)
SONATRACH
SOPEFAL/ERAP
SNPA
Coparex
FRANCAREP
EURAFREP
Petropar
Sinclair
EURAFREP
Tidewater/Getty
PETROPAR
EL PASO
FRANCAREP
PETROPAR
OMNIREX
PHILLIPS
CFP (A)
CREPS
49.0%
51.0%
51.0%
49.0%
33.8%
50.0%
15.2%
51.0%
25.0%
14.0%
10.0%
42.5%
28.0%
18.0%
11.5%
35.0%
49.0%
16.0%
40.0%
30.0%
25.0%
5.0%
100.0%
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Appendix II-B
(continued)
Oil Fields Corporate Ownership
Gassi Touil Est
Tin Fouye Nord
Ohanet Sud
In Akamil
Acheb
Oued Zenani
Krebb
Timedratine
Alrar Est
Ohanet Nord
Askarene
Guelta
Tamadanet
Tan Emellel Nord
CREPS
CPA
50.0%
50.0%
PETROPAR
MOBIL
FRANCAREP
EURAFREP
COPAREX
AMIF
EUAFREP
ELWERATH
PETROPAR
38.0%
25.0%
13.0%
11.0%
9.0%
4.0%
70.0%
20.0%
10.0%
APPENDIX II-C
DEVELOPMENT WELL COSTS IN THE POLIGNAC BASIN AS A FUNCTION OF DEPTH
Table IIC-i presents data, taken from CREPS' annual reports, giving
details on the company's drilling costs. It should be noted that the
cost elements thus analyzed by CREPS include only intangible drilling
costs. This is indicated by the finer cost breakdown shown in Table IIC-2,
which gives the various cost components entering into the figure for
average cost per meter drilled shown in the preceding table. It is also
apparent upon comparison of the data in Table IIC-1 and Table 11-6 (p. 108).
Total well costs in Table 11-6 are consistently higher than total drill-
ing costs in Table IIC-1, indicating that an element of well cost--the
tangible component--is excluded from the latter.
The aggregate figures in Table IIC-1 and Table 11-6, though, are
not directly comparable. The former table refers to all of the wells
drilled by CREPS as operator--for its own account as well as for the
account of its joint association with CPA--whereas Table II-6--represent-
ing the financial obligation which the company incurred--is limited to
CREPS' equity interest in the wells drilled on each permit and concession.
All of CREPS' permits and concessions are either 100% owned by the company
or are shared on a 50-50 basis with CPA (see Appendices II-A and II-B).
But this difference in presentation only serves to emphasize the fact
that the drilling cost figures shown in Table II-Cl are not alone repre-
sentative of the total cost of a completed development well, since the
number of wells drilled by CREPS as operator is consistently and
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TABLE II-Cl
ELEMENTS OF DRILLING COSTS
1962 1963 1964 1965
1) Total Number of meters drilled:
- exploration 51,697 47,270 36,711 16,889
- step outs & development 85,681 131,183 88,213 45,799
- TOTAL 137,378 178,453 124,924 62,688
2) Number of wells drilled:
- exploration 27 22 18 8
- step outs & development 70 114 65 34
- TOTAL 97 136 83 42
3) Meters drilled per rig month:
- exploration na na 1064 1185
- step outs & development na na 1797 1785
- TOTAL 1140 1447 1494 1570
4) Drilling costs per meter (Fr/m):
- exploration 790 862 870 870
- step outs 482 492 587 642
- TOTAL 598 592 670 703
5) Average depth per well
- exploration 1920 2150 2040 2110
- step outs & development 1220 1150 1355 1350
- TOTAL 1415 1310 1500 1490
)
Table II-Cl
(continued)
1962 1963 1964 1965
6) Total drilling costs
(Fr. x 106)
- exploration 40.8 40.7 31.9 14.7
- step outs & development 41.7 64.5 51.9 29.4
- TOTAL 82.5 105.2 83.8 44.1
7) Average cost per well
(Fr. x 106)
- exploration 1.51 1.85 1.78 1.84
- step outs & development 0.60 0.57 0.80 0.87
- TOTAL 0.85 0.77 1.01 1.05
8) Average cost per rig month
(Fr x 103)
- exploration na na 925 1030
- step outs & development na na 1050 1145
- TOTAL 682 855 1000 1100
Source: Lines 1 to 4 - CREPS, Rapport du Conseil d'Administration a l'Assemblee Genbrale,
1964 and 1965. Lines 5 to 8 derived from preceding lines.
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TABLE IIC-2
DRILLING COST PER METER BY CATEGORY
Percent
Exploration Development
Francs/Meter
Average
Consumables
Services (cimenting
electrical opera-
tions)
Transport
Drilling rig
Overhead
TOTAL
14.5
10.3
15.9
51.4
7.9
100.0
21.0 123
15.4
14.5
40.1
9.0
100.0
90
100
299
58
670
Source: CREPS, Rapport du Conseil d'Admiistration a l'Assemblie
Gendrale, 1964, p. 22.
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significantly higher than the wells in which it holds a financial interest.
In order to allow for a direct comparison between Tables 11-6 and II-Cl.
it is necessary to determine the number of productive wells drilled
annually for the account of CREPS. This can be derived from the data
reported in DICA's statistical annual, which gives the number of wells
drilled on each concession and exploration permit in the Sahara. Using
this data, it is possible to estimate the average tangible drilling and
completion cost per well. This is done in Table II-C3. The weighted
average estimate over the three years, 1963 to 1965, is close to
500,000 Francs/well--a figure which will be retained in the following
analysis of total development well costs.
CREPS' average intangible drilling costs were given in Table II-Cl.
But what is of greater interest is how these costs tend to vary from
field to field. In order to estimate this distribution we will presume
that drilling costs are primarily a function of drilling depth. This
assumption can be tested, and the functional relationship between
drilling cost and depth approximated. To do so it is necessary to use
the variable rig-month per well as a proxy variable for intangible
drilling costs per well. As may be noted from Table II-C2, rig time is
by far the most important category of drilling costs. Table II-C4
presents data comparing rig-months per well with well depth. This
data refers to development wells drilled by CREPS from 1962 to 1966.
A regression analysis was run to determine the best curve fit for
the data given in Table II-C4. This was found to be a curve of the
711
TABLE II-C3
ESTIMATE OF CREPS' AVERAGE TANGIBLE DRILLING AND
COMPLETION COST PER WELL
1963
1) Number of productive exploratory wells drilled
2) Number of productive development wells drilled
3) Intangible drilling cost for productive ex-
ploratory wells (Francs x 106)
4) Intangible drilling cost for productive dev-
elopment wells (Francs x 106)
5) Total intangible drilling costs
(Francs x 106)
6) Total productive well costs (Francs x 106)
7) Tangible costs (Francs x 106)
8) Average tangible cost per well (Francs x 106)
5.0
67.5
9.2
38.2
47.4
76.0
28.6
0.40
1964
6.0
44.51
8.0
35.8
43.8
76.0
32.2
0.65
1965
4.5
24.5
8.3
21.4
29.8
45.2
15.4
0.53
Sources: Lines 1 & 2: Ministere de l'IndustrieActivite de l'Industrie Petroliere,
1963, 1964, and 1965
Lines 3 & 4: Lines 1 & 2 multiplied by corresponding figures from line 8,
Table (7).
Line 5 : Line 3 plus line 4.
Line 6 : Table (6), line 3.
Line 7 : Line 6 minus line 5.
Line. 8 : Line 7 divided by line 1 plus line 2.
Ln
-A
TABLE IIC-4
CREPS: WELLS DRILLED BY FIELD, AVERAGE WELL DEPTH AND RIG MONTHS PER WELL
Field
0. Oubarakar
Tan Emellel S.
Acheb
Alrar Est
Assekaifaf
Dome a Collenias
Edjeleh
El Adeb Larache
H. Mazoula
La Reculee
0. Taredert
0. Amasralad
Ohanet Sud
Tinguentourine
Tin Essameid
Tin Fouye
Zarzaitine
Arene
Edeyen
Gara
H. Mazoula B
Krebb
Nord In Amenas
0. Taradjeli
Oued Zenani
Tihalatine
Timellaline
Timedratine
Tin Fouye Est
1962
Rig
Wls. Aver. m./
Dr. Dpth w.
3
2
1
5
5
11
6
2
1
3
1
2
9
3
6
12
860
1003
0.80
0.65
2
2261 1.40 2
605 0.66 4
1128
570
1302
1883
2026
1400
942
2234
1284
550
1359
1102
1.28
0.27
0.58
1.50
2.00
1.67
0.70
10
3
5
6
1.30 1
0.58 16
0.53
0.61 5
0.60 28
1
1963
Rig
Wls. Aver. m./
Dr. Dpth wl.
2383
2717
1034
600
1540
1587
1771
1.50
1.65
0.75
0.30
0.87
0.76
0.87
2444 1.20
1158 0.71
1631
970
2063
0.94 4
0.51 16
1.80
1 2078 1.40
1
1
1
1345
1591
1390
0.60
1.00
0.60
1964
Rig
Wls. Aver. m./
Dr. Dpth wl.
1 2306 1.10
5
1
2
3
807
1262
1809
1745
0.36
0.70
1.40
0.87
1965
Rig
Wls. Aver. m./ Wls.
Dr. Dpth Wi. Dr.
5
2 2586 1.70 1
2
9 612 0.33 7
1
1
1966
Rig
Aver. m./
Dpth wl.
2314
2608
917
1.06
1.80
0.75
586 0.30
1380 0.80
1A A A
.
1 1581 1.30
3 1339 0.80 4 1295 0.72 1 1090 1.50
1105 0.95
1142 0.52
1 1917 1.6
1 2200 1.6
1 2238 1.3
1 2180 1.8
2
9 1133 0.54 3
1438 1.05
1005 1.23
1 2460 1.50
4 2600 1.50 4 2046 1.00
3 2135 1.30
Source: Based on data reported in Activite de l'Industrie P&roliere, selected years.
- -- ' - W% m I ov-.
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form:
Y = XI(A + BX)
where
Y = rig-month/well
and X = well depth
An index of determination of 0.70 was achieved with the following
coefficient values:
3
A = 2.32 x 10
B = 0.543
The actual data given in Table II-C4 is plotted, together with the
curve predicted by the regression analysis, on Figure II-Cl.
The next step is to translate the functional relationship just
derived into economic terms. CREPS' total average intangible drilling
cost per rig month is given on line 8 of Table II-Cl. A sharp increasing
trend is noticeable in this figure from 1962 to 1964. This is partially
explained by CREPS in its 1963 and 1964 annual reports:
"(the) increase in drilling costs, despite a performance
improvement, is due to a substantial deterioration in
the economic conditions facing our contractors, and most
notably to the increase in indirect taxation..."
(CREPS, 1963 Annual Report, p. 20)
"The increase in our (drilling) costs is due both to an
increased consumption of drilling pipe.. .and to an
increase in the tariffs for services, for transportation
and for rig rentals..."
(CREPS, 1964 Annual Report, p. 22)
We thus have an upward shift in the drilling cost function over
time--improvements in drilling performances (essentially ignored in the
preceding regression analysis, and a probable source of scatter) being
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more than compensated for by unit cost increases in services, indirect
taxes, and supplies. To simplify our analysis, however, we will take
the weighted average figure of 945,000 Francs/rig month as obtaining from
1963 on, and of 685,000 Francs/rig month for years preceding 1963 (from
1959 to 1962, the actual figure remained remarkably stable, the high
reaching 698,000 in 1961 and the low 679,000 in 1960).
We are now in a position to construct a development well cost
function. Taking
WC = Cost of a development well, in thousands of Francs
D = Well depth, in meters
we have,
WC = 500 + 685 D/(2.32 x 103 + 0.543 D) prior to 1963
WC = 500 + 945 D/(2.32 x 103 + 0.543 D) from 1963 on
The resulting predicted variation in total well cost (for 1963 on) with
increasing well depth is shown in Table II-C5.
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TABLE IIC-5
THEORETICAL VARIATION OF TOTAL
WELL COST WITH WELL DEPTH
-post 1962-
Depth Intangible Drilling Costs Total Well Cost
(Meters) (Thousand of Francs)
200 85 585
400 180 680
600 284 784
800 397 897
1000 530 1030
1200 680 1180
1400 895 1395
1600 1035 1535
1800 1260 1760
2000 1520 2020
2200 1830 2330
2400 2210 2710
2600 2670 3170
Figure .II-Cl
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APPENDIX II-D
FIELD EQUIPMENT COSTS IN THE POLIGNAC BASIN
For the purpose of this analysis we shall assume that field equip-
ment costs vary linearly with production capacity. This need not
strictly be true. For example, the size of a field and the spacing of
wells will generally determine the cost of a gathering system, while
field storage costs may depend upon a number of parameters not directly
related to production throughput. Nevertheless the assumption of a
linear relationship does not violate reality too drastically and is
adequate for our purposes.
Given the limitations of data availability, two approaches are
possible for estimating field equipment costs per unit of production
capacity. Both will be considered.
The first approach takes as its point of departure the annual
investment in field operating equipment reported by CREPS for the
years 1963 through 1965. This figure is 106.6 million Francs, as given
earlier in Table 11-6. The gross increase in production capacity
associated with this investment is estimated in Table II-Dl by multi-
plying the increase in producing wells per field, from 1962 to 1965,
by the corresponding average rate of production per well. The result
is 2.74 million tons. The average investment in field facilities per
gross ton of production capacity is therefore estimated in this manner
at 38.9 Francs per ton.
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TABLE II-Di
ESTIMATE OF INCREASE IN CREPS' PRODUCTION CAPACITY, 1962-1965
Fields owned 100%
by CREPS
Assakaifaf
Dome a Collenias
Edjeleh
El Adeb Larache
Hassi Mazoula
Krebb
La Reculee
Ouan Taredert
Timedratine
Tinguentourine
Zarzaitine
Zarzaitine N.E.
Fields owned 50%
by CREPS
In Akamil
Tin Fouye Nord
Oued Zanani
Alrar
Increase in
number of
producing
wells
'62 to '65
2
3
11
6
5
1
9
2
9
22
18
12
2
26
1
4
Production
per well
at end '65
(tons/day)
46
17
31
46
27
72
23
21
71
35
121
51
38
148
16
21
Increase
in
production
capacity
(tons/day)
92
51
341
276
135
72
207
42
729
770
2180
612
76
3850
16
84
Total (tons/day)
CREPS'
share
(tons/day)
92
51
341
276
135
72
207
42
729
770
2180
612
38
1925
8
42
7520
(tons/year) 2.74 x 106
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This estimate, however, suffers from two directionally opposed
sources of bias. The source of upward bias stems from the fact that
during the 1963-1965 period a gas lift production stimulation program
was extended over the fields of Zarzaitine and Edjeleh. This undoubtedly
had the effect of increasing CREPS' expenditures in field production
equipment. But the resulting increase in this expenditure category was
probably not very large. The gas injected in these fields is produced
from an adjoining natural gas field at a well-head pressure which is
sufficiently high as to allow for direct injection without prior
compression. This program is thus quite different from the one
instituted further north on the field of Hassi Messaoud; and as a result
its major component of cost consists of the gas producing and gas injec-
tion wells which have to be drilled for the purpose. Expenditures in
field production equipment (which excludes expenditures on wells),
consequently, should not have been substantially affected by this program--
although a limited increase in such expenditures must certainly have been
incurred, for example, to provide for the necessary natural gas gathering
line system.
The source of bias on the downside comes from the use of the gross
increase in production as the denominator in calculating the estimated
average investment required in field equipment per ton of crude production.
Part of this increase in gross production derives from a more intensive
development of already producing fields to compensate for production
decline. Declining well production has the effect of liberating capacity
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in some types of production facilities (e.g., field storage), thus making
it available for newly developed production sources. As a result, the
estimating technique tends to underestimate the investment required to
equip a totally new field for production.
The second method used to estimate field equipment costs was
considered primarily in order to get away from the first, upward source
of bias just described. This method is based on CREPS' gross cumulative
investment in production equipment through 1962--before the widespread
extension of the gas injection program on Zarzaitine and Edjeleh.' The
figure for this investment category--derived from CREPS' 1963 annual
report--is 251 million Francs (the gross cumulative investment shown on
the company's 1963 balance sheet under this heading is 302 million Francs,
from which was subtracted the company's corresponding investment during
that year of 51 million Francs). The production capacity associated with
this investment was estimated at 11.5 million tons per year, as shown in
Table II-D2. A 10% annual decline rate was assumed to apply to the time
history of CREPS' production interests in order to calculate this figure.
Dividing the former investment figure by the latter production capacity
estimate gives 21.8 Francs/annual ton. On the other hand, taking the
actual 1962 end of year production rate as the divisor gives 25 Francs/ton.
The first approach used to estimate the investment in field equipment
necessary to develop an annual ton of production capacity gave a figure
of about 39 Francs/annual ton--a figure which is subject to both a down-
ward and an upward source of bias. The second method gives a range of
TABLE II-D2
ESTIMATE OF THE CUMULATIVE PRODUCTION CAPACITY DEVELOPED BY CREPS THROUGH 1962
Annual production (Tons x 103
End of year
production
rate - 1962
1957
Edjeleh
Zarzaitine
Tinguentourine
El Adeb Larache
Tan Emellel Sud
Ohanet Sud*
Total
Estimate of production
decline (10% of total)
2.2
0.2
2.4
0.2
1958
20.7
2.7
0.2
23.6
2.4
1959
32.9
14.9
0.2
0.2
1960
491.3
1469.5
1.8
2.2
1961
1451.3
5229.3
9.9
5.5
1962
1881.8
7307.1
326.1
301.3
5.5
59.6
48.2 1963.8 1996.0 9881.4
4.8 196.4 199.6 988.1
3(Tons x 10 /year)
1841.7
7276.9
472.7
459.8
7.8
59.8
10118.7
Cumulative estimated
production decline 1391.5
11510.2
50% of total field production
Source: Ministere de l'Industrie, Direction
des Carburants, Activite de l'Industrie
Petroliere, selected years.
(-n
- 156 -
22 to 25 Francs per annual ton. Our subsequent analysis will compromise
between these extremes--although not entirely as the lower end will be
favored by adopting the figure of 25 Francs per annual ton.
- I w-~
CHAPTER III
COMPETITION AND THE FRENCH PETROLEUM MARKET
CHAPTER III
COMPETITION AND THE FRENCH PETROLEUM MARKET
At the close of the preceding chapter it was suggested that as
a consequence of granting a price premium to "nationally produced"
crude oil, a consuming country such as France would necessarily be
led to practice protectionist import policies relative to refined
petroleum products. Imports of these products into France are indeed
subject to official controls. The administrative means by which these
controls are applied have been described in Chapter I. Also described
in this first chapter were various measures of internal control which
have been adopted by the French authorities, and which have had the
effect, among others, of limiting entry into the French refining and
distribution sectors. Together these constraints suggest that a
possible result of French petroleum policies may have been the
dampening of competition on the French market. This chapter will
consider the institutional and regulatory conditions which have
tended to act in this direction, and will evaluate available evidence
concerning their impact.
THE NEED FOR IMPORT PROTECTIONISM:
Chapter I has described how France, faced with the problem of
finding a market for its newly discovered Saharan oil resources,
responded by calling upon the country's private refining sector to
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purchase ERAP's production surpluses at a price which -- at least in
recent years -- has been above that of competitive alternatives. This
supply burden (the price premium multiplied by the quantities of oil
involved) could either be absorbed by the refining industry itself,
or be "passed on" to the consuming public in the form of higher
product prices. Either case presupposes some form of restriction on
petroleum product imports:
a) If the supply burden is passed on in the form of higher
petroleum product prices, competitive pressures from
product imports must be minimal. In the European
context, this implies quantitative or price restrictions
since supply cost differentials between neighbouring
countries, due to either factor differences or
transportation conditions, are relatively unimportant.
b) In the alternative where the supply burden is totally
absorbed by the refining sector, restrictions on
product imports would still be necessary. Otherwise,
the resulting reduction in profit margins would
motivate refining companies to supply the French
market from neighbouring installations -- an effect
which might not be perceptible in the short run, but
which would certainly take hold in the longer term.
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In principle, import protectionism could still prove necessary
even if the preferential crude supply source were priced competitively
This would be the case to the extent that the oil industry is
characterized by profit maximising on an integrated basis -- with
profit margins being selectively accumulated upstream of the refining
function. Under such conditions, the very fact of imposing a
preferential supply source has comparative profit implications, and
would consequently require some form of restriction on petroleum
product imports to be effective.
THE COMPETITIVE CLIMATE OF FRANCE'S PETROLEUM MARKET:
Import protection, although a necessary condition, is not in
itself sufficient evidence to support the presumption that competitive
forces have remained bounded on the French petroleum market. But
apart from the restrictions imposed on foreign trade, the French
refining and distribution sectors have also been characterised by a
number of other singular traits, each of which has tended to act in
the direction of limiting competition, and which together provide
significant circumstantial evidence to this effect.
Barriers to Entry in the Refining Sector:
Construction of new refining facilities in France is subject to
government approval.1 As a result, France is alone among the major
countries of Western Europe not to have had a new corporate entry in
1 Cf. Chapter I, p. 74.
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its refining sector since World War II -- at least until 1960 when
UGP (a predecessor of Elf-ERAP) embarked on its program of forward
integration by acquiring a majority participation in Caltex's
refining facilities in the country. With the latter exception, and
that of the small and somewhat ambiguous position of Antar, French
refining has been dominated by the international majors (including
CFP/CFR in this category).
Barriers to Entry in Distribution:
The construction or acquisition of service station outlets in
France is also subject to government approval. Moreover, all types
of petroleum distribution activities have to receive prior authoriza-
tion from the French authorities. New entrants in this field have
consequently been extremely limited in number, the tendency having
been instead towards increased concentration as the established
refining companies in France extended their control over their market
outlets. In recent years, however, and in partial deference to the
E.E.C. Commission, the government has issued a limited number of
distribution authorizations to outside companies originating from
E.E.C. countries.
Market-Sharing Tendencies:
It was stated in Chapter I that the lists of crude oil import
and product distribution authorizations, issued periodically by the
French government (in their latest form, commonly known as A-10's
1Cf. Chapter I, p. 75.
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and A-3's, respectively), do not directly constrain the activities
of the country's refining and distribution companies. But even though
these authorizations do not have a directly constraining effect, they
can be of indirect influence, particularly inasmuch as they represent
an expression of official intent and expectation concerning the
relative position of each company within its market. France's
refining companies, themselves, admit freely that prior to Elf-ERAP's
entry into refining and distribution, the official expressions of
relative market position, represented by these authorizations, were
used by them -- acting jointly through their professional organizations --
to establish their refining and inter-company product exchange
programs. It is in this context that the international refining
affiliates in France agreed to off-take part of CFR's refining output,
so that the latter would be assured of the 25% market share granted
to it as a sequel to the San Remo agreements which followed World
War I and which led to the creation of CFP.
In addition to the relatively formalised measures of competitive
restraint just mentioned, the relationship between the regulatory arm
of the French Government and the private petroleum sector has, at
least intermittently, been characterized by a not insignificant
degree of informal cooperation; and this cooperation has often had
the directional effect of dampening internal competitive pressures.
To a large extent, the government-industry relationship in the
petroleum sector has been dual in nature: sometimes at odds,
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especially when it came to allowing an outside entrant, ERAP, to
share the benefits enjoyed by the established companies; but also
often cooperative, particularly when the nature of the interests at
hand were mutual in nature. The mutuality of interests which often
underscores this relationship was apparent in 1960, when the govern-
ment issued a decree banning the practicing of discounts on heavy
fuel oil exceeding 5% off official prices. The government's motives
in this regard were partly that of protecting the country's
indigenous coal industry, but they were also concerned with what is
sometimes euphemistically called the "excessive" or "extreme" forms
of competition which could endanger the self-financing capacity of
the country's refining and distribution sectors. The legal ban on
discounting practices, however, proved particularly ineffective, and
was eventually abandoned in 1966 with the issuance of a further
decree which specifically nullified the earlier ban on such
practices.2
The French authorities' attempt at influencing the level of
refined product prices was also evident in mid 1965, when the system
which had been in use for the calculation of French official ex-
refinery prices was suspended. The following section presents a
description of this price system, of its suspension, and of its
eventual reinstatement in different form.
1Arrete No. 24-437 of June 29, 1960.
2Arrate No. 25.240 of September 28, 1966.
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THE FRENCH OFFICIAL PRICE SYSTEM:
Although of little commercial importance in practice, official
prices, and the manner by which they are established, are the objects
of close and continued attention by the French authorities. The
subject is consequently of some interest, especially in so far as
it can be indicative of the government's attitude towards price
competition. The ineffectual legal attempt just described to limit
discounting practices on heavy fuel oil sales is particularly
relevant in this context. So is the new system for establishing
official French prices, which was introduced in late 1968 in replace-
ment for the one suspended earlier in mid 1965.
Prior to 1965, official ex-refinery prices were determined in
France by reference to equivalent refined product quotations FOB the
Caribbean, to which were added representative freight costs as well
as a small margin originally designed to protect the French refining
industry. In 1964 and 1965, this system led to significant price
declines in official price level, as shown in Figure III-1. As a
result of the refining industry's concern with this declining trend,
a concern which was conveyed and adopted by the French official
authority in such matters, the Direction des Carburants (DICA),
further changes in the official price structure were suspended in
mid 1965, pending revision of the government's pricing mechanism.
This suspension extended until late 1968, when a new price system was
finally introduced, which, by virtue of incorporating references not
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FIGURE III-1
THE TREND IN FRANCE'S OFFICIAL REFINED PRODUCT PRICES
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 f 1965
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only to Caribbean product quotations, but also to quotations in the
Persian and Mexican Gulfs, was claimed to be more representative of
the actual flow of international trade in refined products.1
Under the new system French ex-refinery product prices are es-
calated according to an index based on a weighted average of FOB re-
fined product prices in the Caribbean (weighted 60%), in the Gulf of
Mexico (weighted 20%) and the Persian Gulf (weighted 20%). But changes
in this index only apply to the extent that it does not violate an im-
posed upper and lower limit for the weighted average value of all re-
fined products, given the particular product distribution pattern de-
manded by the French market. In principle, the purpose of the upper
limit is to ensure that French product prices remain competitive --
the standard of competition surprisingly being taken as the level of
prices on the United States market. The rationale which has been
advanced for the lower limit is the avoidance of "ruinous" or
"excessive" competition, alternatively described as ensuring that
France's oil industry is in a position to auto-finance its future
investment needs.
The basic significance which can be attached to France's official
price schedule can well be questioned, especially given that the
country's refining companies are not bound to these prices on the
downside -- and therefore can, and do, practice substantial dis-
counting in full compliance with the law (with the temporary exception
of the partial legal ban on heavy fuel oil discounting described above).
1See Appendix III-A for a detailed description of this system.
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Three justifications for the system of official prices are generally
advanced:
1) They represent maximum allowed prices. Although actual
prices are nowhere near these maximum levels today,
oligopolistic or monopolistic tendencies in the industry
could conceivably -- although they are hardly likely to --
widen refining and distribution margins to the point
where the official price structure becomes constraining.
2) The government, not willing to abdicate its power in
this domain, continues with the system in the event
that it may find these powers more important and
meaningful under future conditions.
3) The official prices are known to serve as useful
commercial points of reference. For example, long
term refined product contracts are sometimes
escalated on the basis of offical prices even though
their actual contract price may be substantially
below official levels.
But none of these points explains why DICA found it necessary to
modify the system by which official prices are calculated. The
official justification for the change was that the new system was
introduced in order to reflect more accurately the actual conditions
of France's international trade in petroleum prices, reliance being
no longer placed solely on Caribbean quotations. This explanation, however,
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is not very convincing since the new system remains highly artificial.
A possible alternative explanation is that DICA, being concerned with
the deterioration in product prices on the French market, suspended
the former system in 1965 with the intention of introducing a new
mechanism which would be less likely to produce continued declines
in official price levels. The new system introduced in 1968 does
indeed include this feature. One of the major causes for the decline
in official prices through 1965, was the secular fall in freight
rates which were used to adjust FOB Caribbean quotations to a CIF
France basis. Under the new 1968 system, however, the index by
which official prices are escalated does not include a freight
element, and therefore depends solely upon comparative FOB quota-
tions. This factor in itself implies that France's official prices
should evidence a much higher degree of stability than has been the
case in the past; and if that is not enough, the floor which has been
introduced on average refining realizations, should be further
insurance to this effect. The change in France's official price
system thus provides presumptive evidence that DICA somehow believes
that some direct linkage exists between actual market prices and
their official counterparts, and that its aim in modifying the
system was price stability -- particularly on the downside.
AN APPROXIMATE AND PARTIAL MEASURE OF THE COST OF PROTECTIONISM
It is thus not unreasonable to presume that France's petroleum
market has not only been tightly protected from foreign competition,
but has also been at least partially sheltered -- both formally and
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informally, and often under government auspices -- from the full
pressures of internal competition. In spite of these sheltered
conditions, however, and probably to a substantial extent because of
the catalytic effect of Elf-ERAP's entry into the refining and
distribution sectors, competitive forces appear to have been more
active in recent years. Symptomatic of this is that the agreement
by which the international affiliates have been off-taking products
from CFR has been modified to provide for the gradual elimination of
these inter-company purchases by 1970. Also indicative of this trend
has been the apparent decline in real product prices. Although the
latter are not generally available publicly, the following comments
are representative of this tendency:
"...discounts (on petroleum products) have never
been higher. And ... it was the fuel oils that
were mainly affected. According to marketing
sources, home heating oil was sold at from 20%
to 30% below the official prices and the same
goes for light fuel oil. For heavy fuel,
discounts were in the range of 10% to 20%."
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, January 2, 1967.
"As far as prices are concerned, 1966 was even
worse than 1965. The firming tendency which
had manifested itself timidly at the end of
1965 did not sustain itself, and sales prices
have been in continuous decline, a trend which
accelerated at the end of the year. This
decline affected in particular heavy fuel oil
sales destined to large consumers and most
especially to E.D.F."
Sociftt Francaise des Petroles B.P., 1967
Annual Report, p. 17.
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The one product which has resisted price discounting practices
has been motor gasoline, presumably because of the far greater control
which the refining companies have been able to exercise on the latter's
channel of distribution. But even this exception has of late attracted
competitive discounting as the country's supermarket chains have
opened France's first discount service stations, with some degree of
1
success.
There are thus a number of factors pointing to a climate of
increasing competition on the internal French petroleum market.
Whether this trend has reached a point of competitive equilibrium,
however, remains as yet an open question. A partial and qualitative
answer is given by the following excerpt (which has not been
translated because of its singularly French expressions):
"Le marche francais est tres distinct de la
distribution dans les autres pays europeens. La
liberte commerciale, il faut toujours le rappeler,
y est restreinte. Cela ne veut pas dire que cette
situation est contraire aux interets des compagnies
distributrices. On n'assiste pas en France a ces
'guerres' qu'ont connus %a plusieurs reprises
l'Allemagne Federale et surtout la Grande Bretagne.
Meme dans un domaine aussi concurrentiel que celui
de la vente des fuels lourds, ou la lutte peut
devenir feroce et ou les rabais consentis faussent,
en realite, l'image que pourrait donner le regime
des baremes officiels, la baisse n'a jamais atteint
le meime degre qu'en Allemagne de l'Ouest et en
Suisse, par exemple. Cela provient du fait que
le marche national est bien protege...
1Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, March 27, 1967, p. 2.
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...on peut dire ... que la notion d'un partage (de
marche) par consentement ou par accord des interbts
n'est pas aussi absolue qu'elle l'etait dans un
passe lointain. Cela ne veut pas dire qu'il
nexiste plus du tout de 'chasses gardees', mais il
y a tout lieu de penser que celles-ci ne sont pas
aussi tabou qu'en un temps.
P6trole Informations - La Revue Petroliere,
February 7, 1969, p. 27.
But these are only qualitative and generalized statements.
Ideally, an analytical measure of France's competitive climate would
be based on a comparison of ex-refinery prices between France and
other neighbouring European countries. Unfortunately, adequate data
for such an analysis is lacking. As already noted, the commercial
significance of France's official price schedule for refined products
is marginal at best; and it is only periodically and inconsistently
that the specialised petroleum press reports on the level of discounts
actually practiced by the French refining industry. An alternative
approach must consequently be considered.
The approach which will be adopted below presumes that
oligopolistic returns, if they exist, are filtered backward in the
form of higher crude oil import prices. An analysis of the financial
accounts of the four international refining companies on the French
market, presented further below, sustains this presumption. So does
the fact that the major international oil companies have generally
established their inter-affiliate crude oil transfer prices on a
selective rather than a European-wide basis. The practice of market
discrimination in establishing crude oil transfer prices is suggested
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by the price premium which has traditionally characterized crude oil
sales destined for east-of-Suez markets.1 It was also confirmed by
industry spokesmen in the course of private discussions.
Imports of crude oil by EEC countries in 1966, and associated CIF
prices, are shown in Table III-1. A first pass at this data shows
that, on the basis of the average price for total crude oil imports,
France measures highest among the EEC countries. This fact in itself,
however, does not permit any easy conclusions since this relative
ranking can be due to a number of factors.
THE POTENTIAL CAUSES OF VARIATION IN CRUDE OIL IMPORT PRICES:
Contractual Differences:
The price level for a specific crude oil sale can be affected by
a number of contractual provisions -- such as contract duration and
the payment terms associated with it. Single year data, such as that
given in Table III-1, consequently, may not be representative of
actual price differences since they may reflect differences in
contractual practices between the countries in question. The validity
of this objection, however, diminishes the longer is the time period
over which data is collected. Table 111-2 gives a 9-year time-history.
of the average unit import price of crude oil for the countries in
the EEC. The 1966 price differentials between France and the other
countries can thereby be seen to have arisen from a non-stochastic
1Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, May 6, 1968, p. 1.
TABLE III-1
IMPORTS OF CRUDE OIL BY THE E EC COUNTRIES: 1966
Source
Holland
Greece
Russia
Albania
Algeria
Tunisia
Libya
Egypt
Nigeria
Gabon
Congo (B)
U.S.
Netherlands Antilles
Colombia
Venezuela
Lebanon
Syria
Iraq
Iran
Saudi Arabia
Kuwait
Qatar
Abu Dhabi
Yemen
Malaysia
Unspecified*
Total
France
Tonnage
1,652,994
18,492, 368
7,279,513
1,747,509
670,435
54,872
2,402,174
157,014
10,401,171
4,168,980
3,071,040
8,356,789
1,676,481
2,777,453
62,751,777
$/t
14.00
18. 36
16.92
17.56
18.89
20.39
17.25
16.25
17.47
16.35
17.43
16.85
19.16
18.48
17.52
Belgium-Lux.
Tonnage $/t
241,685 14.25
703,303 14.16
2,678,708 15.51
127,249 13.27
153,073 14.79
18,519 13.93
1,299,678 13.37
45,469 14.32
3,645,045 16.17
1,544,822 15.47
4,389,000 15.16
1,418,352 14.16
3,396,367 14.87
430,930 17.09
16,537,809 14.95
*USSR
Source: Platt's OILGRAM Price Service, New York Edition, December 20, 1967.
EC COUNTRIES: 1966
I
Source
Holland
Greece
Russia
Albania
Algeria
Tunisia
Libya
Egypt
Nigeria
Gabon
Congo (B)
U.S.
Netherlands Antilles
Colombia
Venezuela
Leb anon
Syria
Iraq
Iran
Saudi Arabia
Kuwait
Qatar
Abu Dhabi
Yemen
Malaysia
Unspecified*
Total
TABLE III-1 (Continued)
Holland
Tonnage $/t
212,916 16.24
360,001 16.37
5,266,517 16.32
305,414 15.75
57,714 15.87
1,489,099 16.35
1,303,888 16.10
695,152 15.96
2,647,592 17.18
5,874,260 15.52
6,417,709 16.33
1,199,887 16.18
50,128 15.88
117,568 16.02
29,642,894 16.14
Germany
Tonnage $/t
4,568,041 15.71
365,132 14.19
26,330,410 15.27
3,051,435 14.58
157,735 12.44
3,646,163 13.50
3,959,048 15.79
7,275,403 13.63
9,073,026 15.84
2,035,102 13.69
97,544 16.81
3,842,387 15.58
3,285,198 12.88
67,686,624 14.95
*USSR
A
I-A
-1
-A
TABLE III-1 (Continued)
Total EEC
Tonnage $/t
Holland
Greece
Russia
Albania
Algeria
Tunisia
Libya
Egypt
Nigeria
Gabon
Congo (B)
U.S.
Netherlands Antilles
Colombia
Venezuela
Lebanon
Syria
Iraq
Iran
Saudi Arabia
Kuwait
Qatar
Abu Dhabi
Yemen
Malaysia
Unspecified*
Total
3
19,871
8,219,875
17,208
1,306,882
96,156
8,161,104
858,654
3,679
70,666
805,177
8,268,710
5,394,644
17,216,660
24,303,200
1,101,061
262,542
34,256
70,140,356
33.33
10.97
11.17
9.76
14.62
14.32
13.64
9.62
14.13
15.68
14.25
14.53
14.45
14.00
13.47
14.77
16.96
16.35
13.58
3,325
19,871
9,872,869
17,208
24,821,892
1,524,592
49,716,252
985,903
5,257,432
846,689
54,872
3,679
70,666
57,714
9,642,291
1,349,357
3,802,059
24,848,903
23,875,619
36,653,338
44,509,176
4,074,973
7,363,440
34,256
117,568
3,285,198
252,809,500
*USSR
-j
Source
Italy
Tonnage $it
17.14
10.97
11.65
9.76
17.62
14.71
15.37
10.09
15.64
17.58
20.39
14.13
15.68
15.87
14.76
16.04
16.17
16.06
14.97
15.04
14.64
17.04
16.81
16.35
16.02
12.88
15.32
.Is
Table III- 2
Average Unit Crude Oil Import Prices for
the EEC Countries
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Belgium/Lux.
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
22.3 20.6 19.9 19.4 19.3 19.0 18.6
23.0 20.9 19.6 18.7 17.8 17.3 16.8
19.7 17.4 16.1 15.1 14.6 14.4 14.2
24.6 21.9 20.4 20.6 20.2 19.6 19.3
24.1 22.1 20.8 19.1 18.5 18.4 17.9
1965 1966
18.6 17.5
15.5 14.9
13.8 13.6
17.5 16.1
17.2 14.9
Source: Platt's Oilgram Price Service,
Selected issues.
U,
-- I
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trend in this series -- the average import price for the other
countries having fallen more rapidly over time than that of France.
The difference in these prices has thus steadily widened with time,
a trend which has definitely not been to France's advantage and which
can hardly be ascribed to factors of a contractual nature.
Quality Differences:
It is conceivable that part of the price difference could be due
to differences in the qualities of the crude oils purchased by the
various European countries. A closer comparison of the import data
shown in Table III-1, however, allows one to observe that France's
unit import bill in 1966 was higher than that of its EEC partners for
each and every crude oil source -- with the singular exception of
Dutch imports from Iran. Although there can be significant differences
in the crude oil qualities produced by a single source, or country,
these tend to be small compared to those due to the multiplicity of
producing countries themselves. The fact that France's unit import
prices are observed to be higher whatever the source of import,
indicates that quality differences were not a major cause of the
country's relatively high import bill. But the quality factor cannot
be dismissed so easily. The slate of crude oil qualities refined by
a company is generally determined by reference to: (a) relative crude
oil prices and availabilities, (b) the specifications on petroleum
products (e.g., sulphur content) which it must meet, (c) the refining
facilities available to the company, and, (d) the product demand
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pattern and market opportunities facing the company. At the aggregate
level, only the fourth of these factors tends to vary significantly
between one European country and the other.
Table 111-3 gives a gross breakdown, by major product category,
of the EEC petroleum market demand structure. The French and German
markets are seen to be more oriented than the others towards white
products -- due at least in part to the relatively more important
position held by the coal industry in those two countries. As a
result of this demand pattern, it can be presumed that France and
Germany have been led to import a lighter -- and hence a somewhat more
valuable -- slate of crude oil than their European neighbours. We
will attempt to estimate this difference and the possible price
differential associated with it -- but only in gross and very
approximate fashion. The imprecision of our approach is forced upon
us by the meagerness of the available data. But it should nevertheless
be adequate for the purposes of this analysis; which is directed
primarily at determining on an order-of-magnitude basis whether
France's crude oil import price data helps to support the hypothesis
that competition restraint has been a significant trait characterizing
the French petroleum market.
In order to determine the quality distribution of EEC crude oil
imports, an average density was associated with each crude oil source
shown in Table III-1. There are definite recognized weaknesses to
this approach. Density is not the sole determinant of crude oil
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quality. Sulphur content, pour point, etc., are also of importance
in this respect. Very conveniently, however, most of these latter
qualities have tended to be correlated with density -- the lighter
crudes, for example, being the ones which have been lowest in sulphur
content. A further problem arises from the fact that most of the
sources listed in Table III-1 produce a range rather than a single
type of crude -- Saudi Arabia most notably. These objections,
unfortunately, can only be noted and acknowledged. But imprecise as
it is, our approach is still capable of producing approximate, order-
of-magnitude type, results -- the only claim which is made in its
behalf, and adequate enough for our purposes.
Table 111-4 shows the resulting density (read quality) distribu-
tion of crude oil imports by EEC country. The average density
associated with each crude oil source was estimated by inspection of
crude oil production data by field (in particular that given in the
Oil and Gas Journal end-of-year annual issues) and by reference to
the barrels/metric ton conversion factors used, for example, by
Petroleum Times. Table 111-5 then estimates the average price
differential associated with this density distribution, by applying
the traditional differential of 2(,/*API/barrel. The latter figure
is generally acknowledged to be on the high side, given prevailing
Table III- 3
Breakdown by Major Product Category of the EEC
Petroleum Markets
1966
Motor Gasoline
'000
Tons
Gas Oil
Diesel Oil
'000
% Tons
Germany
Belgium-
Luxembourg
France
Italy
Netherlands
11,530
1,617
9,072
6,493
2,244
14.7 34,456 43.9 19,922 25.4 12,562 16.0 78,470 100.0
10.9 5,021 33.8 5,374 36.2 2,844 19.1 14,856 100.0
18.2 21,717 43.5 11,221 22,5 7,875 15.8 49,885 100.0
14.3 12,491 27.4 19,230 42.3 7,286 16.0 45,500
11.8 4,738 24.9 8,560 44.9 3,505
100.0
18.4 19,047 100.0
Source: Activite de l'Industrie Petroliere - 1966,
Comite Professionnel du Petrole, Paris.
-- j
Heavy
Fuel Oils
'000
% Tons
Other
Products
Total
'000
% Tons
'000
% Tons %
I
TABLE 111-4
AVERAGE DENSITY DISTRIBUTION
OF EEC CRUDE OIL IMPORTS
1.966
----------------------------------- (percent of total)---------------------------
42 0API Crudes
Algeria
Tunisia
Qatar
37 0API Crudes
Libya
Abu Dhabi
36 0 API Crudes
Iraq
35 0API Crudes
Saudi Arabia
Venezuela
34 0API Crudes
Nigeria
Iran
Others
32 0API Crudes
Kuwait
31 0API Crudes
France Belg/Lux. Holland
29.5
2.7
11.6
4.4
4.9
3.8
2.8
6.6
2.7
12.1
13.3
1.1
1.5
4.2
5.7
16.2
2.6
18.8
0.8
1.3
4.5
19.8
0.2
9.3
8.6
7.8
0.9
26.5
1.9
16.4
29.3
20.5
6.6
20.0
Germany Italy
6.7
0.5
0.1
7.3
38.9
5.7
2.6
22.0
5.6
1.1
9.9
8.1
27.6
19.1
24.1
13.4
5.4
44.6
5.8
18.8
4.5
10.8
5.2
20.5
3.0
32.2
16.0
16.6
8.7
100.0 100.0 100.0
1.7
1.4
3.1
10.7
0.3 00
11.0
10.9
22.6
1.1
23.7
7.1
13.1
20.2
31.1
TOTAL 100.0 100.0
TABLE 111-5
ESTIMATED QUALITY PRICE DIFFERENTIAL
FOR CRUDE OIL IMPORTS BY EEC COUNTRIES
Assuming a reference crude of 310 API
Crude Oil Gravity
0 API
42
37
36
35
34
32
Quality Price Differential
in c/0API/ton
2 x 7.72 = 15.44
2 x 7.50 = 15.00
2 x 7.45 = 14.90
2 x 7.41 = 14.82
2 x 7.36 = 14.72
2 x 7.27 = 14.54
Quality Price Differential Relative
to Reference Crude, in c/ton
15.44 x 11 = 169.84
15.00 x 6 = 90.00
14.90 x 5 = 74.50
14.82 x 4 = 59.28
14.72 x 3 = 44.16
14.54 x 1 = 14.54
Weighted Average Quality Price Differential Relative to Reference Crude
Crude Oil Gravity Tranche
0 API
42
37
36
35
34
32
Total Average Differential
France Belg/Lux Holland Germany Italy
---------------- (cents per Ton)--------------
54.6
14.4
12.4
5.2
5.3
1.9
93.8
9.7
16.9
6.9
9.2
13.0
3.0
58.7
11.2
18.0
1.9
16.4
8.4
3.5
59.4
12.4
40.2
4.3
11.1
9.1
0.4
77.5
5.3
9.9
8.1
14.1
8.9
4.5
50.8
Quality Price Differential
Relative to French Crude Imports: (35.1) (34.4) (16.3) (43.0)
Source: Quality distribution of crude oil imports used to calculate weighted average
differential from Table 111-4.
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circumstances during the past few years. But overestimation acts
in the direction of conservatism within the context of the present
analysis -- a directional bias which is probably not amiss. The
weighted average price differential between France and the rest of
the EEC, due to differences in imported crude oil qualities is thus
estimated to range from 43%/ton (versus Italy) to 16(f/ton (versus
Germany).
Transportation Differences:
In addition to crude oil quality, geography -- the determinant
of transportation supply lines -- also affects relative crude oil
import values. While the Suez Canal remained open, countries such
as Italy and France paid less for tanker transportation than those
facing the Atlantic or North Sea. France, itself, moreover, would
be expected to have shouldered a somewhat higher transportation bill
than Italy, since it imports a substantial portion of its crude
supplies through Atlantic ports. This factor can be quantified --
although again only in gross and approximate fashion. Table 111-6
shows the breakdown of France's crude oil imports for 1966 by area
1That this traditional differential is high was implicitly
recognized by the schedule of discounts and gravity allowances off
posted prices incorporated in the so-called OPEC royalty expensing
agreement of 1964. The trend in this schedule of discounts and
allowances was set so that quality differentials would eventually be
reduced to l4/*API/barrel. The more recent 1968 agreement has
moderated the impact on lighter crude oils of the terms agreed to in
1964, by establishing a schedule of allowances whose trend points
towards a gravity differential of 1.5,/*API/barrel by 1972, which,
however, is restored to 2%/*API/barrel over the following three years.
Mediterranean
(Tons x 103 )
Import Zone
Atlantic
(Tons x 103 )
Total France
(Tons x 103 )% I
Mediterranean
West Africa
Venezuela
Persian Gulf
USSR and Other
TOTAL
17,841
0.422
0.272
9,971
0,849
29,355
27.4
0.6
0.4
15.5
1.3
45.4
19,002
2,209
2,224
11,083
0.809
35,327
29.4
3.5
3.5
17.1
1.3
54.6
36,843
2,631
2,496
21,054
1,658
64,682
56.8
4.1
3.9
32.6
2.6
H
0o
100.0
Source: Activite de l'Industrie Petroliere, 1966, Ministere de l'Industrie,
Direction des Carburants.
j
TABLE 111-6
FRANCE'S 1966 CRUDE OIL IMPORTS
BY AREA OF ORIGIN AND BY REFINERY IMPORT ZONE
%
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of origin and by refinery import zone. For our purposes, we shall
limit our estimate of transportation cost differentials to those
between major import zones -- the Mediterranean seacoast (Italy and
part of France's imports), and the various Atlantic and North Sea
ports (Le Havre for the remaining part of France's imports, Antwerp
for Belgium, and Rotterdam for Holland and Germany). Average tanker
charter rates during the mid 1960's are assumed at the level of Inta
Scale -40%. The figures which were retained for estimating tanker
transportation cost differentials between the EEC countries, and the
results derived therefrom, are given in Table 111-7. Averaged over
France's total imports of crude oil, transportation cost differentials
are thus estimated to range from +0.44 to -0.52 dollars/ton.
Geographically imposed supply line differences, however, need not be
the only cause of transportation cost differentials. Administrative
measures can also play a role. Particularly noteworthy in this
respect is the legal requirement that 2/3 of France's internal
requirements for crude oil must be transported on French-flag carriers.
Whether the latter are high cost carriers, and a consequent source of
relative transportation cost differentials between France and other
European countries remains an open question, subject to further
research. The issue has not been investigated in detail within the
context of this study. But it is worth noting that in 1966, 84.6%
of France's crude oil requirements were imported via French-flag
carriers, in addition to 28.9% of the country's crude oil imports for
TABLE 111-7
ESTIMATE OF TRANSPORTATION COST DIFFERENTIALS
BETWEEN EEC COUNTRIES
Inta Scale
- Flat
- -40%
Medite
Le-
Assumed Transportation Cost Differentials Between Import Zones
(dollars per ton)
rranean/ Mediterranean/ Mediterranean/ Le Havre/ L
Havre Antwerp Rotterdam Antwerp R
1.35
0.81
1.55
0.93
1.50
0.90
0.30
0.18
e Havre/
otterdam
0.22
0.13
Average Transportation Cost
Differential per Ton of Crude
Oil Imported by France
- between France and Belgium/Lux.
- between France and Holland
- between France and Germany
- between France and Italy
H-00
Dollars per Ton
45.4%(0.93) + 54.6%(0.18) = 0.52 in France's favour
45.4%(0.90) + 54.6%(0.13) = 0.45 in France's favour
45.4%(0.90) + 54.6%(0.13) = 0.48 in France's favour
54.6%(0.81) = 0.44 in Italy's favour
Source: Percent breakdown of French crude oil imports by import zone from Table 111-6.
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processing and re-export.1 Although not totally conclusive, these
figures indicate that French-flag carriers have been used even when
not required by law, presumably because they were cost-competitive
with available alternatives.
Franc Zone Purchases:
Another identifiable source of price differences between France
and other European countries derives from the Franc Zone crude oil
purchases which the country's refining companies have been called
upon to undertake from ERAP. In 1966, the quantities purchased by
the international refining affiliates in France under this system
amounted to approximately 8 million tons, while about an additional
3.0 million tons was supplied by ERAP to CFR and Antar.2 The first
of these quantities is known to have been valued at 2.12$/barrel FOB
Algeria. The price placed on the latter purchases, however, has not
been reported, but they are known to have been valued at somewhat
less than the 2.12$/barrel applicable to the international companies.
For the purpose of this analysis a price of 2.00$/barrel will be
assumed for the CFR and Antar purchases. This figure may be high,
but this would only tend to render our conclusion more conservative
within the present context. Moreover, the CIF unit value of 18.36$/
ton (about 2.35$/barrel), shown in Table III-1, for France's total
crude imports from Algeria, corresponds with these figures, even
1Activit4 de l'Industrie Petroliere, 1966, Tome II, Ministere de
l'Industrie, Direction des Carburants.
2Cf. Chapter I, pp. 43 and 55.
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though it is a composite of crude oil sales falling under the
national interest contract system and that sold by ERAP and others
outside of this system.
We have already argued that the open market value for Algerian
oil prior to the Suez Canal closure was probably in the neighbourhood
of 1.55 - 1.65$/barrel (see Chapter II, p. 127). This is partially
confirmed by the fact that the unit value of Italian imports of
Algerian oil in 1966, shown in Table III-1, corresponds to an FOB
price of approximately 1.70$/barrel. In view of this price range we
shall adopt the value of 1.65$/barrel as a valid estimate for the
open market value of Algerian oil in 1966. The import burden
resulting from France's Franc Zone purchase system can consequently
be estimated at:
[8.0(2.12 - 1.65) + 3.0(2.00 - 1.65)] x 7.8 x 106
= 37.6 million dollars.
giving rise to a price premium averaged over France's total imports
for 1966 of 0.60$/ton.
These figures may be considered biased on the downside to the
extent that they have ignored Shell's and Mobil's crude oil
production in Algeria -- 80% of which is allowed as a deduction in
calculating the quantities of crude which these companies are called
upon to purchase from ERAP. In 1966 this allowed deduction amounted
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to about 3.5 million tons. It is not unreasonable to presume that
both of these companies transfered this production to their French
affiliates at a price neighbouring the 2.12$/barrel value ascribed
to their purchases from ERAP. If this is assumed to be the case,
the estimate for the total import burden would rise to 50.4 million
dollars, which, averaged over France's total imports of crude oil,
gives 0.80$/ton.
The following figures summarize the results of the analysis
up to this point:
Belg/Lux.
(dollars per ton)
Holland Germany Italy
Gross difference in
import values
relative to France
(from Table III-1)
Adjustment due to
quality
(from Table 111-5)
Adjustment due to
transportation
(from Table 111-7)
Adjustment due to
Franc Zone
purchases
Residual price
differential
2.57
(0.35)
0.52
(0.60/0.80)
2.14/1.94
1.37
(0.34)
0.48
2.57
(0.16)
0.48
(0.60/0.80) (0.60/0.80)
0.92/0.72 2.29/2.09
3.94
(0.43)
(0.44)
(0.60/0.80)
2.47/2.27
Even after accounting for transportation and quality differences,
and after deducting the estimated cost differential due to the Franc
Zone purchases imposed on the French refining sector, a substantial
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price disparity is seen to remain between the unit cost of France's
crude oil imports and that of the other EEC countries. The difference
is least as against the Netherlands' adjusted average import price,
and greatest relative to Italy's. The comparative figures for
Belgium/Luxembourg and for Germany are, however, quite close to the
average Italian price residual. On average, a figure of 2$/ton can
consequently be advanced as an approximate and conservative measure
of the residual and unaccounted price disparity between France and
its European neighbors in the EEC.
Before any conclusions can be drawn from these figures, however,
it is necessary to consider yet another possible factor which could
have caused the differences in oil import prices just estimated.
Taxes and Comparative Profitability:
In view of the vertically integrated structure of the
international petroleum industry, it is possible to argue that the
higher prices which are apparent for France's crude oil imports may
simply reflect a more lenient attitude on the part of the French
fiscal authorities. Generally speaking, it is in the interests of
the international major oil companies to maintain relatively high
transfer prices on crude oil sales to their refining affiliates.
The advantage of doing so lies in selectively reducing their
refining and distribution profit margins -- and hence in reducing
their income tax liabilities on these activites -- in favour of their
crude oil production and transportation activities. Upstream profits
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of the latter type can, generally, be sheltered from fiscal
imposition through the use of trading companies or similar tax
haven creations. It is thus up to the fiscal authorities of
petroleum consuming nations to maintain a watchful eye on such
practices in order to ensure that their countries receive their
"fair due" in income taxes. France's higher crude oil import prices
may then, according to this argument, by symptomatic of the major
companies' interest in minimizing their income tax liabilities in
the country; and, consequently, need not in any way reflect higher
return opportunities on the French market. The issue is thus
critical, since it strikes at the very premise which underlies our
analysis.
In partial response to this argument, however, Table 111-8
presents various financial ratios derived from the accounts of
France's refining companies. These ratios, both individually and
collectively, are indicative of the relative profitability of these
companies. A variety of profitability measures are presented in
this fashion in order to minimize the possible distortional effects
of differences in capitalisation structure or depreciation and
reserve accounting practices among the analyzed companies.
The only independent and non-integrated company within the
French refining sector is Antar. It may be seen from Table 111-8
that this company has fared about as well as its other competitors
on just about any profitability criterion. This is somewhat surprising,
COMPARATIVE FINANCIAL
TABLE 111-8
RATIOS OF FRANCE'S REFINING COMPANIES
In Percent
B.P. Shell Esso Mobil Antar CFR
Net Income/Equity Investment
- 1965
- 1966
- 1967
Equity Cash Flow/Equity Investment
- 1965
- 1966
- 1967
Total Cash Flow/Equity Investment
+ Long Term Debt
- 1965
- 1966
- 1967
Total Cash Flow/Total Net Assets
- 1965
- 1966
- 1967
2.8 4.6
2.7 5.0
2.6 5.9
18.8
15.1
16.4
18.5
15.6
16.7
17.5
18.3
20.8
na
na
na
11.3 na
9.5 na
9.3 na
Equity investment = paid in capital + earned surplus +
Equity cash flow = net income + depreciation + reserve
Total cash flow = equity cash flow + interest charges
Source: Selected company Annual Reports.
5.5
5.6
4.7
18.0
21.9
19.0
17.9
19.3
16.9
11.7
12.5
11.1
na
1.5
0.7
na
20.0
20.4
na
18.9
19.1
na
12.0
11.4
6.0
5.5
5.5
24.8
20.5
20.5
18.2
18.0
18.7
9.7
10.0
10.6
na
6.3
6.3
na
24.4
23.2
na
21.3
21.2
na
14.9
13.0
reserves
charges
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since one would have expected Antar's profitability to be significantly
higher than that of its international competitors. If France's higher
prices on crude oil imports is indeed attributable to the international
companies' attempt to minimize local tax payments then Antar's
profitability would be expected to be higher than that of its inter-
national competitors since it would have no incentive to purchase high
priced crude -- its purchases representing real rather than transfer
transactions. On the other hand, if France's higher crude oil import
prices are instead the reflection of oligopolistic returns, then
Antar would also be expected to fare better than its international
competitors, since the same return opportunities would presumably be
available to it, and would be reflected in higher profit returns
rather than higher crude oil costs. But economies of scale, the
advantages of imported know-how, and differences in general expertise,
may be factors acting contrary to this tendency towards higher
profitability.
In order to decide conclusively between the two possible
interpretations of France's higher crude oil import prices, it is,
consequently, necessary to refer to data which can provide a direct
comparison of refining profitability between the different EEC
countries. Such a data source was available to the writer in the
form of the annual reports and accounts of Esso Standard's refining
and distribution affiliates in France and Germany for 1966 and 1967.
A comparative analysis of these reports is shown in Table 111-9.
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TABLE 111-9
COMPARATIVE FINANCIAL RATIOS FOR
ESSO FRANCE AND ESSO GERMANY
1966 and 1967
Ess
(in percent) 1966
Net income/equity
investment 5.6
Equity cash flow/
equity invest. 21.9
Total cash flow/
equity invest.
+ long term debt 19.3
Total cash flow/
total net assets 12.5
(See Table 111-8 for definition of
o France
1967
4.7
19.0
16.9
11.1
Esso Germany
1966 1967
1.1
14.1
13.1
7.3
1.2
14.8
13.8
7.2
terms)
Sources: Esso Standard SAF, Rapport Annuel, 1966
Esso A.G., Geschaftsbericht, 1967.
and 1967.
Table 111-9 strongly suggests that the French market has been
more profitable than the German one for the local affiliates of the
international major companies. Scale could hardly account for the
substantially different profit performances of Esso's French and
German subsidiaries; and in any event the latter is the larger of the
two. This conclusion, moreover, is further reinforced by the fact
that Gulf's Italian subsidiary was reported to have incurred a net
loss of 1568 million liras in 1968, while Esso Standard turned in a
Bulletin de l'Industrie Petroliere, No. 1314, April 11, 1969.
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net profit of 105.6 million Francs in France. Or to take an earlier
period, Esso's Italian subsidiary also incurred a net loss in 1960 of
1569 million Liras, during which time its French affiliate Posted a
net profit of 39 million Francs. There is thus substantial evidence
to support the contention that France's petroleum market has been
among the most profitable of those in the EEC -- in spite of the
higher prices at which crude oil has been imported into that country.
The only possible remaining cause which can be advanced for
France's residual import price disparity is that it is due to
structural differences between that country's petroleum sector and
that of the rest of the EEC -- differences which are accentuated by
the more sheltered climate which characterizes the French petroleum
market.
Industry Structure and Competitive Climate:
Until recently, France's petroleum refining and distribution
sectors have been dominated by the international major oil companies
(including CFP in this category). This is the one structural facet
which distinguishes the country's petroleum industry. By comparison,
the Italian refining sector, for example, has encompassed a number
of independent companies -- headed by ENI -- which have long been
active in promoting agressive commercial and price policies.
1Phtrole Informations, May 30, 1969, p. 51.
2Esso Standard Italiana, Relazione Annuale, 1960; and Esso
Standard S.A.F., Rapport Annuel, 1964.
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To a certain limited extent, the oil which moves through the
integrated channels of a major oil company may reasonably lay claim
to a price premium over the same physical commodity made available
by a small independent producer. On the demand side this premium
would represent the risk-aversion preferences of consuming nations.
Crude oil supplied by the integrated channels of a major oil company
offers the intangible quality of reliability. On the side of supply,
the premium would represent the economic cost of production diversifica-
tion -- which is the basic means by which the international majors are
able to ensure the reliability of their commitments. It can consequent-
ly be argued that part of France's higher import bill is representative
of the country's higher degree of risk aversion -- that it is no more
than the economic cost associated with a higher degree of security.
Although this argument may have some conceptual merit, it is not
a very convincing or plausible explanation of the substantial and
still unexplained import price difference between France and other
EEC countries. Integrated company channels are not necessarily the
only means by which supply diversification and relative security can
be achieved. Open market purchases can be allotted geographically
to approach the degree of diversification offered by the major
companies. The latter, moreover, sell a substantial portion of
their production on a third-party and non-integrated basis. They
consequently represent in this fashion a possible source of supply
which compromises between cost and security. A wide variety of
structural combinations are thus open in principle to a major
consuming country such as France. Total reliance on a single and
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extreme structural form must therefore be the consequence of causes
which are more fundamental than the simple trade-off of cost and
security. This normative argument is reinforced by the empirical
observation that the EEC countries have not had to face any more
severe limitations on their crude oil supplies than has France
during the past two Suez crises.
We are thus led to conclude that France's higher crude oil
import prices are, indeed, the reflection of higher return opportun-
ities on the French market -- a condition which has been made possible
by virtue of France's policies of import protectionism and obstruction
to market entry. As a result of these higher prices, the cost borne
by French energy consumers has been estimated above at about 2 dollars
per ton of crude oil imported in 1966, or a total of approximately
$120 million during that year. By all evidence, costs of a similar
order of magnitude (although somewhat lower in absolute terms) must
also have been incurred during preceding years. These are large sums
by any standard - and they tend to eclipse the possible losses due
to the misallocation of real resources by ERAP at the field develop-
ment level, a subject which concerned us in the preceding chapter.
OTHER SOURCES OF COST:
The costs associated with France's petroleum policies and borne
by the French consumer are, in fact, substantially higher than the
above estimate. Conceptually, they can be identified with the
following factors:
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1) Government contributions to Elf/ERAP's capital
investment budget. The French national oil company
receives from the government substantial sums which
go to finance its investment program. The source
of government revenue for this purpose is a direct
tax -- the "Fonds de Soutien aux Hydrocarbures" --
imposed on motor gasoline, diesel oil (gas oil),
and light fuel oil. The financial contribution
received from the government by Elf/ERAP in this
manner amounted to 353 million Francs in 1966,1
and to 363 million Francs in 1967.2
2) The Franc Zone crude oil purchase obligations which
French refining companies are required to under-
take from ERAP. This purchase system essentially
provides Elf/ERAP with an indirect source of
financial subsidy which is measured by the price
premium attributed to Franc oil multiplied by the
quantities of oil involved.
3) The higher profitability of France's refining and
distribution markets relative to conditions
existing in neighbouring countries.
1 Elf/ERAP, Rapport Annuel, 1966, p. 39.
2Elf/ERAP, Rapport Annuel, 1967, p. 52.
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4) The tendency of the international oil companies
to practice higher transfer prices on their crude
oil imports into France than elsewhere in the EEC.
These four factors do not have the same economic impact at the
aggregate national level. The first two measure the direct and
indirect financing made available to Elf/ERAP through government
assistance. Whether these resources are invested efficiently by the
company is the key question. The analysis presented in Chapter II
provides some indication that the price incentives inherent in the
Franc oil purchase system may have led ERAP to make inefficient
investment decisions at the field development level.
On the other hand, the last two factors, in the above list of
four, both represent a source of direct cost to the French national
economy. We have been able to estimate above that the cost associated
with the last of these was of the order of $120 million in 1966. To
this sum should be added the above-average profit premium enjoyed by
France's refining companies.
In a real sense the non-visible costs of high crude oil prices
and the relatively high profitability of France's petroleum market
has been a direct corrollary of the Government's decision to ensure
a stable and high-priced outlet for ERAP's surplus crude oil
production. For it is this decision which has made French import
protectionism a practical necessity. It is of course impossible to
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predict whether the French market would otherwise have been an open
and competitive one, but the major practical impediment to this
effect would at least have been removed.
It is consequently not idle to question whether France, instead
of using its overseas oil resources to support, and indeed to foster,
the non-competitiveness of its crude oil price structure, should not
instead have used them as an incentive and a goad for increased
competition and lower prices. This issue is all the more relevant
in the light of ERAP's increasingly widespread exploration commitments.
In the event of sizeable discovery in the Middle East or North Africa
(productive exploratory wells have, indeed, already been drilled in
Iran and Iraq by ERAP, as well as in Libya by SNPA) how will the
French authorities react to the problem of marketing a growing
potential of "nationally produced" oil?
This question transcends the strictly national and French setting
of our preceding analysis. For other European nations have recently
followed in France's footsteps in encouraging their own public or
semi-public national oil companies to embark upon overseas exploration.
And what if they discover sizeable oil resources? Will Europe's
energy market then turn increasingly protectionist?
These issues form part of the set of policy decisions which were
identified early in this study (Chapter I, page 78). Because of their
causal sequence, the particular questions at hand -- pertaining to the
methods adopted for the commercialization of "national" crude oil
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resources -- were there classified as subsidiary in rank. But this
classification only applies when the measure of reference is causal
rather than economic. The potential economic impact of these matters
has just been shown to be of substantial importance.
FORWARD INTEGRATION AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST:
To this point we have considered the advisability and potential
consequences of enforcing the sale of "nationally" produced crude oil
through preferential and protected channels. Forward integration,
however, is a long-term alternative by which a national oil company
can ensure a market for its oil resources; and ERAP has in fact
pursued it, even as it disposed of the majority of its crude
production by way of "national interest" sales to the established
companies on the French refining market.
ERAP's program of forward integration was launched in 1960
through UGP (Union Generale des Petroles), when the latter acquired
a majority participation in Caltex's refining operations in France.
In embarking on such a program of integration, ERAP must have been
prompted by a variety of motives. The following factors are those
which may have conceivably played a role in this respect:
1) Fearing that increased pressure by the EEC Commission
might eventually lead the French Government to
liberalize its control on the country's petroleum
industry, and thus weaken or eliminate ERAP's
present opportunity to dispose of its crude
resources preferentially on the French market,
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the company may have decided to ensure itself
of a stable outlet for these resources through
the means of forward integration.
2) The French authorities may have decided that
active government participation in the country's
refining and distribution sectors -- through
ERAP/Elf -- was necessary in order to reinforce
its watchdog role over the country's petroleum
industry. Through this means it may have hoped
to break outmoded and traditional patterns of
activity and to infuse a greater degree of
competition on the French market.
3) ERAP/Elf may have wanted to benefit from the
higher returns available on the French market,
not only through its "national interest" crude
oil sales to established refining companies,
but also through a direct and active participa-
tion in the country's refining and distribution
sectors.
4) Lastly, ERAP/Elf's program of forward integration
may have been the expression of corporate
ambition tinged with economic nationalism. It
is not implausible to presume that there exists
a certain dynamism to corporate enterprise which
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transcends the short, or even medium term calculus
of economics; a dynamism which feeds primarily on
personal and corporate ambition for size and power.
This possibility is all the greater if public
subsidies, supported by nationalistic argument,
are available -- as they have been to ERAP -- to
mask any potential breach between corporate goals
and economic reality. The mood of nationalistic
economic assertiveness which has accompanied
ERAP's growth and development was highlighted at
the time of launching of the company's brand name,
"Elf", on the French market in 1967. It was
claimed at the time that this constituted the
first appearance of a wholly French entity (of a
"national gasoline", states one report) on the
country's petroleum market. This claim incited a
cursory rejoinder from CFP, which pointed to the
preponderant role long held by this company on the
French market, and to the fact that its national
lineage could hardly be in doubt (as is also the
case for Antar). 1
These are some of the possible factors which may have entered
into ERAP's decision to embark on a sizeable program of forward
1Cf. Platt's Oilgram News Service, April 13, 1967, and Petrole
Informations, April 20, 1967.
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integration. Of the four possibilities which have been listed, the
first two offer the potential that the national French company's
program of forward integration may result in positive national welfare
implications. It is too early to judge whether this will indeed be
the case -- whether as a result of ERAP's entry onto the French
refining and distribution markets, these will become more open and
competitive. But the potential is there. And in this recognition
lies a possibly valid justification for the creation of "national"
European refining and distribution companies.
This justification presupposes that the international major
companies are acquiring a growing degree of monopoly power at the
European market level. That this power, reinforced by indirect
government sanction, has existed on the French market has just been
demonstrated. But the simple remedy to the French phenomenon, to
the extent that it is isolated, is to open the country's import
frontiers. On the other hand, if the power of market concentration
is being manifested increasingly on a European wide level, free
trade conditions would not be as effective. And only more potent
alternatives, such as the creation of publicly-supported national
companies would qualify as effective counter-measures..
Whether the trend in Europe is indeed towards a greater
concentration and monopolisation of the petroleum sector is a
question which is left open for further research. Worthy of note,
however, is that German fears and sensitivities concerning this
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matter have received wide exposure in recent months, and have led
to the creation of a German "supply company" under government
auspices.
Viewed from this perspective, the often repeated French concern
over the necessity to ensure an adequate margin of profitability for
the country's petroleum industry ("adequate" being equated with the
industry's ability to auto-finance its expansion) gains an added
dimension. In this light, this concern may be interpreted as the
reflection of the government's fear that the power of the international
oil companies, conferred to them by their size, may eventually allow
them exclusive domination of the French petroleum market. And from
this fear the conclusion may have been bred that the financial
viability of France's indigenous refining and distribution companies
had to be essentially guaranteed by the State, in order to ensure
their continued independence. Witness the following statement by
Mr. Andre Giraud, France's Directeur des Carburants:
"...(France's) ex-refinery prices are higher than
in other countries. We are not attempting to
lower them. This may cause astonishment and it
is worth dwelling on this subject for a minute
... We have done our best to maintain the self-
financing of the petroleum industry, which has
nevertheless dropped quite perceptibly during
the last few years, and we believe it essential
to maintain self-financing. If we do not main-
tain this, the French petroleum companies would
be the first by a long run to pay for this.
They would no longer be able to combat the
foreign companies and, after a very short time,
this would be harmful to our economic security."
1From an unpublished speech given to France's Conseil
Economique et Social in July, 1968.
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or, to quote from a widely diffused speech given by Mr. Desprairies,
ERAP's Director of External Relations:
"En fait, sur un marche exempt d'interventions
gouvernementales, la concurrence risque
d'engendrer l'abus de concurrence, aussi
dommageable a terme que l'absence de concurrence.
Les entreprises ind6pendantes sont menacees ou
disparaissent devant les entreprises infiniment
plus puissantes, du fait du laminage excessif
des profits auxquels peuvent seules resister
des entreprises beneficiant d'un regime fiscal
particulierement favorable dans le pays de leurs
socistes-mares, et de l'acces, dans ce meme pays,
a un marche interieur aux larges marges
beneficiaires."i
One may or may not take issue with the stated goal of maintaining
a financially viable and independent French presence on the French
petroleum market. Much depends upon one's view of the threat of
market dominance posed by the international majors. But if the
analysis which has concerned us during the course of this chapter is
well-founded, then there seems little doubt that the choice of means
by which the financial viability of France's petroleum companies has
been ensured by the French authorities has been among the most
inefficient of possible options. For their choice of import protection-
ism associated with competitive restraints, is a combination which, by
all evidence, has not only achieved its objective of creating a
favourable climate for the country's indigeneous oil companies, but
which necessarily also went further in giving to the affiliates of
1Desprairies, Pierre, "L'Furope et son Petrole Quotidien: Hier,
Aujourd'hui et Demain", Revue Francaise de l'Energie, No. 202, 1968.
The emphasis as shown is found in the original text.
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the major oil companies in the country similar -- if not greater --
assistance. It remained to the French energy consumer to pay the
bill for this policy through higher prices.
If financial assistance is indeed deemed necessary to maintain
a French presence in the country's petroleum sector, a more selective --
and hence less costly, although also more visible -- means could
surely have been devised to achieve this objective. The possibilities
to this end are so numerous as to hardly warrant listing here.
This issue will probably draw increasing attention as the rest
of Continental Europe follows on France's -- and now Germany's --
footsteps, and becomes increasingly sensitized to the need to maintain
some degree of local market balance in order to counter the possibility
of market domination and control by the major companies. Balance is
the key word in this context; for the extreme alternative of enshrin-
ing a national oil company with near monopoly powers -- as exemplified
most strikingly by CAMPSA in Spain -- is potentially the most
inefficient of possible solutions, since it necessarily infirms the
prodding and regulatory action provided by the interplay of competition.
But while excluding that extreme alternative, the fact remains
that resort can be had to any number of measures -- of which market
protectionism is only one of the most inefficient -- in order to
achieve or maintain a desired degree of market balance. And yet the
inherent security afforded by market-sharing and protectionist
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solutions is such that these are often the first to be considered.
Thus even in Italy, if one is to refer to a recent article in
The Economist reporting on a "semi-secret document" entitled "ENI
and Italy":
"ENI claims that resources are being wasted in
Italy's oil distribution and refining system with
too many petrol stations and too many small
refineries. The ENI answer is state intervention
with fixed quotas on the French pattern, the lion's
share presumably going to ENI which at the moment
has too small a turnover to justify its investments.
ENI backs up its claims for preferential treatment
by accusing the Italian subsidiaries of the oil
majors of concealing profits and evading taxes
through the well-known ploy of buying crude at
artificially high posted prices. The final
indignity, claims the ENI document, is that the
US companies employ Italian capital to finance
their Italian subsidiaries."
"This is fighting talk, hardly calculated to win
friends. And in the long run, ENI's plans for
the Italian market depend on finding crude,
something that has always eluded it."i
"... ENI's plans for the Italian market depend on finding
crude..." -- this claim in favour of backward integration is one
which is often made for oil, generally without much substantiation.
Could it be an obsolete habit of thought inherited from a faded era
wh;en oil production was characterized by substantial (one is tempted*
to say oligopolistic) profit margins? While it has just been
recognized that national oil companies may have a valid role to play
in maintaining some degree of market balance at the refining and
distribution level, there is no reason to presume that a corresponding
'The Economist, October 19, 1968, p. 91-
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role awaits them in overseas exploration. Whether the latter is the
case largely depends again upon an assessment of the trend in
competitive forces -- but with the focus of attention being now
shifted from the market to the production end of the petroleum
industry; and with the number of competitive protagonists being
correspondingly increased to comprise not only the oil companies
themselves, but also the major oil producing countries of the Middle
East and North Africa. This subject will concern us in the following
chapter.
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APPENDIX III-A
The French Official Price System
The new system, introduced in 1968, by which France's official
ex-refinery product prices are calculated is comprised of the
following elements.
An index (I) is calculated on a tri-monthly basis comparing FOB
quotations for petroleum products in the Caribbean (C), in the Persian
Gulf (P) and in the Mexican Gulf (M) with the same prices which
obtained at the end of 1965. The lowest price quotation for each
region published in Platt's Price Service is the primary source of
data for this purpose.
C M P
I = 0.60 C, + 0.20 , + 0.20 ,
The index I is calculated for each category of refined products, and
is applied to the corresponding official French ex-refinery price
("prix paritaire") in effect at the end of 1965; subject to the
limitation that the resulting weighted average realisation, for all
products combined, must remain within the following bounds:
Floor: The floor is based partly on crude oil prices
and partly on refined product prices. The precise
crude oil price quotations used for this purpose
have not been identified explicitly, but they are
apparently established by reference to FOB price
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postings. To the latter is added a freight
component in order to arrive at an equivalent
CIF price. The floor, J, is thus in principle
equated to:
h +
J = 0.5 Z ak[B + A(0.6 fk + 0 .4fk) + S] + 0.5 Z B L
kkkk p p
where:
ak = proportion of crude k ina representative crude slate
for France.
Bk = FOB price for crude
A = AFRA freight rate
hfk = INTA SCALE flat tanker tariff for crude k to Le Havrek
f = same but with Lavera as destinationk
S = Suez Canal toll
B = proportion of product p in a representative breakdown of
France's petroleum product demand
L = the price of product p in the United States. Somewhat
surprisingly, the source of data for this purpose
has been reported to be the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Ceiling: The ceiling is given by the weighted average of
product realizations on the United States market,
as given by data published (again surprisingly)
by the Independent Petroleum Association of
America (IPAA).
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CHAPTER IV
AN APPRAISAL OF ERAP'S EXPLORATION AGREEMENTS
What are the advantages for a European country to be represented
in overseas exploration through a national oil company? The French
have called upon numerous arguments in justifying ERAP's exploration
program. In this chapter these will be reviewed together with related
ideas of pertinence.
The justifications which have been advanced by the French
authorities for ERAP's exploration program have often been complex to
the point of ambiguity. But by and large they fall under the follow-
ing classification:
1) Security of supply arguments;
2) Balance of payments arguments;
3) Arguments of a more general nature revolving around the
notion that cooperation between oil producing and oil
consuming nations should be encouraged;
4) The last factor has not been advanced explicitly by of-
ficial French petroleum circles. It is however, of
central importance to any economic analysis of ERAP's
explorati6n program. It is based on the notion that,
as a result of its national identity, ERAP may be able
to command preferential terms from the producing
countries, either because of political or market
oriented considerations.
EXPLORATION AND THE SECURITY OF OIL SUPPLIES
The phrase "security of supplies" carries an emotive ring which is
not easy to dispel. It has often been stated that the acquisition by
- 209 -
- 210 -
ERAP of an increasing crude oil production potential would enhance the
security of France's crude oil supplies. And the statement somehow
rings true. But in what manner would France's security thereby by en-
hanced, and against what form of threat? A partial answer to this
question was recently given by Mr. Guillaumat, President of ERAP:
"If we were to depend solely upon the supplies of
American groups the security of our supplies could be en-
dangered in three ways: if our general policies were to
displease these groups or their governments; if their
policies, which are determined outside of our control,
were to displease the producing countries, most notably
Arab; finally, if our own policies were to displease the
producing countries."
"Today only the last of these hypotheses could en-
danger part of our supplies. We have therefore enlarged
the margin of our independence."1
Mr. Guillaumat thus identifies three factors which could threaten
France's oil supplies. We shall return to the first of these in a
moment, but the last two will concern us for the present. The latter
have this much in common: they both suppose a break in supplies as a
result of actions taken in, or by, the oil producing countries. Con-
ceptually, such a break in supplies can take one of four forms:
1) A total embargo on all oil exports.
2) A selective embargo - the basis of selection being the
country of destination for the oil.
3) A selective embargo - the basis of selection being not
only the country of destination for the oil, but also
the nationality of the producing company.
1P6trole Informations, November 5, 1967.
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4) An indiscriminate and localized act of sabotage.
Only in the case of the third of these possibilities would ERAP
be in a position to benefit preferentially from its status as a na-
tional oil company of decidedly French identity. In the event of a
selective embargo based on country of destination only, the presence
of ERAP would not add materially to the stability of France's oil
supplies, since the major producing companies, or group of companies
(in which CFP plays a far from negligible role) would be in a posi-
tion to supply France - assuming of course that it is not among the
list of embargoed countries. This last set of circumstances in fact
obtained in the aftermath of the June 1967 hostilities in the Middle
East.
Even in the event of a selective embargo based both on country
of destination and nationality of producing company, the advantages
derived from ERAP's presence on the production scene would have to
be temporary. It is difficult - if not impossible - to imagine a
protracted embargo of this type with France being the only country
in Europe to benefit from continued oil supplies. This may explain
ERAP's eagerness to entice other European national oil companies to
join it in exploration. Even more fundamental is that a protracted
embargo could not be sustained indefinitely by the producing countries
themselves - as has been made evident by the last two Suez crises.
There is a very severe limit to the amount of resources which the
producing nations can accumulate prior to launching a generalized
oil embargo. And any coordinated effort is likely to break down
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well before this limit is reached. In short, as between the producing
and consuming countries, it is probably the former whose economic
security is the most vulnerable; for while there are no markets to
supplant the European one, oil resources are geographically diversified
and could be developed selectively in the event of extreme and pro-
tracted crisis, particularly if petroleum buffer stocks are available
to bridge the inevitable field development lead time.
These remarks serve to underscore the more generalized proposi-
tion that with increasing specialization the only true long term
security is the one which derives from mutual economic dependence.1
More specifically, as long as the very livelihood of both the
European nations and the producing nations depends on oil, the
latter will continue to be ineffective as a political weapon. The
most obvious parallel to this situation is that provided by the
relative impotence of major-power nuclear arsenals in affecting the
course of international events. But while oil may not be a very ef-
fective political weapon under present and foreseeable conditions,
the process of its politicization need not be neutral in consequence.
Indeed, it is possible to contend that such a process would have
detrimental consequences for all parties concerned, insofar as the
Admittedly, however, the threat of a temporary, or short term,
cut in supplies as a result of acts of boycott or sabotage, can be
countered only by more active measures, such as by assuring the avail-
ability of an optimum stock supply of oil. Cf. Adelman, M. A., "Le
Charbon Pourquoi Faire?", Direction, December 1967; or "Security of
Eastern Hemisphere Fuel Supply" published in various periodicals and
summarized in Petroleum Press Service, January 1968.
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economic interests of the producing and consuming nations related to
the production and commercialization of oil, are generally more
likely to be contradictory than compatible in nature. Rather than
constrain the possibility of discord resulting from this potential
conflict of interest, the process of politicization instead
practically ensures that all forms of bi-national exchange become
affected by it. According to this argument, therefore, both Europe
and the producing countries should find it in their wider interests
to neutralize oil's political identity rather than to promote its
politicizing. We shall return to this subject in a subsequent
section devoted exclusively to the matter of consumer/producer
country relations.
For now, we return to the first form of security threat
identified by Mr. Guillaumat in the earlier quotation. The potential
danger which he thus envisages in relying solely on "American oil
groups" for France's oil supplies, was echoed more recently by Mr.
Giraud, France's Directeur des Carburants. The latter's statements
in this respect were preceded by comments of equal pertinence and
interest; and both are reproduced below:
"...One is accustomed to think that security means
being certain that one will not lack a product, to be
protected from a cut in supplies. This is a first mean-
ing of the word. It is what I call "everything or
nothing" security. A crisis which would put this kind
of security in the balance would soon be a matter of na-
tional defense."
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"W...As far as 'everything or nothing' security is
concerned, supply from (the international majors) is
certainly very satisfying. Taken globally, these dif-
ferent companies have sources of crude situated in many
places around the world. They (thus) hold a few deter-
rents in their dealings with the producing countries,
as the crisis in Iraq and Iran have shown. From this
point of view, therefore, it can be considered that this
supply source is good."
"But the word security has another meaning, which
I will call economic security; this means that a country,
an economy, is protected from the abnormal fluctuations
of the international market, for example, or even pro-
tected from pressure which can come from other political
or economic agents, to the extent that the law of market
is not in perfect practice internationally - I do not
need to enlarge on this - as far as petroleum is con-
cerned."1
Mr. Giraud is thus quite explicit in acknowledging that it is not
ERAP's function to attempt to match - let alone surpass - the measure of
supply security provided by the established major international oil
companies by virtue of the geographic diversification of their supply
sources. His secondary allusion to economic security (which is
reminiscent of the first form of security threat identified by Mr.
Guillaumat in the statement quoted earlier), however, remains somewhat
vague. Is it a security against the threat that the producing industry
may once again be hegemonized under some form of cartel arrangement,
raising the possibility that past declines in crude oil prices may be
reversed to France's detriment? Or is it a notion whose roots are
IUnpublished speech given by Mr. Giraud in July 1968 before
France's Conseil Economique et Social.
-- -- - 1 1k" -1 2-1___ __ __ - - - ,
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more political in nature (as, apparently, was Mr. Guillaumat's) -
one which derives from the fact that the overwhelming majority of
Europe's crude oil imports are produced by companies of "Anglo-Saxon"
lineage? In some respects at least, the latter case would be a con-
sistent counterpart to France's recently avowed military defense
policy consisting of pointing the country's retaliatory forces
towards "all azimuths." These questions remain unanswered; and
cannot, consequently be discarded as possible interpretations of
French policies in this field. The extent to which political notions
of the latter vein have gained currency in France was emphasized with
the recent publication of a book1 which visualizes France's relation-
ship with the oil industry in militaristic terms. Nationalism is there
described as a "fundamental reality," from which it is concluded that
"the objective towards which must aim all nations in their war against
the Companies is the economic disarmament of the international
companies." Such statements are so sweeping as to leave very little
opportunity for comment.
The alternative interpretation of Mr. Giraud's concept of economic
security - one that is based on an anticipation of future competitive
trends - does, however, raise a fundamental and relevant issue. For,
as has already been stated at the close of the preceding chapter, any
economic assessment of the advisability of conducting a national oil
exploration program, such as that espoused by France, can only be made
1Clair, Pierre, L'Indspendance Petroliere de la France, Tome I, be
Theatre de Guerre, Editions Cujas, Paris, 1968.
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with reference to future competitive trends in the producing industry.
During recent years the oil producing industry has faced an in-
creasingly competitive climate. Crude oil prices have steadily de-
clined,1 while the number of participants in the industry has in-
creased. Although this competitive trend cannot be traced solely to
the growth in importance of the so-called "independent" companies,
the latter must have had at least a catalytic effect in this direc-
tion. During the short span of six years, from 1962 to 1967, the
number of "independent companies"2 actually producing oil either in
the Middle East (excluding Turkey) or in Libya rose from 11 to 15
(the Iricon group in the Iranian Consortium and the Aminoil group in
the Neutral Zone being respectively considered as singular entities for
this purpose). Furthermore, their share of total production from these
areas rose from 7.4% to 12.2% during the same period. By any measure
there is little doubt that the forces of competition have been in-
creasingly active during the past years.
But what of the future? Because of a number of underlying struct-
ural trends in the producing industry, there is persuasive reason to
believe that competitive pressures may not only be maintained, but may
IAdelman, M. A., The World Petroleum Market, Manuscript submitted
to Resources for the Future, April 1969, Chapter VI.
2Any company other than the 8 majors being classified as "independ-
ent" in this context.
3Calculated from the Petroleum Times' Annual Production Surveys.
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further increase with time. The reasons for this projection are two-
fold:
a) In recent years, the major producing countries have succeed-
ed in gaining significant increases in their unit tax
revenues on oil. As a result, and because of a concurrent
general decline in crude oil prices, the margin between
unit tax-paid development costs and unit revenues has
shrunk considerably. Further increases in unit tax
revenues will, consequently, become more difficult to
negotiate, so that the growth in government revenue will
henceforth depend primarily - if not solely - on the
growth in production
National production rates, and the means by which to
increase these rates can thus be expected to gradually com-
mand the center of attention of the producing countries.
This trend has, in fact, already manifested itself in a
variety of fashions. Negotiations between the Iranian
Consortium and the Iranian Government concerning future
production levels have approached the point of becoming
an annual ritual. New concessions have been granted -
most notably in Libya and in the Persian Gulf - to
companies which offered either the prospect of aggressive
marketing (the American "independents") or of potentially
sheltered markets (the Japanese through the Arabian Oil
Company, ERAP, Hispanoil, India's Oil and Natural Gas
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Commission, the Pakistani Government, etc.). In addition,
the national oil companies of a number of producing
countries have negotiated off-take agreements with the
major companies with the object of breaking into hitherto
untapped East European markets. The effect of this trend
will thus clearly be to make competition between producing
countries more explicit. Whereas these countries in the
past benefitted from a communality of interest in their
attempts to extract from the oil companies a higher pro-
portion of the industry's economic rent, they will hence-
forth, in all probability, find themselves instead pitted
against each other in their attempts to stimulate their
respective production rates. As a result of these develop-
ments, and of the continued efforts of the producing
countries to increase their rates of production through
market (i.e., concessionaire) diversification, the number
of participants in the exploration and production of oil
can be expected to increase; thus creating a condition
directionally favorable to the intensification of competi-
tive pressures.
b) In this environmental climate the availability of oil at
less than the traditional tax-paid cost can be expected
to grow in importance. On the one hand, the producing
countries, in their eagerness to expand their oil produc-
tion may be tempted to grant new oil concessions on
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favorable fiscal terms. On the other hand, the national
oil companies of the producing countries have the under-
standable ambition to substantially expand their produc-
tion interests; and oil from the latter will generally be
available to them at minimal fiscal cost.
There are thus a variety of factors - both historical and prospec-
tive - pointing to an increase in competitive pressures associated with
the production and marketing of crude oil; and none to the contrary.
Under such conditions, the economic danger of possible market carteliza-
tion, to a European nation such as France, is minimal at most, whatever
is the extent of its reliance on market supplies for its crude oil
requirements.
We are consequently led to the conclusion that the margin of added
supply security provided by ERAP's presence in oil production can be re-
duced to the following:
a) In the event that the producing countries impose a coordinated
embargo on oil shipments both destined to selected countries,
and produced by companies of selected nationality, ERAP, as a
national oil company of French identity, may provide France
with a temporary continuity of oil supplies - assuming, of
course, that France does not itself figure among the boycotted
countries. ERAP's presence in oil production thus provides
France with insurance only against the threat of a temporary
dislocation of its oil supplies, and then only under a re-
latively restricted set of circumstances.
A
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b) To the extent that France believes that reliance upon
"Anglo-Saxon" companies for its crude oil supplies
either compromises or threatens its political options,
then the presence of ERAP in oil production - presum-
ably as well as that of CFP - should help to dissipate
this fear. Only under a relatively extreme set of
circumstances, however, is it possible to visualize
the form of threat which could materialize from this
direction. Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored; and
in the final analysis it remains to the French auth-
orities themselves to appreciate its importance.
PETROLEUM EXPLORATION AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
ERAP's exploration ventures have often been at least partly
justified on the basis of their potential impact on France's balance
of payments. Over time, however, this form of argument has evolved
through a phased change in emphasis.
Initially, when ERAP's exploratory efforts were concentrated
primarily in the Franc Zone, much was made of the fact that fiscal
payments for oil produced under this currency regime would direction-
ally only tend to increase the reserves in French Francs of the ex-
porting countries. Although under just about any system of account-
ing, an increase in these reserves would have a negative impact on
- 221 -
France's international payments balance,1 most commentaries on the
subject preferred to emphasize instead the fact that payments in Franc
currency would not reduce France's gross reserves in international
currency. This factor was therefore considered as favoring Franc Zone
oil. And so it did. But the reason does not derive from a mercantil-
istic belief that anything which tends to increase France's foreign
exchange assets is necessarily favorable to the country. Not is it
correct to suppose that the fact of helping to maintain the level of
France's gross foreign exchange assets necessarily adds to the
country's financial defenses against speculative attacks on the Franc.
This last illusion was apparently dispelled during the run on the
Franc of November 1968. It was reported2 that Algeria at the time
shifted part of its reserves out of French Francs; an understandable
enough action under the circumstances, but one which was far from
welcome in French circles.
1As an accounting identity, the sum total of credits and debits in
a country's balance of payments is always equal. Whether a country's
international payments transactions are in surplus or deficit is con-
sequently a matter of definition, and depends upon the transaction items
which are considered for the purpose of striking the partial balance
which measures this condition. A number of definitions have been ad-
vanced in this respect, among which the "liquidity balance" and the
"official transactions balance" are probably the most widely used. In
most, if not all, cases, however, an increase in official short term
liabilities (such as that which would be associated with the payment
in Franc currency for Franc Zone oil) is a "below the line" item, which
is not accounted for as a credit in calculating the state of a country's
balance of payments.
Cf. Kindelberger, C. P., International Economics, Fourth Edition, Richard
D. Irwin, Homewood, Illinois, 1968, Chapter 24.
2Bulletin de l'Industrie Petroliere, December 17, 1968.
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These misconceptions aside, however, the financial advantages
which France derives from the Franc Zone system arises from the fact
that it effectively allows France to borrow short-term - the amount
of such borrowings being equal to the reserves in Francs of member
countries. To the extent that these reserves are held in non, or
relatively low, interest bearing form, France essentially benefits
from preferential financing on its Franc Zone imports.
The last point may be clarified if it is recognized that under
the Franc Zone currency system, France essentially acts as interna-
tional banker to the member countries in the system. To take an
extreme example, if France's imports from any one of these countries
are paid in Francs which are deposited in their entirety with the
Banque de France, the effect is equivalent to having France receive
a loan from that country. In real terms France would have received
the value corresponding to its imports from that country, against
which it would have increased that country's Franc balances - which
represent a future claim on France's real resources. A time lag in
the exchange of real resources is thus implicit to the transaction.
The lower the rate of interest which France pays on its official
Franc liabilities, the greater will be its accompanying benefits
from this transaction - although a complete account of the balance
of interest in this respect needs also to consider the banking
services provided by France in this respect.
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As ERAP's exploratory programs have grown outside of the Franc
Zone area, however, the exposure given to the purported advantages
of this currency system has progressively declined. In its place,
the argument brought forth has been that French-controlled oil
offered the advantage of giving rise to at least partially compen-
sating exports of French goods and services; primarily in the pro-
cess of exploring, developing and producing this oil through French
companies.
".,..the economic cost of oil... is... the amount which
the economy of the buying country will disburse in order
to procure for itself each ton of crude oil. It means the
net disbursement, since there can be both disbursements and
receipts. But what is important is the difference between
the two, which represents the economic cost.
"...To buy a barrel of Libyan crude oil from an
American company established in the U.S. will not entail
any receipt for the French economy. Nothing will come
through the intermediary of the company itself and nothing
will be gained from any rise in French exports to Libya.
"...by buying (French produced) crude oil, one is
ploughing back into the French economy everything that it
is possible to bring back: the profits, the self-financing
of the companies, and even the amounts corresponding to the
supply of French equipment firms or service companies re-
lated to the operations leading to the production of this
crude oil."I
These arguments are symptomatic of the extent to which economic
bilateralism appears to be prevailing in international economic rela-
tions. The disequilibrium in international currency values which they
imply is today fairly evident. But one of the characteristics of oil
1Unpublished speech given by Mr. Giraud in July 1968 before
France's Conseil Economique et Social.
------ -
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exploration is that it is a long term commitment. The balance of
payments "returns" of an exploratory program can, therefore, only
be anticipated well out into the future; while its initial impact
in this respect is, on the contrary, to add to a country's demand
for foreign exchange. The justification of oil exploration on bal-
ance of payments considerations, therefore, has to depend on an
expectation that present conditions of international financial dis-
equilibrium will persist for some time to -come. This is perhaps
a sobering view, but one which objectively cannot be rejected un-
equivocally, depending as it does upon a judgement concerning the
future condition of international exchange markets.
This being said, however, a more forthright position can be
assumed if one were to take a universal view of French economic
policy. To the extent that the benefits of a market economy are
not at issue, then it can be suggested from this somewhat loftier
viewpoint that France would be better advised to restore balance in
its international exchanges through price adjustments, rather than
by attempting to channel the flow of its real resources in accord-
ance with a necessarily arbitrary measure of their impact on the
country's international finances. It follows from this suggestion
that the balance of payments argument in favor of ERAP's exploratory
ventures would then no longer be relevant.
To close the subject, it is interesting to note, albeit paren-
thetically, that some of the recent exploratory agreements signed
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by ERAP specifically incorporate compensating trade provisions, re-
flecting again the same spirit of economic bilaterism just mentioned.
For example, the ERAP-INOC agreement of December 1966, provided for
the sale of ERAP, acting as broker, of part of NIOC's production.
These 'optional sales'
"...are dependent upon the utilization by the
Iranian Government, according to conditions to be
defined, of the proceeds of this operation to pay
for purchase by Iran of French equipment and products
agreed upon mutually by the Iranian and French Govern-
ments and/or for the use by Iran of French services
mutually agreed between the two said governments."i
THE CONCEPT OF ASSOCIATION
In many respects France's petroleum policy has championed the con-
cept of consumer/producer country association. Describing the basic
principles of France's petroleum policy, a pamphlet published by the
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs states:
"In its negotiations with producing countries,
France attempts, through the intermediary of this
state-owned group (ERAP), to promote a policy founded
on the concept of association (which finds expres-
sion in the form of a contract of exploration and
development) whereas, traditionally the Cartel based
itself on the notion of concession and royalty." 2
The apparent play on words underlying the construction of this
statement - the unflattering connotation given to the words "concession"
and "royalty" - is a stylistic twist which gives insight into this
1Section 4, Article 31 of the Agreement, as published in Petroleum
Intelligence Weekly of January 2, 1967.
2 La Politique Petroliere Francaise, Direction des Services d'informa-
tion et de presse du Ministere des Affaires Estrangeres, Paris, 1968.
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aspect of French petroleum policy. For this policy has indeed been
revolutionary - at least in the sense of breaking with traditional
forms of oil exploration agreements - and in so doing, has found in-
spiration in the widely held sense of exploitation found in most
major oil producing countries. The form of exploratory agreement
sponsored by ERAP has thus typically responded to the expressed de-
sires of the producing countries to gain direct participation and
control over the oil producing activities located on their soil.
This responsiveness has been achieved by patterning ERAP's ex-
plorationagreements around one of two basic structural forms. The
first of these has been that of the joint association between ERAP
and the counterpart national oil company of the producing country
in question (of which the most notable examples have been the Coopera-
tive Association between ERAP and SONATRACH of Algeria, and, more
recently, the agreement with Lipetco of Libya). Here the emphasis
has been placed on the notion of partnership, between national
entities sharing common concerns and interests.
The second basic form of agreement has been that embodied in
the so-called "service contract" agreements passed between ERAP and
NIOC of Iran and INOC of Iraq. Their common feature has been that
of relegating ERAP's role to that of contractor, with the host
country retaining full title over any eventual hydrocarbon discoveries.
These broad distinguishing features among ERAP's exploratory
agreements are admittedly a matter of contractual form - but form
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can be important especially if the issues at hand are sensitive
politically and psychologically, as they are to an unusual extent
in the oil industry.
All of the above, however, does not answer the question of
what it is that ERAP has tried to accomplish through these new forms
of agreement, and what, if any, are the latter's advantages to
France. More to the point, what are the advantages which ERAP - as
a French national oil company rather than a private one - can claim
in their behalf, and hence in behalf of its entire exploration pro-
gram? Two possible answers to this question can be advanced of
which the first is primarily political, and the second primarily
economic, in nature. These will first be presented in broad outline
before being evaluated in detail.
a) The first possibility is one which has attracted a size-
able following in both French and European circles. It
relies on the premise that government to government rela-
tions can be a positive factor in helping to attenuate
the potential clashes of interest between a foreign oil
producing entity and the country in which its production
activities are located. The exploratory activities of
ERAP have thus been justified on the grounds that they
represent a vehicle through which relations between oil
consuming and producing nations can be harmonized. The
perceived advantages claimed by this line of reasoning
are by nature primarily political. Thus the argument
goes...
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"...Des Etats souverains ont beaucoup plus de
choses a mettre en commun que des enterprises, si
puissantes soient-elles. La Politique est un
facteur important de securit&. Elle joue le role
de tampon; elle aide a amortir le rude affronte-
ment du vendeur et de l'acheteur par des elements
d'associations particuliers, au plan culturel ou
d'industrialisation, par des engagements et des
raisonnements economiques a long terme."i
b) The second claim which can conceivably be made in behalf
of ERAP's exploratory ventures is more economic in nature.
It relies on the contention that as a result of its
political identity ERAP may not only contribute to the
creation of a more clement political climate, but may
also benefit tangibly from it. On the one hand, the
state-owned company may benefit whenever French foreign
and commercial policies in general evoke favorable responses
in the producing countries- as they have done in the recent
past. On the other hand, ERAP may also be able to benefit
by trading on the asset represented by the French petroleum
market itself, and the control which the French Government
can exercise on the origin of its crude supplies. As al-
ready mentioned, the major oil producing countries have
become increasingly volume conscious, so that the prospect
of being able to rely on a preferential access to the
French petroleum market must be of some consideration to
them. That this has been recognized by French policy
makers is suggested by the following statement.
1Desprairies, Pierre, op. Cit.
-~ I
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"Un enorme pays industriel consommateur d'energie
comme l'Europe, qui n'a pas lui-meme de ressources en
6nergie a bas prix - ni charbon ni p6trole - doit con-
siderer que le droit de choisir ses fournisseurs et
de les mettre en concurrence et de permettre a ses
propres producteurs de placer leurs productions, est
inalienable et imprescriptible; son marche est sa plus
grande richesse; c'est pour lui l'equivalent des
richesses du sous-sol pour un pays producteur; c'est
un bien national dont il doit rester toujours le
maitre..."i
In short, the second, economically oriented, claim
which can be made in behalf of ERAP's exploratory
activities relies on the proposition that ERAP, as a
result of its national identity, can hope to receive
preferential terms from the oil producing countries
either because of political or market oriented considera-
tions. And this brings us back to the matter of contractual
form by raising the question of whether the very novelty of
the exploration agreements sponsored by ERAP may not have
been designed in part to mask the possibility of prefer-
ential fiscal treatment - either real or anticipated,
Given the oil industry's general sensitivity to fiscal
matters, the inclination to veil such an objective would
be understandable.
These then, are brief descriptions of the two conceivable argu-
ments - outside of the security of supply and balance of payments argu-
1Ibid.
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ments already considered - which can be made in behalf of having a
European nation such as France conduct an extensive petroleum explora-
tion program. Before presenting a more detailed evaluation of their
merits, it may be well to emphasize again that the issue under con-
sideration is not whether oil exploration per se is an attractive in-
vestment opportunity, but rather whether a public exploration program,
such as that conducted by ERAP, offers particular advantages which are
either not available to, or not appreciated by, the private sector - in
other words, whether the oil producing industry is characterized by
particular externalities which can best be exploited by a European na-
tion only through publicly-sponsored national oil companies.
THE POLITICIZING OF OIL
There is little question that a general belief has prevailed in
French oil circles in the positive consequences of the elevation of
petrolaum exploration and production activities to an inter-governmental
level between producing and consuming countries; and that this belief
has played a substantial role in the formulation of French policy. The
question which shall be examined here, however, is whether such a politi-
cal development - which is already quite advanced in some cases, most
notably in Algeria - is really in the best interests of either France
or the producing countries themselves. The position which will be
This belief has gained not only in France but also elsewhere in
Europe and among the producing countries. In March 1968, the Second
International Congress on Energy devoted its proceedings exclusively
to this issue.
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argued, in this respect, is that quite the opposite is likely to be
true, particularly over time.
This contention is based on two propositions. The first is
that the economic interests of the consuming and producing countries,
with respect to oil, are basically in opposition to each other. The
export pricing of crude oil is only one example among many where in-
terest divergence between these two parties can be fundamental. In
attempting to salvage the notion of association, some observers have
pointed out that on the matter of maintaining stability in the flow
of oil, the interests of both consuming and producing nations are
congruent.1 True enough. But to attempt to hang a consistent policy
on such a slender thread, and in the face of far more severe potential
points of discord, hardly seems realistic.
The second of these propositions is that the producing industry
in the Eastern Hemisphere as a whole is entering an era during which
conflicts of interests, between the host producing countries and the
foreign oil companies active on their territories, are likely to be
both greater in number and more accentuated than in the past. One
of the reasons for this projection has already been suggested. As the
oil producing countries become increasingly volume conscious, an added
dimension will enter into their relations with the producing countries.
Cf., for example, Bye, Maurice, L'Association Cooperative Entre
Pays Producteurs et Pays Consommateurs d'Hydrocarbures., Paper delivered
at the Second Annual Congress on Energy, Rome, 1968.
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For some time to come, however, this issue will most likely primarily
affect the large traditional concessions in the Middle East, if only
because of the latter's preponderant size. A second cause for pessim-
ism on this score derives from the otherwise understandable aspira-
tions of the producing countries to participate directly in their oil
production activities. As this goal is achieved - primarily by way
of the more novel forms of association which are rapidly becoming the
standard for new exploration agreements - one consequence will be to
widen considerably the areas over which conflicts of interest can
arise. It is thus possible to trace an evolutionary process starting
from the most traditional concession system where the major - if not
sole - point of contention in the past has been over the matter of
host government tax take. From there, a second point, the matter of
relative production rates, has increasingly entered into the picture.
And with joint participation in production, the process will have gone
much further, to encompass essentially all aspects of exploration,
production and planning activities.
Because of the substantial size of the reserves discovered in the
Middle East's large traditional concessions, the last of these develop-
ments is less likely to be of direct consequence to them, even in the
event that the producing countries acquire a direct participation in
their activities. The central issue which will face the major oil
companies in the future is, instead, likely to be that of the geo-
graphic allocation of their production on a basis consistent with a
-i -
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variety of political and economic considerations. On the other hand,
the newer and smaller joint production associations will not operate
under conditions of overwhelming reserve surplus. Exploration and the
formulation of optimum field delineation and development programs will,
therefore, be of far greater concern to them. And as a result, they
will in all likelihood have to face a far wider range of internal
problems, compounded by the differences in viewpoint between the
participants in these ventures.
This has implicitly been recognized in the very texts of these
agreements of association, which often go to great lengths in order to
attempt to define prospectively certain activities or events of
potential economic significance to the parties concerned (e.g., the
definition of a discovery well, or of a commercial field).
In order to illustrate some of the problems which can arise in
this respect, we turn to an analysis of selected aspects of the explora-
tion and production agreements which ERAP has entered into in recent
years. In order to place it in context, this analysis is prefaced by
a brief description of the more relevant aspects of these agreements.
ERAP'S EXPLORATION AGREEMENTS - A SUMMARY DESCRIPTION
The service contract agreements which ERAP has entered into with
NIOC of Iran, and INOC of Iraq (both of the latter being hereafter
referred to as the national party), are characterized by the following
features:1
For the complete text of the NIOC-ERAP contract agreement, see
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, January 2, 1967; and for that of the INOC-ERAP
contract agreement, see the Middle East Economic Survey, March 22, 1968.
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- ERAP finances all exploratory expenditures. These ex-
ploratory outlays are considered as an advance by ERAP
to the national party - an advance which is repayable,
however, only in the event of commercial discovery.
- Field development expenditures are financed by ERAP to
the extent that the net cash receipts of the national
party are not sufficient to cover these outlays. In
other words, ERAP's financing obligation in this res-
pect is limited to ensuring that the net cash flow of
the venture to the national party is never negative.
The latter is, consequently assured of never having to
call on outside sources of financing.
- In return for ERAP's technical and financial services,
as well as for its assumption of the initial risks of
exploration, it is guaranteed the right to purchase a
certain proportion of the venture's eventual production
at a specified price. In the case of the agreement with
NIOC of Iran, this right extends over from 35% to 45% of
the production from each field (depending upon the latter's
distance from seaboard). The price for these guaranteed
purchases is essentially equivalent to real costs (includ-
ing the amortization of exploration and development ex-
penditures) plus a 50% income tax based on realized prices.
In the case of the agreement with INOC of Iraq, on the
other hand, ERAP's guaranteed purchase right is fixed at
30% of the venture's production. The price for these
- 235 -
purchases is a composite, consisting of: (a) counting
for 59% of the total - real costs (including the
amortization of exploration and development expendi-
tures), plus a royalty payment equal to 13.5% of the
posted price of the crude oil concerned, plus the
equivalent of a 50% income tax, based on posted price
(costs and royalty payments being expensed); and, (b)
counting for 41% of the total - real costs plus a
royalty payment equal to 13.5% of the posted price.
Thus, if R = Realized price per unit
P = Posted price per unit
C = Operating costs per unit, including the
amortization of exploration and develop-
ment capital expenditures
then, ERAP's guaranteed purchase price per unit (E), is
given by:
Under agreement with NIOC
E' = .50(R - C) + C
Under agreement with INOC
E' = .59 [.50(P - .135P - C) + .135P + C]
+ .41 [.135P + C]
- In the agreement with NIOC of Iran, ERAP's exploration and
development advances can be repaid in oil valued at realized
prices.
- In the agreement with INOC of Iraq, ERAP is committed to
provide the latter with sales assistance for quantities not
to exceed 200,000 barrels/day. This commitment can be ful-
filled either by channeling third-party sales opportunities
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to INOC, or lacking suitable opportunities of this kind,
by purchasing oil outright from INOC. The price for the
latter type of transaction, dubbed "International Market
Price" is defined as the "average realized price per
barrel really obtained by INOC or ERAP for arm's length
transactions on world markets." In the agreement with
NIOC of Iran, on the other hand, the marketing assist-
ance which ERAP is to provide - in addition to that
associated with its off-takes of oil as reimbursement
for its financial advances - consists of having ERAP
sell for the account of NIOC up to 3 million tons of
oil per annum (4 million tons after the first five
years of commercial production), these sales being
valued at realized prices (the level of which is to
be determined by a committee by reference to third
party sales from the Persian Gulf); with the further
proviso, however, that the proceeds from these sales
must be allocated to the purchase of French goods and
services.
- In both agreements ERAP is committed to set aside 50%
of the discovered recoverable reserves as "National
Reserves" whose characteristic is that they are to
remain outside of the scope of the respective agree-
ments.
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ERAP's joint venture agreements with SONATRACH of Algeria and
with Lipetco of Libya,1 are substantially different in form from the
above. In both of these, ERAP's role relative to that of the na-
tional oil company of the producing country concerned, is that of co-
associate in the development and production of oil. The major
features of these agreements are:
- In the agreement with Lipetco, the latter's participating
interest in the joint venture depends on the level of pro-
duction. A minimum interest of 25% for Lipetco is fore-
seen for production levels up to 200,000 barrels per day,
which can be increased thereafter by increments of 1% for
each additional 14,000 barrels/day of production, up to a
maximum of 50%. In the Cooperative Association in Algeria,
SONATRACH has exercised its right to take a 50% participa-
tion in the venture from the outset.
- In the agreement with Lipetco, all exploration expenditures
are borne by ERAP. In the case of commercial discovery,
however, Lipetco is to repay ERAP for its proportional share
of these expenditures. In the case of the Cooperative
Association, each party is liable for its share of explora-
tion expenditures from the outset. However, ERAP is oblig-
ated to finance up to 60% of SONATRACH's exploratory
The terms of agreement between ERAP and Lipetco were published in
the Middle East Economic Survey, August 9, 1968. The terms of the
Franco-Algerian Accord have been summarized in a number of publications.
The full text of this agreement has been published by the Imprimerie des
Journaux Officiels, Paris, 1965.
L
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liabilities, these advances being repayable in oil
eventually produced by the Association and valued at
ERAP's average realized price.
- Both Lipetco and SONATRACH are liable for their pro-
portional share of development expenditures.
- In the agreement with Lipetco, ERAP has agreed to mar-
ket all of the latter's production share, the value
given to these sales being the "weighted average price"
which is to be determined "by reference to current mar-
ket prices of petroleum of similar quality and gravity
of the Arabian Gulf or other sources sold to third
parties and generally used in the supply of European
markets." For this purpose, "special consideration
shall be given to sales by (ERAP) to third parties."
On the other hand, the Algerian Cooperative Associa-
tion anticipates the possibility that SONATRACH might
not be in a position to market its entire production
share, by providing for an internal system of settle-
ment between the two parties for overlifted oil (i.e.,
for oil lifted in excess of a party's equity share in
a given field). The overlift price, according to this
system, is to be determined by reference to ERAP's aver-
age realizations less a schedule of discounts, whose
importance increases the greater are the quantities of
crude involved.
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- ERAP's exploration advances to SONATRACH are repayable
in oil according to an established schedule. These re-
imbursements, however, are not to exceed 25% of any
field's eventual production. The oil is valued for this
purpose at ERAP's average realized price.
- Under both the Algerian and Libyan agreements, ERAP is
subject to royalty and tax payments on its proportional
share of production, these payments being based on a tax
reference, or posted, price. The tax rate in Algeria is
55%, but royalty payments are allowed as a credit against
taxes. In the agreement with Lipetco, the tax rate is
50% with no discounts or allowances being allowed off
price posting. Royalty payments, whose rate varies from
12.5% to 15% depending on the level of the venture's pro-
duction, can be expensed in calculating taxable income.
In brief, these are the more relevant aspects of the exploration
and production ventures which ERAP has embarked upon in Iran, Iraq,
Libya and Algeria. In each of these ventures, ERAP's contractual
position is seen to be distinctly different from that of the national
oil company of the corresponding producing country; and as a result
each party to these ventures will tend to face a different set of
economic parameters throughout their course. Added to this con-
tractually determined difference in viewpoint is the fact that the
fundamental economic interests of the parties concerned are direc-
tionally opposed - ERAP's interest being to minimize the cost of
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its crude oil supplies, while that of the producing countries being
to maximize their receipts from oil production. Under such conditions
the potential for discord is high. The following section describes
the more important areas which could give rise to contention in this
connection.
ERAP'S EXPLORATION AGREEMENTS - THE POTENTIAL AREAS OF DISCORD
Realized prices. Under all four of the agreements in question,
the level of ERAP's price realizations has a direct bearing on the
economics of the counterpart national oil company. The agreement with
NIOC of Iran is the most sensitive in this respect since almost all of
the financial flows between the parties in this venture are affected
by this parameter. By contrast, in the agreements with INOC of Iraq
and Lipetco of Libya, the level of ERAP's price realizations is of im-
portance to the national party only in the event that the latter calls
upon ERAP for marketing assistance. In the Cooperative Association
with SONATRACH, on the other hand, the importance of ERAP's price
realizations to Algeria is threefold: a) in the event that SONATRACH
is a net underlifter of oil, the value given to the underlifted
quantities is determined by reference to this price level (less a
schedule of discounts); b) the reimbursement of ERAP's exploratory
advances, if effected in oil, is valued at the latter's average
realizations; and, c) the foreign exchange regulations governing
the Cooperative Association require ERAP to repatriate to Algeria 50%
of its gross revenues, the latter being, of course, a function of price
realizations.
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Thus, as opposed to the more traditional fiscal framework which
obtains in the large Middle Eastern and Libyan concessions, where pro-
ducing government receipts are - at least in the short term - inde-
pendent of the price realization of the concessionaire, the agreements
entered into by ERAP introduce price realizations as a variable of
direct economic concern to the relevant host countries, The price
issue, moreover, sensitive as it is under normal conditions, has
been made even more complex - and consequently even more subject to
misunderstanding - by the regulatory framework governing the French
petroleum industry. For this framework has made available to ERAP
a captured, and characteristically high priced, market for its crude
resources - in addition to the outlets generally available to it either
through its own refineries or on the world market. Moreover, ERAP's
sales of crude oil to French refiners under the "national interest"
mantle, generally fall under the definition of third party transac-
tions - a distinguishing feature which gives them added importance in
the context of ERAP's exploratory agreements, given the fact that the
latter emphasize explicitly that third party transactions are to be
singled out for the purpose of crude valuation.
The potential for discord along this front broke to the surface
relatively early in the brief history of the Cooperative Association
in Algeria. In September 1968, the Algerian Government temporarily
interdicted the export of oil which it considered to be invoiced at
artifically low prices. This issue was eventually settled by negotia-
tion between the parties concerned, but the incident remains as an
-- NWPAPWXQAmQ" - .- 11 _- - - ., 11 ,
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example of the type of problem which is likely to arise intermittently
throughout the life of ERAP's exploration and production ventures.
Exploration and Exploratory Budgets. The most fundamental differ-
ence in viewpoint between ERAP and the oil producing countries derives
from the fact that the former's cost horizon for oil includes the pay-
ment of an economic rent margin to the producing countries, whereas
the latter's horizon is limited to real costs. It is consequently
possible - indeed likely - that these parties will genuinely differ in
their economic assessment of the discovery prospects of any given area.
This difference in viewpoint is heightened by the fact that ERAP, in
all of the agreements under review, bears alone the risks of explora-
tion (the Cooperative Association being an exception in this respect,
SONATRACH sharing the burden of these risks, but on a basis which is
less than proportional to its participation in any eventual discovery).
In partial recognition of this divergence in viewpoint, the joint
venture and service contract agreements entered into by ERAP all pro-
vide for a minimum exploratory budget. But these minimum expenditure
levels often provide no more than a negotiating starting point - as
was illustrated most pertinently when the time came to establish the
Cooperative Association's exploratory budget for 1969. At this occa-
sion Algeria pressed for an increase in the Association's exploration
effort, but ERAP countered that discovery prospects (as viewed by the
French company) did not justify any intensification of this nature.1
1Bulletin de l'Industrie Petroliere, May 8, 1969.
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A compromise was eventually worked out; but the climate of discord
engendered by this disagreement was probably less easily dispelled.
Discovery and Field Development. Differences in viewpoint
between parties associated in exploration are often most likely to
surface at the time of oil discovery. At this occasion, a decision
must be made as to whether the discovery constitutes a commercial
field worth developing; and in the event, a program for the delinea-
tion and development of the field must subsequently be established.
Two factors are of particular importance in the latter respect. The
first is the degree of intensity at which a field is to be developed
(partially reflected in the field's eventual reserve to production
ratio), while the second concerns the rate at which an agreed upon
program is to be implemented over time. Differences of viewpoint which
can be important at these decision junctures include the following:
a) The most important has already been mentioned. It is that
the producing countries generally account for the cost of
oil in real terms as opposed to the tax-paid terms which
ERAP must anticipate. As a result, the economic evalua-
tion which each party will make concerning the viability
of developing a particular discovery, and of the optimum
program for its development, may yield substantially dif-
ferent results. Strictly speaking this fiscal effect only
applies in the case of ERAP's joint association ventures,
such as those with Algeria and Libya. But even in the
case of ERAP's service contract agreements, somewhat of
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the same calculation applies - the "tax" in this case
being incorporated in ERAP's guaranteed purchase price.
In neither of these forms of agreements, however, are
taxes necessarily the sole, or even the dominant,
factor tending to distinguish between ERAP's approach
and that of the producing countries to the development
decision. Other elements which enter into this deci-
sion include the following.
b) In its service contract agreements with Iran and Iraq,
ERAP's commitment to finance field development expendi-
tures is not proportional to its guaranteed crude pur-
chase rights from the venture. This commitment is
instead calculated as the balance between the venture's
total financial requirements and the net annual cash
flow available to the national party from its sales
of oil produced under the service contract framework.
ERAP's financial obligations is thus greatest early
in the field development phase of such a venture - but
rapidly tapers off thereafter, even in the event that
new fields are discovered and developed. This implies
that the timing of a field development program can af-
fect ERAP's financial obligation. And indeed it can.
Generally speaking, the slower the pace at which a
development program is implemented, the lesser will be
ERAP's corresponding financial outlay. Whether such a
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slowdown in field development is in ERAP's economic in-
terest, however, cannot be answered in generalized
fashion. For it also implies a deferral in production -
and this negative implication must consequently be
weighed by ERAP against the positive advantage of re-
ducing its initial investment commitment. The calcula-
tion is quite complex, and quite particular to the case
in point. From the national party's viewpoint in the
venture, however, the advantage lies clearly in accel-
erating the development of a field, once a program to
this effect has been established. In this distinction
between the latter's interest and that of ERAP's lies
the potential for discord.
c) The preceding paragraph has assumed a given development
program and has analyzed the interests of the parties
in a service contract agreement relative to the pace at
which this program is implemented. But differences of
interest can also arise in the definition of the program
itself. At the extreme, for example, as the net cash
receipts of the national party grow to the point where
ERAP is no longer called upon to finance any development
expenditures, ERAP's interest is clearly in the direc-
tion of intensifying field development - since this will
tend to increase the present value of its production in-
terests. The national party, on the other hand, must
El
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weigh the increasing marginal costs of a more inten-
sive development program against the advantage of a
more rapid production rate. At the opposite extreme,
where ERAP finances all field development expenditures
(at the very start of development activity), ERAP's
economics will be dictated by the fact that its fi-
nancing commitment extends over 100% of development
expenditures, while it perceives only a fraction of
the resulting production - and at a cost which in-
cludes an implicit tax premium. Its economic interest
will therefore be in the direction of reducing the
initial intensity of field development - which is
equivalent to reducing the pace of field development,
the variable which concerned us in the preceding para-
graph - until the cash flow from the venture allows
the national party to assume a higher proportion of
development financing.
The possible economic returns to ERAP of such a
tactical decision may not be very great at the time
of first field development, since the net cash flow
to the national party will then be minimal - or more
likely zero. Under such conditions, ERAP would have
to stretch out the schedule of field development over
a large number of years in order for it to have a
perceptible effect on its financing commitment. On the
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other hand, the issue becomes far more pertinent when
considering the development of the second or subsequent
fields which might be discovered under a service con-
tract framework. For the national party would then
presumably be netting a not insignificant cash flow
from fields discovered and developed precedingly. The
financial mechanisms at play, in this respect, are
illustrated in the form of a quantitative example
presented in Appendix IV-A.
d) In the joint venture associations with SONATRACH and
Lipetco, the factors which differentiate between ERAP's
and its associates' viewpoints at the point of develop-
ment are less complex than those which arise under the
service contract framework. Apart from the different
fiscal posture of the parties in the Algerian Coopera-
tive Association, the other elements which differentiates
between their respective analyses of the economics of
field development stems from the Association's contractual
provisions concerning the reimbursement of ERAP's ex-
ploration advances. These advances are repayable in oil
upon discovery, within the limitation, however, that they
are not to exceed 25% of any field's production. Under
extreme conditions of high exploration costs - hence of
high indebtedness - the proportion of production which
ERAP can anticipate from any given discovery is,
- 248 -
consequently, 75% (50% being its equity interest in pro-
duction plus 25% in loan reimbursements), the balance of
25% reverting to SONATRACH. As against this proportion-
al return in production, the share of development and
production costs borne by ERAP is 50%. These financial
provisions thus clearly introduce a bias in ERAP's deci-
sion-making pointing towards more intensive field develop-
ment. This bias, however, in this case helps to counter-
act the opposite pull resulting from the different fiscal
posture of the associates.
In the association with Lipetco of Libya, on the other
hand, ERAP's exploration advances are seemingly reimburs-
able in cash immediately upon determination that a field
is commercially exploitable. This fact could conceivably
weigh in the parties' respective assessments of whether
a field does measure up to the criterion of commerciability,
but once the latter decision is made, its impact on the
economics of development is nil. However, a further
factor which could be of importance in the latter respect,
is the provision entitling Lipetco to increase its partici-
pation in the joint venture with increasing production.
As the production from the venture approaches the 200,000
barrels per day mark, when this Drovision becomes effective,
its impact will quite obviously be in the direction of
raising ERAP's marginal cost function for field develop-
ment and production, thus differentiating it even further
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from Lipetco's real cost function. A similar effect
is produced by the provision that makes the royalty
rate a function of production. The first break in
the cost curve due to this provision, however, only
arises at a 400,000 barrels/day production rate.
Faced with dissimilar cost parameters, the economic
interest of the two parties will generally be quite
different - thus raising again the possibility of
discord or misunderstanding.
The National Reserve Clause. In ERAP's service contract agreements
with Iran and Iraq, 50% of the recoverable reserves discovered by ERAP
are expected to be set aside, and the responsibility for their develop-
ment is then entrusted entirely to the national party. Little attention
appears to have been given, in this respect, to the fact that the
economic value of oil reserves can vary widely depending upon a number
of conditions - of which formation depth and well productivity are
generally the most important (see, for example, Figures (2) through
(4) in Chapter II, which shows the possible variation in the supply
price of a unit of oil reserves under the cost conditions prevailing
in Algeria). In the event that reserves of significantly different
economic value are discovered by ERAP under these agreements, the issue
of their allocation according to the "national reserve" clause will un-
doubtedly be a sensitive one to resolve.
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The areas which can potentially give rise to dissension, during
the course of ERAP's various exploration and production ventures, are
thus seen to be numerous in number and varied in form. The preceding,
relatively lengthy description of the possible differences in economic
interests between the parties associated in these ventures, serves as
evidence to a more general proposition, stated earlier in this chapter;
namely, that the trend in oil production will be towards continued, if
not increasing, dissension between the oil producing countries and the
oil companies operating in their territories. In support of this
proposition one can point not only to the preceding analysis of ERAP's
exploration ventures, but also to the more basic observation that all
exploratory ventures which are based on the format of association and
producing country participation are inherently more prone to carry
seeds of discord than the traditional concessionary pattern.
The joint venture form of association adopted by ERAP with Libya
and Algeria is somewhat less subject to the latter tendency, since its
basic format relies on the concept of creating equal - or symmetrical -
conditions between the parties in association. But perfect symmetry -
the one provision which can ensure against conditions conducive to
discord - requires that the national oil companies of the oil producing
countries be taxed on a basis identical to that of their foreign
partners; a requirement which apparently has not been entirely foreseen
by these countries.
By contrast with the joint venture form of association, the guiding
line behind the service contract approach is to create conditions of
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assymetry between the parties concerned - the foreign party being
identified with the role of contractor, and the producing country
with that of owner and operator. In its simplest and most basic
form, this is a valid enough formula which would appear to offer
very little opportunity for conflict. But in its service contract
ventures, ERAP's role is not as clear cut, maintaining as it does
an interest in the risks and rewards of the venture. It is thus
neither contractor nor partner in the purest sense of these terms -
and as a result of this dualistic identity, its economic reactions
are, by and large, not likely to be parellel to the interests of
the producing countries.
We are thus left with the conclusion that ERAP's exploration
ventures, far from helping to harmonize relations between France and
the producing countries, are, instead, more likely to exacerbate
them. And from this it follows that the politicizing of oil - one
of the apparent goals of French petroleum policy - will, in all like-
lihood, have consequences which are detrimental to the wider interests
of both the producing and consuming countries, by tending to widen
the scope of potential dissension from the strictly limited confines
of the petroleum industry, to the all-encompassing level of govern-
ment to government relations.
We have thus considered all except one of the various arguments
in favor of ERAP's exploration ventures, which were identified at the
start of this chapter. The next section rounds out this analysis.
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FISCAL DISCOUNTS, FOREIGN POLICY AND MONOPSONY POWER - A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF EXPLORATION AGREEMENTS
Although never stated explicitly, the most potent justification
for ERAP's exploration program, from France's viewpoint, would be if
it were to allow the country access to low cost crude. Given the
reserve surplus conditions which characterize the oil producing in-
dustry, the likelihood of such an eventuality depends not so much on
ERAP's ability to discover lower real cost oil than others, but rather
on its ability to receive preferential treatment from the oil producing
countries.
It is not hard to conceive of the possibility that the producing
countries could be induced to treat ERAP preferentially either because
of foreign policy considerations (which, by slightly stretching the
meaning of this phrase, would also include ERAP's willingness to tailor
its contractual agreements to a format which is responsive to the pro-
ducing countries' general desire to achieve a position of participation
and direct control in oil production), or, because of ERAP's ability to
trade on the monopsony power which the French Government can exert on
France's sources of crude oil supplies. The latter possibility has
gained increasing attention of late. A recent study on France's energy
policies within the context of the European Economic Community, undertaken
for the country's "Conseil Economique et Social" by Mr. Rene Fillon, in-
cludes the following statement:
"Des effets de dimension peuvent etre obtenus, au
dehors de la Communaute, par la coordination des
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politiques commerciales et le renforcement de la
position acheteur des pays membres. Cette action
serait du plus grand interet pour les contrats
d'importation de combustibles, l'obtention de
concessions de recherche, l'achat de brevets
techniques et de materiels d'equipment energetique
egalement pour la n&gociation d'exportations de
contrepartie.,"
Whether ERAP has, in fact, fared unusually well at the negotiating
table with the oil producing countries, is not an easy question to deter-
mine empirically. This is partly the case because the relatively complex
forms of exploration agreements popularized by ERAP make them difficult
to compare on a generalized basis with the more classical terms obtaining
elsewhere in the industry; but also because of the difficulty in arriving
at some meaningful measure of the discovery and cost prospects associated
with the particular geographic areas covered by these agreements.
On the latter point, it is particularly relevant to note that the
prospects for discovery associated with the areas covered by ERAP's
agreement with INOC of Iraq were considered particularly favorable by
the specialized press at the time of its signing; while in Iran, most
of the areas picked up by ERAP are off-shore, hence characterized by
higher drilling costs relative to onshore operations. Together, these
factors indicate that the Iraqis should have been able to extract from
ERAP more favorable terms than the Iranians; and in the event, this
could by no means be necessarily construed as evidence that ERAP re-
ceived preferential treatment from Iran relative to that granted by Iraq.
1Fillon, Rene, Politique Francaise de l'Energie dans le Cadre de
la Comunaute Economique Europ6enbe, Rapport presentl' au nom du Conseil
Economique et Social, Paris, 22 janvier, 1969. The emphasis that is
shown has been added.
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The comparative analysis of exploration agreements is thus compli-
cated by the fact that discovery and cost prospects between different
areas (as well as for the same area, but over time) are generally non-
homogeneous. This difficulty being acknowledged, however, the results
of such analysis can still be of interest, even if they are based on
the assumption of homogeneity, particularly if these results are sub-
sequently evaluated - if only qualitatively - against the differences
in conditions anticipated for the areas in question.
The first methodical attempt to analyze ERAP's service contract
agreements was authored by Stauffer in the form of a paper presented
at the Sixth Arab Petroleum Congress.1 His analysis focused on ERAP's
agreement with NIOC of Iran, and compared the economic returns which
the latter could anticipate from this agreement with those that it
might have been able to receive had it ceded the same territorial
area under a somewhat idealized fiscal framework, dubbed "OPEC terms"
(taxable income based on flat posted prices, i.e., not accounting for
any discounts or gravity allowances, and with 12.5% royalty subject to
expensing). The analysis was conducted for various assumed conditions
of cost and attendant production returns. Its general conclusions is
that Iran would have fared better economically from an old fashioned
concession framework incorporating the "OPEC" fiscal terms. Although
1Stauffer, T. R., The ERAP Agreement: A Study in Marginal Taxation
Pricing, paper presented to the Sixth Arab Petroleum Congress, Bagdad,
March 1967.
Cf., Also letter by Stauffer to the Middle East Economic Survey (MEES),
April 14, 1968, concerning the ERAP-INOC agreement, as well as the reply
by Saad, F. W., in MEES, May 3, 1968.
mm
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this conclusion remains valid, by and large, it is worth noting that
Stauffer's analysis contains a certain number of partially off-
setting biases. In the direction of favoring the "OPEC" terms - in
the sense of making the ERAP venture appear less rewarding to Iran -
Stauffer's analysis assumes:
a) That the eventual discovery will consist of a relatively
light crude oil for which discounts from postings tend to
be proportionately higher than for heavier crude oil
qualities. 1
b) The "National Reserve" clause in ERAP's agreements is
purposefully excluded from Stauffer's analysis. Al-
though the economic impact of this clause may not be very
large, it nonetheless imposes on ERAP a somewhat higher
exploration commitment than would otherwise be the case.
In other words, ERAP's returns from exploration - in
terms of barrels of oil discovered per unit of explora-
tion expenditures - will essentially be halved as a result
of this clause; to the corresponding advantage of the na-
tional party. That this may not have a substantial impact
on either ERAP's or Iran's returns from the venture implies
that exploration costs are expected to be relatively minimal
under prevalent conditions.
In point of fact, the discount assumed by Stauffer (18%) is rela-
tively modest, even though the level of posted price he assumes (1.70 $/
bl.) indicates a lighter quality crude. This factor, consequently tends
to bias his conclusion in the opposite direction from the one just in-
dicated.
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In opposition to the above, the following aspects of Stauffer's
analysis tend to favor the ERAP-NIOC agreement, in making it appear
more favorable to Iran than "OPEC" terms:
a) Perhaps the most important of these is that the analysis
is based on the discovery of a single field. However,
as has already been mentioned above and in Appendix IV-A,
the proportional returns to ERAP from the venture will
tend to increase (and, by the same token, those to Iran
on a comparative basis will tend to decrease) the greater
is the number of commercial fields discovered.
b) In discounting Iran's annual revenues derived from the
two forms of agreements, Stauffer adopts the same dis-
count rate. In doing so, the greater commercial risk
associated with the ERAP-NIOC agreement - as viewed by
Iran - is ignored. The latter stems from the fact that
Iran's revenues from its venture with ERAP are entirely
based on the uncertain level of realized prices on world
markets, whereas, under the OPEC framework, unit govern-
ment revenues are based on the far more stable posted
price system of taxation.
On balance, the opposing biases just listed only tend to reinforce
Stauffer's conclusions. They also emphasize, however, the extent to
which any objective comparison between the ERAP service contract form
of agreement and the more traditional "OPEC" fiscal framework, is
sensitive to the assumptions made concerning the results and conditions
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anticipated from any given venture. The following qualitative compari-
son between these two forms of agreements may help to illustrate this
point.
Exploration
financing:
Development
financing:
Schedule of
reimburse-
In both forms of agreement, the foreign party fi-
nances all exploration expenditures. 50% of the
reserves discovered under the service contract frame-
work, however, are to be set aside as "national re-
serves."
In the "OPEC" framework, all development expendi-
tures are financed by the foreign party, these ex-
penditures being eventually recuperated by way of
depreciation charges. In the service contract form
of agreement, however, only initial development ex-
penditures are borne entirely by the foreign party.
As the net cash flow to the national party from
the venture increases, the foreign party's commit-
ment to finance development expenditures tapers off
proportionately. The portion of development expendi-
tures financed by the foreign party are consolidated
in the form of an interest bearing loan repayable by
the national party over five years.
Exploration and development outlays borne by the
foreign party under the service contract framework
are subject to a more rapid reimbursement schedule
than that provided by the depreciation norms generally
- ---- - -- -4~4
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prevailing in the large traditional concessions.
Moreover, the development component of these
outlays carry an interest charge.
Production Under the "OPEC" framework, all of the produc-
and Taxes:
tion resulting from field development reverts to
the foreign party. The latter is liable to a 50%
tax based on posted price plus a 12.5% royalty
which can be expensed. Under the service contract
form of agreement, the proportion of production
reverting to the foreign party - in the form of
guaranteed purchase rights - ranges from 30% to
45%. The "tax" component included in the guaranteed
purchase price is, however, significantly lower than
the OPEC standard, being either a 50% tax based on
realized prices (as in the agreement with NIOC of
Iran), or a composite of a 50% tax based on post-
ings and of a flat royalty charge of 13.5% of the
posted price (in the agreement with INOC).
The gross cash receipts to the national party from a service contract
venture will thus generally derive partly from sales of oil on the open
market and partly from those to ERAP at the guaranteed purchase price. A
comparative analysis, presented in Appendix IV-B, shows that these gross
receipts - at the limit when all capitalized expenditures have been either
repaid or fully amortized - will generally be higher than the equivalent
government tax take under the OPEC fiscal framework, given prevalent price
- I -
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conditions. Price discounts of well over 30% off postings have to be-
come the rule for realized prices before this conclusion is reversed.
Offsetting this longer term advantage, however, is the fact that
the financing for field development expenditures under the service con-
tract framework must either be supported by the producing countries them-
selves, or, when they are supported by ERAP, are subject to repayment
conditions which are more onerous than the concessionary norm. Develop-
ment expenditures incurred by a concessionaire under the "OPEC" frame-
work are generally capitalized and depreciated over periods extending
over ten to fifteen years. The effect of these depreciation charges is
to reduce government income by 50% of their absolute magnitude. On
the other hand, under the ERAP terms, these expenditures have to be
reimbursed by the national party over a five year period and are sub-
ject to an interest charge as well. Moreover, since they are considered
as a loan repayment rather than a depreciation charge on income, their
negative impact on government cash flow is very close to 100% (the im-
pact of development expenditures, when financed by ERAP, is somewhat
less than 100% of the loan reimbursements because a depreciation com-
ponent is allowed in the calculation of ERAP's guaranteed price - based
on a 10 year depreciation period and allocated pro-rata to total pro-
duction).
Schematically, it is possible to portray the evolution over time
of the national party's net cash receipts under the two sets of agree-
ments as follows:
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"ERAP" terms
4-4- - - - -
>
0/
4 "OPEC" terms
S C
Years from start of
commercial production
During at least the first five years of commercial production, the
net cash receipts of the national party are below those under "OPEC"
terms, reflecting the reimbursement of ERAP's development advances. Sub-
sequently, the level of these receipts increase significantly, and will
generally cross the "OPEC" line, depending upon the level of open mar-
ket prices. Directionally, therefore, whether one or the other set of
terms is more favorable than the other depends upon various considera-
tions, of which the following are the more important:
a) The lower the rate at which the national party discounts-
future earnings, the less favorable will the "OPEC" frame-
work appear to it, relative to the service contract al-
ternative.
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b) The higher are the unit costs of development the less
favorable from the national party's viewpoint is the
service contract framework, since this would only tend
to emphasize the initial disparity in its cash receipts
compared to the level attainable under an "OPEC" frame-
work.
c) The lower the level of realized prices relative to price
postings, the less favorable is the service contract al-
ternative to the national party; the quality of the crude
oil discovered being a factor in this respect.
d) The larger the number of fields discovered by any one
venture, the less favorable is the service contract frame-
work to the national party. The above graphic illustra-
tion implicitly assumed a single field venture. In the
event of a 2 field venture, the national party's cash re-
ceipts can schematically be represented as follows:
"ERAP" terms
C" terms
0 P~
WI a
Z 0time
-- fields 1 & 2
field 1
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The above qualitative analysis of the comparative advantages of
the two forms of agreements illustrates the critical extent to which
the process of choice between one or the other of these agreements de-
pends upon the parameters assumed for the purpose. However, Stauffer's
analysis of the ERAP-INOC agreement, referred to above, especially
when considered against its inherently conservative biases - indicates
quite clearly, that for the normal range of external parameters which
can be anticipated, the service contract framework popularized by ERAP
is indeed a more favorable alternative to the foreign contractor than
the "OPEC" framework considered as reference standard.
It does not thereby necessarily follow, however, that ERAP's ser-
vice contract agreements can be pointed to as evidence of its ability
to negotiate preferential terms from the producing countries: for it
has not been demonstrated that the cost and return prospects of ERAP's
ventures in Iran and Iraq could have attracted "OPEC" fiscal terms or
better. In the absence of competitive bidding for the self-same areas
covered by the ERAP agreements, it is practically impossible to resolve
this issue objectively and irrefutably. The matter must remain judge-
mental in nature. With this proviso, however, and given the degree of
interest and success which has characterized exploration in the Persian
Gulf, as well as the particularly favorable apparent geological condi-
tions which exist in Iraq (although admittedly the political condi-
tions in that country may induce such sizeable discounting as to counter-
act the latter), the weight of evidence appears to indicate that ERAP
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has indeed been able to capitalize on its identity, as well as on its
willingness to respond to the more politically oriented objectives of
the producing countries. If successful, ERAP will thus in all like-
lihood have secured a potential oil producing capability in the Middle
East on preferential terms. Whether these ventures will necessarily
represent remunerative investment outlets for France is another ques-
tion; but they do at least offer the possibility that, through them,
ERAP may eventually have access to oil resources which are competitive
with the tax-paid costs of the large traditional concessionaires in the
Middle East. This is especially true in as much as the latter are ex-
pected to face the "OPEC" fiscal framework - used as reference both by
Stauffer and in the above analysis - by 1975 at the latest, when all
discounts and gravity allowances are due to be eliminated from their
system of tax accounting. This has been ensured by the settlement
negotiated between these companies and the major Middle Eastern pro-
ducing countries in January 1968.1
To this point the emphasis has been placed on ERAP's service con-
tract agreements in the Middle East. The French company's ventures
in Libya and Algeria, however, are of no less importance. But they
are more difficult to categorize. For, although they are simpler to
analyze from a strictly fiscal viewpoint, the results of such analysis
are less susceptible to interpretation.
Cf. Petroleum Press Service, February, 1968, p. 44.
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The fiscal terms of the ERAP-Lipetco agreement are clearly (al-
though not substantially) more favorable to Libya than the "OPEC"
terms used above as a standard of comparison. ERAP is subject in
this venture to taxation based on the full posted price, while the
royalty rate, although initially set at the 12.5% level incorporated
in the "OPEC" terms, is subject to a step-wise increase to 15%, as
the production from the venture increases beyond 400,000 barrels/day.
More importantly, Lipetco is given an option to participate in the
venture at historical book-value cost, the extent of this participa-
tion ranging from 25% to 50%, again depending upon production levels.
Lipetco is thus assured of the opportunity to participate in the
venture's eventual production without having to run the risks of ex-
ploration. If the latter are not perceived to be high by ERAP, then
obviously the importance of this provision is reduced in consequence.
But in any event, it is clear that ERAP has offered Libya some-
what more than the standard "OPEC" fiscal package. Whether this con-
tradicts the hypothesis that ERAP has been aiming for preferential
terms in its exploration agreements, however, is less clear, since
Libya has, in recent years, been able to demand and receive more
than the "OPEC" package.1 This may reflect particular bullishness on
the part of oil companies concerning the cost prospects of finding and
1Cf. The Middle East Economic Survey, May 9, 1969, p. 4, for
a summary of the terms of the latest joint venture accords signed by
Lipetco.
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developing oil in the country, or it may reflect the belief that Libya's
posted price level is undervalued compared to Middle Eastern levels in
light of future demand conditions for higher quality crudes and for
those in the tanker market. Whether this bullishness will be justified
is another matter.
The Cooperative Association (ASCOP) in Algeria provides us with the
very opposite set of conditions. The fiscal terms which face ERAP in
this association are, in fact, significantly more lenient than the
"OPEC" standard. Although the ASCOP tax rate is somewhat higher (55%
rather than 50%); more than offsetting this factor are the facts that
royalty payments are admitted as a credit against income taxes, and
that the tax reference price faced by ERAP in Algeria is significantly
lower than the equivalent Libyan level (2.08 $/barrel versus 2.21 $/
barrel, to take the two most important data points), even though Algeria
could claim a slight quality and transportation advantage over Libya.
But cost differences are far different between the two countries, as
was indicated summarily on page 95 , of Chapter II. Whether the com-
bination of higher real cost and a more lenient fiscal package implies
that tax-paid costs in Algeria are higher or lower than elsewhere re-
mains a key question.
The question is difficult to answer, depending as it does upon an
assessment of future discovery prospects. Two events during the past
months provide contradictory - and also questionable-evidence in this
connection:
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a) In October 1968, the Getty Oil Company agreed to enter
into an agreement with SONATRACH under conditions which
are more onerous than those imposed on ERAP under the
ASCOP framework. This would seem to indicate that, at
least as far as Getty is concerned, prospects in Algeria
warrant the payment of a higher economic rent to the
government. A rejoinder to this argument is possible,
and was in fact immediately seized upon by ERAP.1 It
relies on the fact that prior to its latest agreement,
Getty's production interests in Algeria were under govern-
ment control and subject to 100% foreign exchange re-
patriation. Getty's motives in agreeing to the terms
of its new venture with SONATRACH may therefore have
been directed primarily at salvaging part of its exist-
ing interests in the country. By contrast to Getty's
action in this respect, it is reported that Sinclair
(now Atlantic-Richfield) has steadfastly refused to
accept similar terms even under the threat of confis-
cation of its existing interests in the country.
b) When SONATRACH and ERAP came to determine the level of
ASCOP's exploration budget for 1969, the French company
refused to consider an intensification of the venture's
exploration effort. This may indicate a pessimistic
ERAP, Bulletin Mensuel d'Informations, November, 1968.
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outlook concerning future discovery prospects in the
country. An alternative interpretation, however, is
that it may have been a tactical ploy on the part of
the French company in anticipation of the renegotiation
of the major fiscal provisions governing the Cooperative
Association, due in mid to late 1969.
The evidence is thus partial and inconclusive, not only for ERAP's
venture in Libya, but also for the one in Algeria.
But the normative fact still remains that of all the arguments
which can be made in favor of ERAP's exploration program, the most
potent by far is that it may allow France access to low cost oil, to
the extent that preferential terms can be secured from the oil producing
countries. Our preceding analysis indicates that ERAP may have been at
least partially successful in this respect through its service contract
agreements in the Middle East. On the other hand if this goal is ex-
cluded from French strategic thinking, then there remains little to
justify ERAP's exploration program:
- the sole arguments which would remain in its favor are the
rather extreme and nebulous ones founded on the notions of
security of supply and political independence.
- Against these weigh the potential cost of this program -
especially in view of the likelihood that crude oil prices
will continue to decline - and the fact that ERAP's explora-
tion ventures are more likely to exacerbate rather than help
to harmonize relations between France and the producing
countries.
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Indeed, even the argument that ERAP's exploration program is
justifiable on the basis that it may allow France access to low
"tax-paid" cost oil is subject to question. For it is not chimerical
to foresee the possibility that the producing countries will, in time,
gain control over an increasing portion of their oil production, and
that they may consequently eventually become large sellers of crude
oil on world markets. The projection of such conditions then raises
the question of whether the most remunerative access to low cost and
reliable oil supplies may not lie in a judicially balanced purchasing
program--associated with the promotion of competition and structural
diversity in a country's refining sector--rather than in a widespread
exploration program; in other words, whether ERAP would not be better
advised to become a "first class purchaser rather than a second rate
producer," to use a phrase coined by Dr. Paul Frankel. This question
becomes all the more pertinent when it is also considered that the
conditions of preference which ERAP may be able to negotiate from the
producing countries are not immutable. Sooner or later attempts to
redress such conditions are bound to arise. A policy based on preferen-
tial treatment will thus in due time tend to act as an irritant--if not
an outright barrier--to political harmony between the parties involved.
The relative advantages of open market purchases over the explora-
tion and production alternative are especially important when it is
further considered that the former would eliminate one of the strongest
incentives in favor of protectionism. Chapter III has demonstrated how
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France has paid handsomely for its present protectionist policies in
the petroleum sector. The temptation to maintain this policy will be
all the greater the more will ERAP discover oil of relatively high
economic cost. And the high prices attainable on the French market as
a result of these policies will incite ERAP to further exploratory
efforts. The tendency will thus clearly be to perpetuate a circular
relationship between cause and effect.
APPENDIX IV-A
THE MULTIPLE-FIELD EFFECT IN ERAP'S SERVICE CONTRACT AGREEMENTS
Assume that after having discovered and developed its first field
to an initial production rate of 100,000 bls/day, a service contract
type of association then makes a second commercial discovery, also
estimated to be capable of producing 100,000 bls/day upon development
(ignoring for our purposes the national reserve clause). In order to
attain this production rate, further assume that a total investment of
$100 million is required in wells, production equipment, pipeline and
loading facilities. Finally, our last assumption is that the national
party to the venture nets an annual cash flow of $20 million from the
first field.
Given these assumed parameters, ERAP's financing commitment for
the development of the second field can be reduced by $20 million if
the schedule for the latter's development to the initial target production
rate is stretched out by a year (say from one to two years). Since ERAP's
development advances under the service contract form of agreement are
generally repayable over five years, an interest of about 6% being
assessed on the unpaid balance, the net savings associated with the
reduction of ERAP's financing commitment would equal $20 million multi-
plied by the difference between ERAP's opportunity cost of capital and
6% over five years. Offsetting this saving would be the one year
deferral in production from the second field. If we assume that the
income which ERAP can net from the latter is 40, per barrel, the total
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income deferred would be of the order of $4 million. And the opportunity
cost associated with this deferral would be the latter sum multiplied by
ERAP's opportunity cost of capital. If 10% per annum is accepted as a
reasonable approximation of the latter figure, we have:
Savings due to deferral 6
of development program (10% - 6%) x 5 x 20 x 10 = 4,000,000
Cost associated with
deferral of develop- 6
ment program (10%) x 4 x 10 = 400,000
Net Savings 3,600,000
These numbers are obviously only meant to be illustrative of the
possible incentive mechanism which could come into play, as well as
to give a general appreciation of the order of magnitude of the sums
involved.
APPENDIX IV-B
REALIZED PRICES AND ERAP'S SERVICE CONTRACT AGREEMENTS
In this appendix, the limiting conditions for the level of realized
prices--at which unit revenues to the national party in ERAP's service
contract agreements equal those perceived under an "OPEC" fiscal
framework--will be derived. This limiting condition only applies after
all capitalized exploration and development expenditures have been fully
amortised--i.e., we ignore for the purposes of this appendix differences
in revenue arising from differences in the way in which these agreements
provide for the financing and reimbursement of capital expenditures.
Let R = the level of realized prices
P = the level of posted prices
and D = Direct operating costs per unit of production.
Then the limiting unit government revenue under "OPEC" terms, G ,
is given by
G = .50 (P - .125P - D) + .125 P
On the other hand, the limiting revenue to the national party under
the terms of the ERAP-NIOC agreement, G ', is given by:
G ' = sales on open market + guaranteed sales to
ERAP - direct operating costs
= .65 (R - D) + .35 x .50 (R - D) assuming
that the guaranteed sales to ERAP represent
35% of the total
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Thus for G = G0 e
R = .68P + .42(D)
Similarly, the limiting revenue to the national party under the
terms of the ERAP-INOC agreement, G ", is given by
e
G = .70 (P - D) + .30[.59(.50 (P - .135P - D) + .135P)
+ 41 (.135P)]
Thus, for G = G "
0 e
R = .65P + .40(D)
CHAPTER V
SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER V
SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS
We are now in a position to pull together the various strands of
the preceding analysis. It may be recalled that in the opening chapter
of this study (cf., page 78 ), the major questions which confront any
European petroleum policy-maker were identified summarily as a combination
of primary and secondary decision points. The preceding analysis of
French petroleum policies and of their economic consequences has sug-
gested certain answers to these questions.
* Should a country such as France promote and finance
petroleum exploration at the government level?
Chapter IV was devoted entirely to the question of evaluating the
merits of government-sponsored exploration by national oil companies of
European origin. The justification for such exploration programs was
shown to depend primarily on economic considerations; the political or
security-related dividends which can be anticipated from such ventures
being minimal at best (cf., Chapter IV, "Exploration and the Security
of Oil Supplies," p. 209 , and "The Politicizing of Oil," p- 230)-
It was argued, in fact, that these dividends can actually turn out to
be negative, insofar as the novel forms of exploration agreements popu-
larized by ERAP are more likely to give rise to friction between the
parties involved than the more traditional forms of concession agreements.
If significant economic returns from exploration are to be achieved,
it was further suggested that these returns must depend, ex ante, on the
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ability of a European national oil company to secure preferential terms
from the producing countries. This is the case since the probability
that exploration will uncover lower cost oil--in real terms--than that
which characterizes existing reserves in the Middle East, is at best low.
Even an exploration program which is based on the objective of
securing preferential terms from the producing countries (in exchange
for either political or market oriented considerations) was shown to be
subject to critical question at the close of Chapter IV (cf., p. 268).
The most important of these questions are:
(a) Conditions of preference are generally open targets for
future action by host producing countries. Sooner or
later such conditions are bound to incite attempts at
redress. Preferential treatment will thus tend to act
as an irritant--if not an outright barrier--to political
harmony between the consuming and producing countries
involved; while the economic advantages which can be
derived from an initially preferential exploration agree-
ment are likely to be of only short-term duration.
(b) Furthermore, even the short-term economic gains which
may be anticipated by a national oil company of European
origin under a preferential regime may prove illusory.
For by the time a discovery is made and developed under
such an agreement, arms-length crude oil prices may have
declined to the point of reducing the latter's attractiveness.
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The inherent cost conditions of the international oil
producing industry today imply conditions of price
disequilibrium--the overwhelming pressures being
towards price reduction. A structural element has been
added to this fundamental condition--the entry, as
commercial sellers, of the national oil companies of
the producing countries, which generally have access
to oil at minimal fiscal cost, and which therefore
benefit from the most preferential of fiscal regimes
(cf., Chapter IV, p. 216 , for a discussion on the
competitive climate characterizing the crude oil
producing industry).
Exploration for oil by European national entities, even if it is
undertaken under initial conditions of preference, is consequently not
easy to justify either on economic or political grounds. For a European
country, an alternative route to low cost oil supplies may lie in the
establishment of a balanced purchasing program--associated with the
promotion of competition and structural diversity within its petroleum
sector. The most obvious step in the latter direction is the encourage-
ment of entry by newcomers into each country's respective refining and
distribution sectors.
9 Should a European country create a state-owned refining
and distribution entity to serve the local market?
- 277 -
Independently of whether a country embarks upon an extensive
exploration program, it may decide to promote an indigeneous presence
in its refining and distribution sectors. The argument in favor of
doing so depends on the perceived threat of market domination posed by
the major international oil companies. But whatever the merits of this
argument, it was demonstrated in Chapter III (cf., in particular,
"Forward Integration and the National Interest," p.200 ) that the most
inefficient and counter-productive method by which this objective can
be achieved is to isolate the local market behind protective import
barriers--as has been the case in France.
Protectionist policies will invariably tend to benefit the companies
already entrenched in the industry, and to promote the very conditions
of market dominance which they were intended to dissipate. The French
example is instructive. The protectionist measures erected by that
country's authorities around its petroleum industry--designed apparently
to assist the growth of ERAP's downstream activities as well as to
provide a clement atmosphere for the commercialization of the latter's
surplus crude oil production--was shown in Chapter III to have primarily
benefited the established companies in the country's local petroleum
market. This benefit was estimated to be running at the rate of well
over $100 million per year (cf., "An Approximate and Partial Measure of
the Cost of Protectionism," p.167 ).
If assistance to indigeneous oil companies is considered vital,
then it is best supplied in the form of direct subsidies, while allowing
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complete freedom in the marketplace. This last option at least has the
virtue of focusing government assistance solely to the benefit of the
intended party, and perhaps even more importantly, of providing a
reasonably accurate and visible measure of the true cost to the nation
of such assistance.
* In the event of discovery of sizeable crude oil
resources, how should these be commercialized?
Should the country invoke the national interest
and insist that private refining companies purchase
at least part of the nationally produced oil? Or
should the national oil company integrate forward,
or, alternatively sell its crude on the world
market? At what price level should the national
oil company transfer or sell its crude oil to the
country's local refining industry?
The first three chapters of this study were essentially concerned
with the problems related to the commercialization of national oil
resources. The case study provided by French experience in the matter
is meaningful, not only in itself, but also in a wider European context,
since it is illustrative of the commercial problems which would face any
European nation in the event of oil discovery by national entitites.
The imperfectly competitive nature of the international petroleum
industry, implies that in the event that a European country does enter
into oil exploration and discovers significant oil reserves, the chosen
strategy by which this oil is eventually commercialized can have important
economic ramifications. The basic quandry in this respect derives from
the likelihood that the discovery's potential production will be far in
excess of the market outlets directly controlled by the European oil
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company in question. Transaction prices for crude oil today still reflect
to a substantial extent artificial transfer conditions between the oil
producing and oil refining subsidiaries of major integrated oil companies.
A European nation with overseas oil resources will therefore be faced
with the very real and understandable temptation to impose the purchase
of its surplus oil production on the companies operating in its refining
sector--and to do so at equally artificial prices. As described in
Chapter I (cf., "Franc Oil and the National Interest," p. 38 ), this has
in fact been the French response to its discoveries in the Sahara.
An artificial price premium for nationally produced crude oil in
itself only represents a transfer payment and not an economic cost at
the aggregate level. But as the preceding analysis of French experience
has shown, such a premium can have undesirable economic consequences.
First, it provides an artificial and potentially misleading price incen-
tive which can lead to a misdirection of investment either in exploration
or in field development. The selective economic analysis of Algeria's
oil industry, presented in Chapter II, provides evidence to the effect
that certain small and marginal fields may have been developed in that
country only because of the relatively high crude oil price made available
to ERAP on the French market (cf., "Analysis of CREPS' Economic Supply
Price by Field," p.115 ). Second, if a high price for nationally produced
crude oil is imposed, then a corresponding degree of local market protec-
tion must be provided. The restraints on competition which this implies
can have substantial cost consequences, especially if most of the
companies participating in a country's refining sector are of foreign
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origin. The costs which French energy consumers have had to bear in
this respect have been shown to total well over $100 million per year
in Chapter III (pp. 171 to 196).
The French experience thus provides strong argument against the
imposition of "national interest" purchase obligations on a country's
refining sector--especially if these obligations become cause for
import protectionism. If oil resources are discovered by a national
entity of European origin, they should rationally be used to lower the
price of the country's oil supplies, rather than to increase its import
price structure, as has been the case in France.
The conclusions just stated are pertinent on a European-wide level.
It is still too early to draw a complete balance sheet of the strictly
national costs and benefits associated with French petroleum policies
and achievements. The returns which ERAP can anticipate from its
extensive exploration program in the Middle East and in Africa are
speculative in nature, and will only manifest themselves well out into
the future.
However, the particular costs associated with these policies can be
partially accounted for at this point; and the more important of these
are identified, and where possible quantified, in the following table.
Also shown are the sources of finance--or transfer payments--which have
been made available to ERAP outside of normal commercial or financial'
channels. The unusual return opportunities available on the French
market as a result of the country's protectionist policies effectively
represent an indirect source of subsidy which benefits all of the
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TABLE V-1
THE COSTS AND TRANSFER PAYMENTS
ASSOCIATED WITH FRENCH PETROLEUM POLICIES
Direct Costs Transfer Payments
Higher return opportunities
available to the international
oil companies on the French
petroleum market, relative to
conditions prevailing in other
major European countries. These
returns are manifested in two ways:
(a) Higher import prices for
crude oil transferred
between the common sub-
sidiaries of integrated
oil companies. This cost
has been estimated in
Chapter III at over $100
million in 1966.
(b) Higher profitability of the
international companies on
the French market, in spite
of higher crude oil trans-
fer prices. This cost has
not been quantified, but
its presence has been estab-
lished in Chapter III.
Misallocation of investment
resources either in field
development or in exploration.
Chapter II has shown that this
effect has probably been
operative in affecting CREPS'
(an ERAP subsidiary) field
development program in Algeria.
The cost in this respect,
however, has not been quantified.
Government contributions to
Elf/ERAP's capital investment
budget. These funds are raised
by a direct tax on certain
petroleum products (the "Fonds
de Soutien aux Hydrocarbures").
Contributions of this nature
totalled 353 million Francs
(about $73 million) in 1966.
The price premium paid to ERAP
for the Franc Zone oil purchases
which are imposed on French
refining companies. This premium
was estimated in Chapter III to
have been of the order of $40
million in 1966.
Higher profit returns available
to French companies (as opposed
to those of international affilia-
tion) in refining and distribution,
and made possible as a result of
the country's protectionist import
policies as well as of the limita-
tions which are imposed on entry
into the French petroleum sector.
WIN"Mm
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country's refining and distribution companies. But whereas these
opportunities can only be considered to be a transfer of resources at
the aggregate level in connection with companies of strictly French
origin, they represent a source of direct cost when the beneficiary is
of foreign origin.
The investment of the ERAP Group in petroleum exploration and in
field development and transportation, is reported in that company's
annual reports. The latest figures available run through the end of
1967 and are reproduced in Table V-2.
TABLE V-2
ERAP'S GROSS CUMULATIVE INVESTMENT IN PETROLEUM
EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSPORTATION
THROUGH 1967
Millions of
Francs Dollars
Exploration 2444 489
Development, Production
and Transportation 1097 219
TOTAL 3541 708
Source: Elf/ERAP, Rapport de Gestion, 1967.
These are cumulative and gross investment figures, only a small
fraction of which may conceivably have been misspent (in the sense that
their anticipated economic returns are less than those of alternative
WONOW
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opportunities) in response to the artificial incentives created by
*
French regulations. Investment in exploration has probably been the
most susceptible to misguided effort of this nature. The limited
information available on exploration activities, and the inherent
uncertainties associated with these activities, however, only allow for
judgements based on hindsight. It is consequently difficult to establish
objectively whether, and to what extent, ERAP's investment decisions in
exploration have in fact been affected by the sheltered crude oil
outlet available to it on the French market. On the other hand, there
is good cause to believe that ERAP's investments in field development
have, in certain cases, been misallocated in this fashion. The evidence
to this effect was presented in Chapter II ("Analysis of CREPS' Economic
Supply Price by Field," p. 115), although the costs related to this
behavioral tendency were not correspondingly determined.
Even though the precise amount of resources which may have been
misspent by ERAP, either in exploration or development, has not previously
been estimated, the figures shown in Table V-2 imply that the correspond-
ing national costs must, in any event, have been far smaller than those
associated with the country's protectionist policies. This is made
evident by the fact that only a small fraction of ERAP's gross cumulative
investment of 708 million dollars in exploration, development and trans-
portation combined, could conceivably have been committed in response to
*
Investments in refining, distribution, and petrochemicals, reported in
ERAP's Annual Report to total 762 million Francs, have not been included
in the above list on the assumption that these will be commercially
remunerative.
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the artificial incentives provided by French regulations, whereas the
costs associated with the country's protectionist policies have been
estimated, in Chapter III (pp. 171 to 196), to be running at the rate
of substantially more than $100 million per year. Note that the first
of these figures represents a cumulative total over a number of years,
whereas the other is an annual rate. Moreover, the costs associated
with an inefficient investment decision are given not by the amount of
resources thereby committed, but by the difference in return opportuni-
ties associated with this investment--which is a far smaller figure.
However, this comparison does not, in itself, absolve the French
program of exploration and development, for without it, the need for
protectionism would not have appeared so persuasive, and France might
instead have opted for a more liberal energy policy.
The cost record is thus reasonably clear. No attempt has been
made to contrast these costs against the potential benefits of French
petroleum policies. For these benefits have still to manifest them-
selves, and will depend almost exclusively on the successes which are
scored by ERAP's exploration program.
The analysis of ERAP's service contract agreements with NIOC of
Iran and with INOC of Iraq, presented in Chapter IV ("Fiscal Discounts,
Foreign Policy and Monopsony Power - A Comparative Analysis of Explora-
tion Agreements," p. 252), indicates that the terms of these agreements
are more favorable to ERAP than the more widely prevailing "OPEC" fiscal
conditions. To this extent, ERAP has apparently been successful in
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capitalizing on its national identity--as well as on its willingness
to respond to the more politically oriented objectives of the producing
countries--by negotiating preferential economic conditions for its
exploration program. This conclusion is tempered, however, by the fact
that ERAP's agreements with Libya and Algeria do not appear as clearly
preferential in nature as ERAP's Middle Eastern ventures.
The fact that ERAP's service contract agreements with Iran and Iraq
are more favorable to the French oil company than the "OPEC" fiscal
standard does not, however, imply that these agreements will necessarily
represent remunerative investment outlets for France. They offer only
the possibility that, through them, ERAP may eventually have access to
oil resources which are competitive with the tax-paid costs of the
large traditional concessionaires in the Middle East.
Only if ERAP discovers large and prolific oil reserves in Iran
or Iraq, if it is able to hold out against revision of its service
contact agreements with NIOC and INOC, and if crude oil prices do not
deteriorate substantially from today's levels; only in the event that
all three of these conditions do materialize will it be possible to
attribute a significant economic achievement to French petroleum
policies. As against this uncertain benefit, the protectionist facet
of these policies has cost the country a relatively heavy toll, which
in all likelihood will increase with time, while offering little, if
anything, to show in directly related returns.
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